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In this dissertation, I investigate the relationship between human rights participation and political 
subjectivity in Ghana. Specifically, I address two primary questions: 1) does participation in 
human rights-based activities have an impact on individual beliefs about democracy and the state? 
And, 2) if so, how do these altered beliefs manifest themselves in behavioral changes, including the 
way that individuals advance claims, settle disputes, and talk about the responsibilities of the state? 
To answer these questions, I conducted 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork in two low-income 
communities in Accra, Ghana. I argue that participating in human rights activities has had a long-
lasting impact on the way that activists settle disputes, the frequency with which they contact 
government officials, and the way that they speak about corruption and the responsibilities of the 
state. Although many scholars have argued that the human rights system may be depoliticizing as it 
universalizes participants and contains their resistance within controllable state channels, I argue for a 
nuanced understanding of how social and historical contexts may affect the way that citizens 
encounter human rights and take on rights-bearing subjectivities. In the communities in which I 
worked, legacies of colonial urban planning and social exclusion have combined to produce a post-
colonial environment where residents continue to feel excluded from the governmental processes 
that regulate their lives. Therefore, for activists living within these communities, even representing 
oneself in front of the government as an acceptable political subject may feel like a radical act and 
may have the potential to challenge existing power inequities and alter subjectivity in a way that it 
may not in other contexts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Some City over There” 
 
The first seeds for this project were planted back in 2008, before I began the PhD program at the 
University of Connecticut. I was working in Accra as an intern with the Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC), a Ghanaian legal aid and human rights NGO. One day, as I was talking with a 
community organizer from the LRC, I asked him whether he thought the presence of the 
organization in Nima and Maamobi, two of Accra’s poorest communities, had made an impact 
on residents. The community organizer had grown up in the area and had therefore seen how it 
had changed over the years. He responded by telling me a story about how people had behaved 
before the LRC began its programming. In the 1990s, a portion of a concrete drain had been 
constructed from the center of Nima and Maamobi northward to the Paloma Hotel. This drain 
had replaced part of the deteriorating gutter that divided the neighborhoods. A large portion 
remained, however, and since then had become the center rallying point for much of the human 
rights activism in the community. After telling me about this, the community organizer stated:  
When the other part of the drain was built, people did not ask questions. Many people do 
not think about human rights. They do not think about development. They just live. Then 
they begin to realize. Then there are strange and specific questions that are presented to 
lawyers. They are very interesting questions. They begin to realize that as citizens, they 
are supposed to be part and parcel of the government. Government is not some city over 
there anymore. Now they say “Oh! So it is our right! They are not being good. That is 
what they are supposed to be doing.1 
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After I left Ghana that summer, the phrase, “government is not some city over there 
anymore,” remained with me. In his response, the community organizer is either stating that he 
hopes that human rights education has changed the perspective of community residents or that he 
believes it has already done so. From his perspective, residents, who before felt very distant from 
the operations of government, now felt connected. For him, residents no longer saw government 
as an altruistic entity, like so many other organizations that had made an appearance in Nima and 
Maamobi over the years. Instead, government leaders were participants in a social contract.  The 
perceived relationship had changed, and residents had developed a new sense of their own 
citizenship status. This altered notion of the relationship between person and state is particularly 
radical in a community that has long been categorized as a “slum.” Within the literature, slums 
are general described as places that are governed, rather than places that participate in 
government.2 Therefore, if true, the claim made by the community organizer presented a 
potentially valuable new way to consider the impact of human rights participation from a local 
perspective.  
 
Research Focus 
When I entered a doctoral program, I knew I wanted to return to Ghana to revisit the relationship 
between human rights and subjectivity. I ended up returning to the communities in which I first 
worked to conduct 12 months of fieldwork over the course of four years. This dissertation is the 
culmination of that research. In this dissertation, I investigate the relationship between human 
rights participation and political subjectivity in Ghana. I do so by addressing two primary 
questions: 1) does participation in human rights-based activities have an impact on individual 
beliefs about democracy and the state? And, 2) if so, how do these altered beliefs manifest 
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themselves in behavioral changes, including the way that individuals advance claims, settle 
disputes, and talk about the responsibilities of the state? In taking subjectivity as a primary focus, 
this dissertation seeks to understand the “procedures by which the subject is led to observe himself, 
analyse himself, interpret himself, [and] recognize himself,” (Foucault 1984, 942) as a rights-
bearing individual. How does taking part in human rights activities (such as capacity building 
workshops, community forums, or lobbying efforts) inform the way that activists interpret 
themselves as citizens and “rights-holders” as well as the way that they analyze their relationship 
with the state? How does this specific subjectivity influence the manner in which activists engage 
with political figures and the way that they deem acts legal or illegal, ethical or corrupt? And in 
turn, how do community activists engage with, and occasionally challenge, the particular versions 
of rights-claiming subjectivity endorsed by other loci of authority such as political parties or 
human rights NGOs?   
 When addressed together, this dissertation contributes to a larger conversation about the 
manner in which marginalized populations gain access to decision makers in order to lobby for 
their rights. By embracing a human rights-based approach, the activists discussed in this 
dissertation are choosing a particular form of political engagement over other advocacy 
possibilities such as violent confrontations or using the system of political patronage to advance 
their concerns. As I will discuss at several points throughout the dissertation, however, the 
decisions about which forms of advocacy in which to engage are continually negotiated, and there 
is not always consensus among activists. As I will describe in Chapter 7, decisions over advocacy 
strategy can be highly contentious and are actively reshaping the landscape of political engagement 
in the community.  
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The data for this dissertation is drawn from ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted over 
the course of 12 months in Accra, Ghana (June-July 2010; July-August 2011; June-November 
2013; March-April 2014). The project employs a mixed-methods approach, combining classic 
ethnographic participant observation and semi-structured interviews with community surveys, and 
archival research. During my fieldwork, I attended meetings with community groups and 
conducted interviews with their members, human rights activists, and local and state authorities 
involved in various community development projects. I accompanied local activists to their 
meetings with community stakeholders, opinion leaders, and human rights lawyers. 
My research focused on the two communities of Nima and Maamobi within Accra, the 
capital city of Ghana. The two communities are both densely populated and officially designated 
as slums. There are only a few roads large enough for vehicles to pass, and most residents must 
travel by way of narrow alleys that wind their way between concrete and plywood structures. 
The neighborhoods have also developed a reputation for violent crime and were the site of a 
highly publicized arrest of a notorious group of armed robbers in 2005 (Ntewusu 2005). Because 
of the community’s poverty and reputation, residents often struggle to gain access to justice and 
social services. In 1997, motivated by these challenges, two University of Ghana law students 
opened the LRC in Maamobi, and began providing legal aid services and human rights education 
to community residents. In Chapter 4, I describe the history of the organization in more detail. 
Although human rights are formalized through the Constitution in Ghana, citizens still often 
struggle to claim these legally guaranteed rights. This is especially true for residents in Nima and 
Maamobi who are often excluded from political processes due to their social and economic 
position. Although residents of these communities are geographically very near the site of 
government, they are often kept at a distance socially. In part due to this social distance, 
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residents have attempted to address community development concerns using a variety of 
strategies. Political patronage, the threat of violent protest, and the use of the courts are all 
strategies often proposed by community residents. The approach introduced by the LRC was 
therefore not the first attempt at community activism, but rather a new form of political 
engagement. Thus, these communities provide a rich location for the study of the impact of 
human rights participation on political subjectivity.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
This research is informed generally by scholarship on the anthropology of human rights and 
specifically by anthropological research on the relationship between legal participation and 
subjectivity. The study of law has long been a central focus of anthropologists. For early scholars, 
law was seen as an indicator of civilization. For these scholars, law was defined by its relationship 
with the state. Therefore, societies without a state could have no law, and thus they could not be 
considered to be a civilization (Tamanaha 1993, 197). Anthropologists, however, particularly 
those conducting research in Africa, challenged these notions.  Through their fieldwork, these 
anthropologists documented multiple spheres of legal authority that were simultaneously operating 
within one geographic location. Individuals used both state and customary law to settle disputes, 
and strategically “forum shopped” between various legal venues (Benda-Beckman 1981).  
 The knowledge that multiple legal authorities could exist simultaneously and that 
individuals could use these systems to their own advantage changed the general understanding of 
law in Europe and the United States. It also reinforced the understanding that culture and law are 
mutually constitutive. As Malinowski noted in Crime and Custom in Savage Society, “The true 
problem is not to study how human life submits to rules – it simply does not; the real problem is 
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how the rules become adapted to life.” (1959, 127). Legal anthropology added to the scholarship 
on law by not only studying the intricacies of written law, but also by examining how cultures 
challenged, redefined, and constructed systems of law and authority. In the latter quarter of the 
century, the areas of inquiry for legal anthropologists grew beyond state and customary law to also 
include international law, and particularly relevant for this dissertation, human rights law.  
The relationship between anthropology and human rights over the years has been fraught, 
marked by the American Anthropology Association (AAA)’s 1947 “Statement on Human Rights,” 
in which the Association rejected the concept of universal human rights. As time passed, however, 
the stance of the Association changed. Beginning in the 1980s, there was a renewed interest in the 
anthropological study of human rights. This interest solidified into the production of several 
influential compilations of work around the turn of the century that guided how anthropologists 
thought about their relationship with the study of human rights (Wilson 1997; Cowan et al. 2001; 
Goodale 2006; 2007). Rather than concentrating on the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the concept 
of universal human rights, these scholars focused their research on the way that people around the 
world use, challenge, and speak about human rights. These research foci were labeled “the practice 
of human rights” or “human rights talk,” and they allowed anthropologists to interrogate the 
relationship between culture and rights while maintaining some distance from the normative 
questions surrounding universal human rights.  
Within the overarching field of the anthropology of human rights, anthropologists studied 
international courts, truth commissions, social movements, cultural rights claims, NGOs, and the 
United Nations. They considered questions of how rights shape subjectivity (Sierra 1995; Merry 
1996; Cowan 2001; Sieder and Witchell 2001; Englund 2006; Leve 2007), how human rights 
knowledge is “translated” between the global and the local (Merry 2006a), and how human rights 
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institutions contribute to constructing identity (Hayner 1994; Wilson 2001; Clarke 2009). This 
dissertation positions itself within the scholarly debates surrounding the relationship between 
human rights and subjectivity. Engaging with the human rights system influences behavior by 
compelling individuals and groups to make claims in particular ways (Merry 1996, 2006a; Cowan et 
al. 2001; Leve 2007; Speed 2007). As such, participating in human rights activities, whether through 
rights talk or legal processes, “entail[s] certain constructions of the self and sociality, and specific 
modes of agency” (Cowan et al. 2001, 11-12). This participation creates certain legal categories 
(violations, victims, perpetrators, etc.) and then compels individuals to represent their claim within 
the parameters of these categories. As a result, human rights serves to universalize political subjects 
and contain resistance into “appropriate” channels. This process of universalization, some argue, 
decreases the radical potential of actors to challenge the power of the state (Speed 2007).  
This dissertation does not attempt to refute these claims. Rather, it argues for a nuanced 
understanding of how social and historical contexts may affect the ways that citizens encounter 
human rights and take on rights-bearing subjectivities. Central to my argument in this 
dissertation is the notion that the process of claims making not only affects the power of the 
state, but also the way that human rights activists view themselves and their positionality vis-à-
vis the government. Activists may bolster the power of the state by engaging with the human 
rights legal process (an anthropological critique of human rights that I will discuss further in 
Chapter 2). But for individuals living in a low-income migrant community, long viewed as 
“foreign,” and excluded from the political process, such as the individuals with whom I worked, 
the act of representing oneself in front of the government as an “acceptable” political subject 
may itself feel like a radical act. Residents of Nima and Maamobi have for years been limited in 
their ability to effectively engage with the national government. As slum communities, both 
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neighborhoods are categorized and governed by the state. And yet, as residents of slum 
communities, individuals living within the two neighborhoods often struggle to gain recognition 
for themselves as full rights-bearing citizens, entitled to social service provision, property rights, 
and access to justice. Because of this, the act of representing oneself as a rights-claiming political 
subject in Nima and Maamobi has the potential to challenge existing power inequities in a way 
that it may not in other contexts. 
I also argue that, as researchers, we must not stop at the point where activists have been 
incorporated into the “appropriate” dispute channels of the state, but we must also examine what 
activists do once they are there. As I will discuss in Chapter 7, once the activists with whom I 
worked gained access to the state, they occasionally broke with the sanctioned behavior of a 
human rights-claimant, challenging both the government officials of whom they were making 
claims and also the NGO that was encouraging a particular mobilization strategy. Through their 
actions, these “interstitial activists” are attempting to redefine what it means to behave as a rights-
holder and also what constitutes appropriate political engagement.   
 
Organization 
In this chapter, I provided a brief overview of the research question, fieldwork site, and theoretical 
framing for this dissertation. Chapter Two provides a review of the literature that serves as the 
theoretical groundwork for this research project. In that chapter I discuss the history of 
anthropological research on law in Africa as well as an overview of the anthropological research 
on human rights. Chapter Three provides a detailed description of the research site and also 
outlines the methods used during this study. Chapter Four provides a review of the colonial and 
postcolonial legal history of Ghana. It also introduces the human rights context of both the country 
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and the community in which I conducted research. In Chapter Five, I begin to discuss the results of 
my study with an examination of the changes in political participation among activists. I explore 
how individuals have changed the way that they advance claims from their community as well as 
the frequency with which activists interact with political officials as compared with other residents.  
Chapter Six explores the concept of “corruption talk” in Nima and Maamobi. In that chapter, I 
argue that speaking of corruption serves as evidence that activists have adopted a new view of the 
state and its responsibilities. The chapter then explores the concept of corruption as it relates to the 
practice of patronage and the handling of disputes. In Chapter Seven, I discuss how many activists 
have broken with the conventional approach for claiming human rights by introducing elements of 
political patronage and customary relationships into their campaigns. I explore the actions of these 
“interstitial activists” as well as the tensions that surround their strategic decisions. Chapter Eight 
concludes the dissertation by reviewing the primary findings and grounding them within the larger 
context of Ghana and the country’s place in the global political system.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 One of anthropology’s primary contributions to the study of human rights is the way that 
the discipline has engaged with the relationship between culture and rights. By examining how 
identity is constructed through the process of claiming human rights, this dissertation fits 
squarely within this body of scholarship. Traditionally, human rights lawyers, scholars, and 
activists have focused most of their attention on two conjunctions of rights and culture: rights 
versus culture and rights to culture (Cowan et al. 2001, 4). In the first of these two relationships, 
culture is seen as a barrier to the achievement of rights. In the second, which is often brought up 
in the process of claiming minority rights, culture is portrayed as a distinct quality that is 
identifiable and able to be protected or preserved. In both of these cases, “culture” is seen as 
bounded with distinct symbols and values. Many contemporary anthropologists, however, have 
taken a slightly different perspective on the relationship between culture and rights. Drawing on 
the understanding of culture as sets of beliefs, values, practices, and habits that are “unbounded, 
contested, and connected to relations of power,” (Merry 2003a, 67), anthropologists have come 
to view human rights itself as culture. Anthropologists have chosen to identify human rights as 
culture because the human rights system possesses many of the same qualities that 
anthropologists identify as qualities of culture. For example, the human rights system creates a 
body of knowledge that is related to particular ways of being in the world. Additionally, the 
framework of human rights influences behavior by compelling individuals and groups to make 
claims in particular ways (Merry 1996, 2006a; Cowan et al. 2001; Leve 2007; Speed 2007). 
In this dissertation, I propose a potential fourth permutation of rights and culture: culture 
through rights. Engaging in human rights talk or legal processes can often have a lasting impact 
on both group and individual identity. Human rights discourse has been used by political elites in 
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nationalistic struggles (Wilson 2001), and scholars such as Cowan (2001) have demonstrated that 
the claims-making process itself can serve to reify the identities of emerging groups. The 
question of how culture may be created and challenged through legal participation is especially 
interesting in legally plural countries like Ghana. In Ghana, there are multiple legal authorities 
through which individuals may address disputes. Each one is linked to a specific model of 
political engagement and therefor, choosing to use a particular legal system has implications that 
go beyond just that specific dispute.3  
Although I will focus on the specific relationship between human rights and subjectivity 
in this dissertation, the relationship between identity and law is not unique to human rights. For 
example, in Ghana, during the struggle for independence, Kwame Nkrumah used the symbolic 
authority of law for the purposes of nation building. Nkrumah supported policies to constrain the 
individual powers of chiefs, but he also attempted to advance a symbolic Pan-African notion of 
law that was founded on customary law and values (Nkrumah 1962; 1963). Although this law 
would be adjudicated by the state judicial system, Nkrumah argued that the legal logic of state 
courts in Africa should be drawn from the values of customary law. Partly inspired by 
Nkrumah’s ideas concerning law, in the 1950s and 1960s, conceptions of law began to play 
larger symbolic roles in many newly independent African nations, a process that Martin Chanock 
has described as “legal nationalism” (1985, 54). In Ghana, this peaceful and official balancing of 
the potentially conflicting realms of customary and statutory authority has remained central to a 
Ghanaian national identity.  
In this chapter, I begin with the history of legal anthropology in Africa, as well as a 
discussion of the concept of legal pluralism, which arose out of this early ethnographic work. 
The theory of legal pluralism is central to my understanding of how human rights law fits into 
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Ghana’s overarching legal system. It has also informed my thinking about how the presence of 
multiple legal spheres may affect the role that law plays in shaping subjectivity. Next, I discuss 
how Anthropology’s engagement with the subject of human rights has changed over the years 
and how this altered understanding of human rights has resulted in new thinking about the 
relationship between rights and culture. Finally, I close with a review of the literature on law and 
subjectivity, as well as a discussion of how this literature relates to the study of the state. 
Anthropologists have addressed the relationship between law and identity in various contexts 
including international courts, truth commissions, and social movements. Although much of this 
work has been focused on group identities, a few notable works have also examined the role of 
legal participation on individual subjectivity (Merry 1990; Osanloo 2006). Through the use of 
these cases, I illustrate the value of “culture through rights” as a theoretical concept through 
which we can understand how individual identity is related to human rights.  
 
Legal Anthropology of Africa 
The work of anthropologists in Africa has a long history, especially in regard to the study of 
political and legal systems. In the early 1900s, the British Colonial Administration implemented 
a policy of indirect rule in their African colonies. Indirect rule involved ruling “through” African 
political institutions whenever possible, “delegating power to native authorities and native 
courts” where they existed, and creating new authorities where they did not (Moore 1994, 19). 
The cultural knowledge possessed by anthropologists and their ability to conduct fieldwork made 
them potentially valuable to the Colonial Administration. Although anthropologists attempted to 
persuade the British government to view them as useful to the Colonial Administration (a period 
of anthropology that became deeply controversial for future anthropologists), Moore (1994) 
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notes that many times, the Administration preferred to employ local political officers. Despite 
the fact that most anthropologists did not work directly for colonial governments, their work still 
had an influence on the policies implemented in Africa (Moore 1994). Similarly, policies such as 
indirect rule greatly contributed to the theoretical work of legal anthropologists in Africa, as I 
will discuss below.  
When anthropologists began conducting fieldwork in Africa, legal thought was 
dominated by the theory of legal centralism. Legal centralism defines law as being necessarily 
the product of the state, and therefore also suggests that societies that do not have a state cannot 
have law. As Tamanaha (1993) notes, at the time, law was generally seen by scholars in the West 
as an indicator of civilization. Thus, legal centralism’s linkage of law and the state implies that 
pre-state societies can have no law, and thus, cannot be civilized (Tamanaha 1993, 197).  For 
early anthropologists, however, the legal centralist conception of law did not hold true. The 
research of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926) in small-scale societies revealed complex 
systems of social ordering, norms, and customary laws despite the absence of a Western style 
state. For anthropologists working in Africa, such as Paul Bohannan (1957), A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown (1952), E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1940), and James Gibbs (1963), law was not something 
strictly confined to state institutions. Bohannan’s (1957) work among the Tiv of West Africa was 
one of the earliest examples of such studies. The Tiv were long categorized as a society that 
lacked a central authority structure, and therefore, lacked law. Bohannan’s work, however, 
revealed a system of indigenous “moots” that operated alongside the Colonial Administration’s 
native courts. James Gibbs’ (1963) well-known work on the custom of berei mu meni saa 
(“house palaver”) among the Kpelle of Liberia provides a similar example. Gibbs (1963) 
describes the “Kpelle moot” as an informal, ad hoc practice where domestic disputes are settled 
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in front of a group of neighbors and kinsmen. The Kpelle moots do not replace local courts, but 
instead have a “separate but complimentary” function (Gibbs 1963, 10).  
 The distinction between formal and informal law challenged early anthropologists 
studying law in Africa to develop new terminology for what they were seeing. Scholars such as 
Bohannan (1957) and Radcliffe-Brown (1952) explicitly attempted to avoid direct comparisons 
between Western legal systems and African ones. According to Radcliffe-Brown (1952), some 
scholars had previously attempted to map formal and informal law onto the categories of civil 
and criminal law. To avoid this, Radcliffe-Brown proposed two new categories: “public delicts,” 
which included sorcery, magic, incest, and the breaking of custom, and “private delicts,” which 
included acts such as theft, wounding, killing, and adultery (1952, 211-214). These categories 
allowed anthropologists to avoid simply trying to fit non-Western legal systems into the 
structures already used in Western ones.  
 
Legal Pluralism 
This understanding of the fact that there may be various loci of authority from which law 
emanated led anthropologists to propose the concept of “legal pluralism.” Generally, the term 
“legal pluralism” refers to the presence of multiple legal systems or mechanisms within any 
social field, (Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988). Although the term was initially developed to discuss 
the simultaneous presence of both customary and statutory law within one context, the concept is 
also useful when applied to our thinking about human rights law. Human rights law often co-
exists with other normative orders including customary, religious, and state law. The system of 
human rights law is usually codified in distinct treaties and declarations and is generally upheld 
in stand-alone courts or administrative bodies. This is often even the case in countries such as 
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Ghana, where international human rights law has been incorporated into the country’s 
Constitution. Thus the application of the theory of legal pluralism to a study of human rights 
highlights the fact that human rights exists alongside, rather than in place of, other forms of law. 
And similarly, individuals who choose to engage in human rights talk and mobilization do so in a 
context in which there are various competing legal orders.  
When the concept of legal pluralism was first proposed, notions of “legal centralism,” or 
an understanding that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions,” dominated 
thinking about law (Griffiths 1986, 3). As stated above, however, Anthropologists conducting 
research in colonial areas often observed multiple legal authorities within a single social space. 
When it was first conceived, therefore, the concept of legal pluralism was not only seen as a tool 
of empirical description, but also as a way to directly challenge the dominant paradigm of legal 
centralism (Griffiths 1986).  
Despite its utility, the concept of legal pluralism presented theoretical obstacles for 
scholars.  First and foremost was the problem of how “law” should be defined. If legal pluralism 
was to break from the former notion of law as rules and behaviors that are mandated by the state, 
it had to offer an alternative. But the question of what fit into the category of “law” for 
supporters of legal pluralism has not been easily answered. Merry (1988, 870), for example, 
states that many works of legal pluralism define “‘legal system’ broadly to include the system of 
courts and judges supported by the state as well as non-legal forms of normative orderings.” 
Under this definition, all rules and norms that are seen as significant elements of social ordering 
within a society are included in the broad definition of “law.” This definition has come under 
substantial criticism from some scholars. Tamanaha, for example, argues that: 
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So generous a view of what law is slippery slides to the conclusion that all forms of 
social control are law. Not only does the term “law” thereby lose any distinctive meaning 
– law in effect becomes synonymous with normative order – other forms of normative 
order, like moral or political norms, or customs, habits, rules of etiquette, and even table 
manners are swallowed up to become law. (1993, 193). 
 Even scholars who support the theory of legal pluralism have noted the potential 
problems surrounding this definitional ambiguity. Merry (1988, 871), for example, states that the 
inclusion of informal systems of normative ordering within the category of law “runs the risk of 
defining legal system so broadly that all social control forms are included.’ Moore (1978), one of 
forebears of the theory of legal pluralism, also notes that “once sensitized to law-like phenomena 
in pre-state societies, the importance becomes evident of similar, non-government, but law-like 
phenomena in modern complex societies, but to call it all law, particularly speaking of complex 
societies, may be to risk confusion” (Moore 1978, 18).  To lose definitional specificity by 
lumping many varied forms of normative ordering into the same category potentially limits the 
analytical use of the theory of legal pluralism. 
Another criticism leveled against legal pluralism is that it occasionally overstates the 
strict separation between state and non-state law. This can obscure or neglect the state’s role 
within non-state legal fields such as customary law (Wilson 2001, 124). For example, authors 
such as Chanock (1985) and Roberts and Mann (1991) argue that customary law cannot be seen 
as a discrete and immutable legal “tradition,” but instead should be viewed as something that 
was, in part, invented by the Colonial Administration as a form of domination. Similarly, many 
scholars have argued that legal systems should be viewed as mutually-constitutive rather than 
discrete and internally ordered (Wilson 2001; Ameh 2004; Dovlo 2005; Hodzic 2009).  
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Perhaps one of the most useful contributions of legal pluralism scholarship is the concept 
of forum shopping. As Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 117) states, the term “forum 
shopping” describes instances where disputants have a choice between different institutions, and 
they “base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will be.”  When individuals 
find themselves living in contexts where multiple legal systems are present, they may be able to 
choose to which authority they wish to take their claim. These choices, in turn, impact the 
procedures individuals follow as well as the language through which they frame their claims.  
The works of Crook (2004) and Ubink (2008) on land tenure in Ghana provide a good 
example of how this works in practice. In Crook’s (2004) quantitative study of legal decision 
making in disputes concerning land tenure in Ghana, he noted that he was “surprised” to find that 
overall, “47% of respondents had gone to a state court first, without going through other kinds of 
dispute settlement procedure” (2004, 13). He argued that this finding (although dependent on 
region, with rural areas being more likely to seek assistance from a chief first) suggests that for 
many of the litigants, “the Court was the preferred or most obviously appropriate way of getting 
their dispute resolved” (2004, 13).  Ubink’s (2008) study builds on Crook’s data, using the 
findings of her supplementary case studies to provide additional explanatory information. Ubink 
argues that Crook’s finding may have more to do with the type of case than the overall feelings 
of individuals about the state courts. In Ghana, the majority of land is still held by lineages, and 
therefore generally under the purview of the local chief (Alden Wily and Hamond 2001). When 
individuals have disputes about land, they are often in direct dispute with the chief, making the 
likelihood of their self-interests being met in the chief’s court relatively low. Because of this, 
individuals may choose a state court, especially in the case of land disputes. This decision may 
serve as a possible way to increase an individual’s power in a dispute (Ubink 2008). 
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Forum shopping is also a useful concept when applied to the study of human rights. With 
the introduction of international human rights treaties, institutions, and social movements, 
community actors now have new possibilities for addressing their disputes in addition to state 
courts and local systems of justice, such as customary law. Individuals or groups may be able to 
increase their power in legal negotiations through forum shopping and framing their claims in 
ways that appeal to international activism circles. In their work on indigenous rights in 
Guatemala, Sieder and Witchell (2001) describe how local groups invoked the efforts made at 
the international level for indigenous rights in their attempt to secure greater recognition within 
Guatemala.  By framing their claims in the language of human rights, indigenous groups were 
able to appeal to a much larger transnational community that was interested in promoting legal 
claims on this issue. Additionally, many of the domestic advocacy efforts within Guatemala were 
led by local NGOs that maintained strong ties with international human rights organizations. 
Sieder and Witchell (2001) argue that these ties, along with the global push for indigenous rights, 
dovetailed with the claims made by indigenous groups within Guatemala to increase their power 
in negotiations with the state.  
Occasionally, it is just the threat of taking the dispute to another forum that allows for 
increased power within negotiations. For example, Sierra (1995) describes how the development 
of international conventions and declarations on the topic of indigenous rights has provided new 
tools for groups to use to claim their rights at the domestic level.  If the state was to deny the 
human rights claims of its people, it could potentially be held accountable for this within the 
international community. Thus, in this case, the presence of multiple legal systems provided 
indigenous groups with additional leverage in their negotiations. 
19 
 
The introduction of international fora into the layers of law in a community does not 
always, however, have emancipatory outcomes. In her work on the human rights response to 
Sharia law in northern Nigeria, for example, Clarke (2009) describes the ways in which the 
presence of the international community may limit the legal choices of individuals. Clarke 
describes the cases of two Nigerian women who were convicted of adultery and sentenced to be 
stoned to death. Several international NGOs including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International quickly became involved in protesting the case. The groups organized email writing 
campaigns and sent a petition to the Nigerian courts. The petition became particularly 
controversial for the way that it portrayed the overall institution of Sharia. As Clarke (2009, 220) 
notes, “by disrespecting the religious principles of Islam on which the Sharia is built, by 
regarding it as only a barbaric practice, this petition had the effect of insulting jurists of the lower 
courts, consequently compromising the defense team’s safety.”  Clarke argues that the 
introduction of the international community into these cases therefore decreased the options 
available for the defense team. Where before there had been the possibility of working within the 
Sharia structure to both appeal the convictions and simultaneously enact legal reforms, the 
international advocacy efforts created a “hostile environment for the defense team,” greatly 
limiting their legal actions (Clarke 2009, 221).  
As Clarke describes, the interests of the international community may not always be the 
same as those involved in the dispute at the local level. The international community may favor 
certain types of causes or forms of “justice talk” (Clarke 2009). Unequal power relations and the 
need for funding may also force those involved in the dispute to cater to the desires of 
international NGOs and justice institutions. Sally Merry describes this as the paradox of human 
rights-based social movements; human rights must be grounded in a local context to be accepted, 
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but they must also challenge these local norms and be “framed in terms of transnational rights 
principles” to be effective and to receive funding (2006a, 5).  
Additional difficulties may arise for local human rights campaigns due to the fact that 
disputes are often stripped of their cultural context and meaning when brought to the 
international community. For example, although “custom” is often viewed by the global justice 
community as being in opposition to human rights (Merry 2006a), individuals sometimes use 
customary practices in innovative ways to advance emancipatory claims at the community level 
(Jensen and Poulsen 1993; Manuh 1994; Ibhawoh 2000; Stoeltje 2000). When cases involving 
custom are brought to a higher legal level, such as a national or international court, they can 
quickly become separated from this particular and highly embedded social context. These 
examples illustrate that although various systems of law offer more possibilities for potential 
locations of adjudication, this arrangement can have varied outcomes. Sometimes, the presence 
of legal pluralism improves the ability of parties to decrease power differentials. Other times, 
however, conflicting interests between legal regimes may interact to limit the choices of the 
parties involved in a particular dispute.  
Despite the theoretical utility of legal pluralism, the ethnographic examples contained in 
this dissertation also illustrate the importance of not replicating past studies that have portrayed 
normative orders as internally homogenous. To make a theoretical case for legal pluralism, one 
must be able to identity why a specific legal field is self-regulating and semi-autonomous (Moore 
1978). Additionally, the law or legal institutions must be portrayed as different enough from that 
of other legal fields to justify identifying it as a separate legal “system.” This effort to distinguish 
legal systems too often leads to a generalized description of the specific legal regime, which 
neglects the heterogeneity and fluidity of any cultural system. This portrayal also obscures the 
21 
 
fact that the boundaries between normative orders are often not completely clear (Meagher 2007; 
Smith 2008).  
The slip into essentialism is likely an unintentional one. Indeed, part of the initial drive to 
create a theory of legal pluralism was to counter an understanding of law that suggested a 
uniform, homogeneous legal experience. There are several factors that may encourage scholars 
to fall into the trap of essentialism.  First, many scholars take on a specific legal field as their 
research location. If one focuses solely on customary law (Stoeltje 2000; Ubink 2008), the norms 
of a market (Clark 1999), or village institutions (K. Benda-Beckmann 1981), the norms, laws, 
and procedures of that system may become the primary focus of the study. In this way, there is a 
potential for the unit of analysis to become the legal system itself, as opposed to the diverse set 
of individual actors who are members of the system.  
A second related factor that contributes to essentialism in legal pluralism is a neglect of 
the fact that individuals are members of multiple legal systems simultaneously. This is a point 
that I will discuss at length in Chapter 7. In that chapter, I discuss how the presence of multiple 
regimes of authority has created new spaces for activism, but has also caused tension among 
community activists in Nima and Maamobi. Again, by making one legal system the focus of 
research, it is possible to forget that each individual is simultaneously affected by multiple layers 
of law. Additionally, the layers of law experienced by one person in a legal system may not be 
the same as another person within that legal system. As Bronstein notes, “individuals have 
multiple identities and operate in a range of contexts” (1998, 393). She continues by arguing that 
when an individual moves from a customary legal system to a statutory legal system, for 
example, she does not transcend the norms of the first system and replace them with those of the 
second. Instead, the norms of both systems are a part of her personal legal experience. If each 
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individual is impacted by the amalgamation of their personal layers of law, then it is theoretically 
possible that each person within a legal “system” may have a different overall conception of law 
informed by their various social memberships. By focusing primarily on one legal system, 
however, much of this internal diversity is neglected. 
Lastly, through attempts to accurately describe the laws and norms of a system, legal 
pluralism has the potential to portray legal systems as relatively unchanging and constant. This 
tendency seems to reflect antiquated anthropological understandings of culture as a set of “life-
ways” (Harris 1975), more than a contemporary understanding that sees culture as a “fluid, 
contested, and changing set of values and practices” (Merry 2003a, 67). As I will illustrate at 
various points in this dissertation, actors seldom reach consensus on the exact definition of 
human rights or how best to behave as rights-bearing individuals. Instead, in Nima and 
Maamobi, the borders of what constituted a “human rights-based approach” were constantly 
being negotiated between various individuals at the NGO, in the community-based 
organizations, and in governmental offices.  
These critiques also suggest the utility of considering legal pluralism from the individual 
level. Legal systems do not exist in a static form untouchable by the people who engage with 
them. Rather, individuals are continuously attempting to reshape law to pursue various concerns 
and disputes. Similarly, as Bronstein (1998) notes, individuals have multiple legal identities and 
are affected to varying degrees by different legal and moral authorities. Because of this, we 
cannot speak to how legal systems interact. Rather, we should focus on how individuals behave 
within, and are transformed by, various legal forums and practices. By attempting to join the 
literatures on legal pluralism and law’s effect on subjectivity, this dissertation attempts to do just 
that.  
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Culture through Rights 
The field of anthropology has long grappled with the subject of human rights. In 1947, the 
American Anthropological Association (AAA) published their “Statement on Human Rights,” 
famously rejecting the concept of universal human rights. Their argument was based on several 
primary claims. First, it was argued that the study of anthropology revealed significant global 
variation of moral and ethical values. As the Statement notes, “what is held to be a human right 
in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people, or by the same people in a 
different period of their history” (American Anthropological Association 1947, 542). Second, 
anthropologists argued that to choose between these values, designating some as “universal 
human rights” would be to make normative judgments, a process that was in conflict with the 
way that anthropology viewed culture. Third, anthropologists also felt that these judgments were 
based in Western conceptions of law and morality, and that therefore, the human rights 
framework was a new kind of imperialism to be imposed on the rest of the world (Goodale 2006, 
2).  
 Despite this formal rejection, however, anthropologists continued to encounter human 
rights in their work. According to Goodale (2006) in the 1980s, there was a renewed interest in 
studying human rights due to the publication of several influential articles dealing with human 
rights (see Geertz 1984; Cohen 1989; Messer 1993 for examples), the AAA Executive Board’s 
creation of a Commission for Human Rights (later converted into a permanent Committee for 
Human Rights), and the adoption of the “Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights” by 
the AAA in 1999. This new declaration, which stated the AAA’s support of human rights, was a 
significant change in the official stance of anthropology toward human rights. The declaration 
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stated that the field of anthropology should support the promotion and protection of “the right of 
people and peoples everywhere to the realization of their humanity, which is to say their capacity 
for culture” (American Anthropological Association 1999, preamble). 
 This updated position on human rights within anthropology represented a change in the 
disciplinary understanding of both human rights and culture itself. The 1947 “Statement on 
Human Rights” largely reflects the beliefs of “Boasian Cultural Relativism” (Engle 2001, 537; 
Merry 2003a, 65), where cultures are seen as unique and dependent on their particular histories 
and social environments (Boas 1920). When culture is seen as static, the imposition of beliefs, 
such as human rights, can be interpreted as a threat to culture. Contemporary anthropologists, 
however, tend to highlight the fluid and contested nature of culture (Merry 2003a). When culture 
is understood in this way, the system of human rights becomes one of the many forces that 
interact with individuals to shape beliefs, meaning, and identity.  
This changing understanding of human rights and culture also contributed to one of 
anthropology’s primary theoretical contributions to the study of human rights: thinking of the 
human rights system as culture itself. The concept of human rights as culture reflects a notion of 
culture that is contested, negotiated, and made of shared symbols and structures that influence 
meaning, values, and behavior.  Sari Wastell explains it this way: when “universalism” and 
“human rights” are studied as part of a culture of rights, they are “understood as ‘discourses’ or 
‘concepts,’ the sorts of lenses through which we apprehend and constitute objects of knowledge, 
rather than objects of knowledge in and of themselves” (2007, 332). Understanding human rights 
in this way challenges the presumed uncontested unity and normativity of the human rights 
framework. Instead, human rights discourse is seen as something that is created and reproduced 
through such things as rights talk, human rights reports, and international legal structures. This 
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dissertation follows along in this tradition, understanding human rights not only as a specific set 
of laws, but also as the way that individuals practice the act of claims-making and participate in 
rights talk, often attempting to transform a local understanding of human rights in the process 
(Wilson 2007).  
As these arguments highlight, the human rights framework is reproduced (and also 
adapted and negotiated) through interaction between various groups including international 
human rights lawyers, NGO workers, politicians, activists, and community members. In Merry’s 
(2006b) research on gender violence, she argues that human rights move from their international 
origins and are adapted into community level discourse through a process called 
“vernacularization.” Merry defines vernacularization as the process by which international 
human rights are “presented in terms of existing cultural norms, values, and practices” (2006b, 
39). The social actors who aid in this process are referred to as “translators.” Translators must be 
well versed in both international and local norms. As Merry notes (2006b, 42), translators must 
be able to portray human rights as not being inconsistent with local beliefs so that they will be 
accepted, but they must also continue to speak the language of international human rights 
organizations to continue receiving funding.  A view of human rights as culture adds even more 
insight into this process. As previously discussed, cultures are contested, and connected to 
relations of power (Merry 2003a). By taking this view, anthropologists not only see how human 
rights knowledge moves, but also the various power dynamics to which it is exposed. Not all 
countries or communities have equal power in the international community, so their ability to 
negotiate during translation will vary (Merry 2006b; Clarke 2009).  
Within the larger body of scholarship on the anthropology of human rights, this 
dissertation focuses on one aspect of the human rights as culture relationship, the impact of 
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human rights claims-making on the construction of social identities. On the surface, the 
discourse of human rights may seem to be in conflict with the creation of specific and 
particularistic group identities. The founding tenets of human rights place normative value in the 
universal. In fact, as Goodale notes, human rights “assumes the most global of facts: that all 
human beings are essentially the same, and that this essential sameness entails a set of rights” 
(2007, 10).  On the other hand, social groups generally, and nations specifically, have “an 
inherent need to divide others into insiders and outsiders,” into those who belong and those who 
do not (Eriksen 2010, 139). Anthropological research on human rights talk and human rights as 
culture, however, has illustrated that although the theory of human rights may argue for 
universality, human rights discourse is often employed in attempts to achieve particularistic ends. 
For post-conflict nations, human rights institutions (such as truth commissions and 
human rights tribunals) present mechanisms for the establishment of legitimacy and the 
construction a new shared history on which to establish national identity.  Human rights may also 
be used along with a general model of Constitutionalism as a way to unite polyethnic nations. 
For others, human rights may present a set of tools with which minority groups may transcend 
state borders and appeal for support and recognition from the international community. In all of 
these cases, viewing human rights as culture allows anthropologists to see the many intersecting 
social, political, and economic forces that work to create legitimacy, normativity, and a sense of 
community. Although many of the studies that I will discuss below focus on how human rights 
processes contribute to the formation of group identities, their conclusions demonstrate the real 
impact that participation in human rights cases and campaigns can have on shifting notions of 
identity. In that way, they support my larger goal of investigating the concept of culture through 
rights.  
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Identity through Institutions and Constitutions 
One body of anthropological literature on the connection between rights and subjectivity centers 
on the question of how formal human rights laws and institutions affect identity. Much of this 
work is particularly concerned with the construction of national identity. Since the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, Constitutionalism and human rights have been used by governments as a 
primary rhetoric of nation-building (Wilson 2001; Englund 2004). Jean and John Comaroff 
(2006) point to the fact that 36 African nations have written new Constitutions since 1989 as 
evidence of an increased “legal fetishism” that has swept the postcolonial world. In many of 
these cases, governments embrace the language of democracy and human rights as a way to both 
officially and symbolically make a break with the past to establish a new sense of national 
identity (Ackerman 1997).  
 In Ghana, human rights became part of the national vernacular during the country’s last 
transition to democracy in 1992. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, countries had to demonstrate 
that they were meeting “good governance” standards if they wanted to continue receiving aid 
from international agencies. Human rights discourse was closely linked with these efforts. Law 
and human rights also hold tremendous symbolic value in Ghana due to the fact that the country 
was one of the first to gain its independence from colonialism and is often cited as a model of 
African democracy (Bob-Milliar 2014). Because of this, the state has often embraced human 
rights language as a way to gain legitimacy both among the citizenry and within the international 
community. I will discuss this in more depth in Chapter 4.  
Wilson’s (2001) study of nationalism and the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission provides another example of a country embracing human rights language for the 
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purposes of nation-building. During the period of political transition after Apartheid, the new 
South African government embraced the language of human rights in an effort to create a new 
“culture of rights” that broke with the ethno-nationalist sentiment of the past. Wilson argues that 
the language of human rights became a way to unite two opposing groups: the ruling National 
Party and the African National Congress (2001, 6). Wilson also notes that the concept of human 
rights was employed in a general enough manner that both political parties, although sometimes 
in conflict, saw rights as being consistent with their goals. In this way, the political rhetoric of 
human rights quickly lost any connection to a set of universal moral values. As Wilson states, 
“because of its role in the peace negotiations, human rights talk came to be seen less as the 
language of incorruptible principles and more as a rhetorical expression of an all-inclusive 
rainbow nationalism” (2001, 5). This example also illustrates another point about nationalism. 
When specific ideas of law, political composition, or culture become the basis for nationalistic 
claims, they can lose their connection to earlier meanings and become “subjected to the 
imperatives of nation-building and state formation” (Wilson 2001, 3).  Specific notions of 
cultural practices or political beliefs are often essentialized by leaders seeking to portray a 
unified notion of national character. 
Formal legal institutions, such as truth commissions and human rights courts, may also 
have an impact on identity construction. A sense of shared history is often seen as one of the 
building block of national and ethnic identities (Anderson 1991). After moments of war or mass 
atrocities, nations may be left with an unsettled notion of history and several competing versions 
of the events that took place.  In these cases, human rights mechanisms may serve to construct a 
shared version of the past. One of these mechanisms is a truth commission. Priscilla Hayner 
(1994, 604) defines truth commissions as having four primary elements: 1) a focus on the past; 
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2) a goal of painting a general picture of human rights abuses over a period of time; 3) the 
commission’s temporary nature, and 4) the commission’s authority to obtain information.  
Hayner (1994) notes that most truth commissions occur at a moment of political transition in 
order to mark a historical break with the past. In his ethnography of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Richard Wilson (2001) argues that this symbolic break in 
history constitutes a major element in the rebuilding of the nation, as nationalism and identity are 
necessarily constructed in opposition to “the other.” Wilson states: 
 The most significant site of otherness for the new South Africa has not been other 
nations, it has been itself. The relationality of Constitutional nationalism is often 
constructed in an opposition between the present self and the past other. The old 
nationalism was based upon a particular view of history/culture/race/truth/rights, etc., 
which is ritually rejected in favor of a revised formulation of those concepts (2001, 16). 
In many ways, the creation of truth commissions reflect Benedict Anderson’s (1991) 
concept of “official nationalism.” Anderson defines official nationalism as “an anticipatory 
strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion 
from an emerging nationally-imagined community” (1991, 101).  In the case of truth 
commissions, official nationalism is established through the official writing of history. This 
strategy may be adopted when the post-conflict political regime feels threatened with a complete 
loss of legitimacy or national unity. 
In addition to truth commissions, international human rights tribunals may also serve as a 
location for the assembling of an official national history. In many human rights criminal trials, 
historical evidence has become an integral component of the legal arguments. Lawyers attempt 
to use history in a way that contextualizes crimes, makes a case for mitigating circumstances, or 
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proves special intent in genocide cases (Wilson 2011). Although these proceedings have the 
potential to create a rich historical record, Wilson (2011) notes that there are also challenges to 
using a human rights court to write history. Law is often guided by positivist epistemology which 
values verifiable, tangible, and forensic evidence. And, as Wilson states, “legal institutions 
cannot do anything – judge, convict, acquit, or sentence – without pronouncing somehow upon 
truth” (2007, 363). History, on the other hand, recognizes many (sometimes competing) 
narratives (Wilson 2011, 7). Another challenge extends from the fact that the scope and length of 
criminal trials is necessarily limited. The mandate of each trial therefore affects the historical 
record that is produced (2011, 219).  
Trials, and the history that they produce, are also shaped by local political forces. Wilson 
notes that in many cases, human rights criminal trials have become tools of nation-building.  
Trials are a way to establish legitimacy within post-conflict regimes. Because of this, 
governments may seek to “portray themselves as liberators of the nation, construct a new, shared 
‘collective memory’ (as in Israel in the 1960s), or wish to rehabilitate the reputation of state 
institutions and officials tarnished by their authoritarian past (as in France in the 1980s)” (Wilson 
2011, 34). Wrongdoing by the succeeding regime may be blocked from prosecution and the 
“official” history being produced. Political forces of this kind are often referred to as “victor’s 
justice,” with some of the most notable cases occurring in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
following World War II (Robertson 1999).  Although holding international human rights trials 
outside of the nations in question may lessen the impact of nationalist political forces, states may 
still choose not to cooperate with the prosecutions of members of their regime or they may limit 
the amount or kind of evidence that is released (Peskin 2005; Wilson 2011).  In this way, 
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international human rights trials may still be used as a tool by state governments to construct a 
particular version of history and identity. 
In addition to contributing to how a nation views itself and its past, international justice 
institutions also play a role in influencing how others may view a region. In her book, Fictions of 
Justice, Kamari Clarke problematizes the notion of justice by situating her study of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) within a global context of political pressures. Clarke notes 
that in regards to the ICC, strong countries maintain “a monopoly of symbolic and enforced 
power to exercise the authorial meaning of justice – the fiction of justice,” (2009, 13).  Because 
of this, stronger states such as the U.S. can evade the power of the court and play a major role in 
managing the meaning of “justice” while weaker ones (such as Uganda) must exist within the 
other’s conceptions of justice. The monopoly of power is not restricted to states, however, and 
instead is generally possessed by a “cosmopolitan elite” who have come to have the power to 
sway the way that justice is constituted around the world (2009, 18). This group includes 
international NGOs, political leaders, and the UN.  
Many, including Clarke, argue that the International Criminal Court is proof of these 
power inequalities as, thus far, the ICC has only indicted individuals from African countries.4 
This type of case selection results in a global perspective that Africans are human rights victims 
and perpetrators, and the rest of the world must intercede to protect and prosecute. Although 
African countries initially signed on to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC, with 
great enthusiasm, attitudes toward the court within the continent have changed over time (Mills 
2012). By 2009, following the indictment of Omar Al Bashir, the African Union called on 
countries to not cooperate with the court (Tladi 2009; Mills 2012). Since this time, the African 
Union’s relationship with the ICC has remained contentious. Although prominent figures such as 
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Desmond Tutu and Kofi Annan have remained in support of the court, other leaders have 
proposed withdrawing from the Rome Statute altogether. These feelings were especially 
prominent after the court’s indictment of Kenya’s President, Uhuru Kenyatta. The indictment 
was later withdrawn, in part due to Kenya’s unwillingness to cooperate with the court  
 
Minority Rights Claims 
A closer examination of the anthropological literature on the topic of minority rights claims also 
adds to our understanding of “culture through rights.” In many cases, group identity has been 
shaped through the process of making indigenous rights and rights to culture claims. Despite 
many assertions that globalization is making the world more similar, the recent years have also 
witnessed an increased political presence of social movements based on identity politics.  
Jonathan Spencer notes that paradoxically, “the more the world is culturally ‘fluid’ and 
‘permeable,’ to use Wolfe’s terms, the louder are assertions on all sides of cultural difference” 
(1990, 290). Similarly, Eriksen notes that the “centripetal” forces of globalization and the 
“centrifugal” forces of identity politics should be studied as “two sides of the same coin” (2007, 
145). For indigenous and minority groups, globalization, immigration, and international 
networks of indigenous people have provided new ways to contest nationalist claims of 
homogeneity. The language of human rights has increasingly become part of this resistance. 
Groups may claim cultural rights in an effort to seek international support and bypass an 
uncooperative state (Sierra 1995; Merry 1996; Sieder and Witchell 2001) or to establish formal 
group recognition (Cowan 2001; Leve 2007). In both cases, viewing one’s group as rights-
bearing may become a component of that identity itself. 
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When minority groups are unable to succeed in their claims for recognition within a state, 
human rights presents another potential forum in which political and legal claims may be made. 
The language of human rights provides an avenue for individuals to transcend territorial 
boundaries and engage in transnational political and legal advocacy movements. In her work on 
Tepehuano Indian communities in Mexico, for example, Maria Sierra (1995) describes how the 
discourse of human rights opened up new advocacy possibilities for indigenous groups. By 
framing local claims for cultural recognition in the language of human rights, local advocates 
were able to link up with global indigenous rights movements. As discussed above, Rachel 
Sieder and Jessica Witchell’s (2001) research on indigenous rights claims in Guatemala reveals a 
similar process. Both Sierra (1995) and Sieder and Witchell (2001) argue that indigenous groups 
can increase their power in their negotiations with the state when they call on international 
advocacy tools and support. The examples discussed here, along with many other studies of 
indigenous rights, illustrate how the language of rights has become a way for social groups to 
make appeals for group recognition that transcend the territorial barriers of the state. Wilson 
(2007) describes this process as the “verticalization of conflict.” When conflicts are 
“verticalized” they are removed from a local context and raised to a higher legal forum where 
they are exposed to a different set of institutional resources (2007, 355-356).  
Sometimes, as in the cases just discussed, the verticalization of conflict may increase a 
group’s power in legal negotiations. In other cases, using the language of human rights is a way 
to cater to the interests and advocacy goals of international donor agencies. In his study of 
refugee camps in Sudan, Massoud (2011) argues that the language of human rights is often used 
at the community level because international donors respond to human rights claims more than 
other claims. As he states, “human rights are like a password to the global bank account from 
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which humanitarian aid money might be withdrawn,” (2011, 18). Massoud also notes, however, 
that even though there is a clear pragmatic use of rights language by refugees seeking 
humanitarian assistance, many individuals draw more from the discourse than just humanitarian 
aid (2011, 20). In the same way that researchers should separate the acceptance of human rights 
values and the use of human rights talk, they should also be cautious not to assume that 
individuals only use human rights language due to financial incentives. 
Using the human rights framework may be able to advance collective identity-based 
claims against the government, but this does not mean that groups are directly challenging “the 
architecture of power,” as Shannon Speed (2007, 180) has noted. In fact, for some time, 
anthropologists who study human rights have critiqued the potentially depoliticizing and 
universalizing processes of making human rights claims, particularly within neoliberal states. 
Shannon Speed (2007) notes that although other human rights scholars such as Jack Donnelly 
(2003) and Michael Ignatieff (2001) have argued that neoliberalism and human rights are 
antagonistically positioned, in many ways, the system of human rights laws creates processes 
that strengthen the authority of the neoliberal state. By creating an “appropriate” way to advance 
claims, the state maintains its structure of law while simultaneously producing subjects that are 
“autonomous and self-regulating” (Speed 2007, 175). These claims do not challenge the 
generalized social inequalities or power dynamics built into the neoliberal state system, but 
rather work within, and potentially reinforce, its structures (Merry 1992; Speed 2007). 
Speed’s arguments remind readers that although these identity-based groups are 
advocating for their right to a distinct culture, by using human rights, they are using a 
universalizing structure to do so. These claims reflect Richard Wilk’s concept of “structures of 
common difference” (1995, 118). Wilk notes that in today’s interconnected world: 
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We are not all becoming the same, but we are portraying, dramatizing, and 
communicating our differences to each other in ways that are more widely intelligible. 
The globalizing hegemony is to be found in structures of common difference, which 
elevate particular kinds of diversity while submerging, deflating or suppressing others. 
(1995, 118). 
As noted by Wilk and others, such as Rajagopal (2003), when claims are made within structures 
of common difference, there are limits placed on the versions of diversity that are accepted 
within the international community. Within claims for cultural rights, often it is the picture of a 
unified, bounded culture, rooted in historical traditions that denotes the type of diversity worth 
celebrating and protecting (Eriksen 2001). Because of this established vision, groups with 
differing conceptions of culture that do not fit this definition may feel the need to alter the 
portrayal of their cultural beliefs in order to fit within the established parameters of cultural 
rights advocacy. In this way, the human rights system compels a particular portrayal of culture. 
Sierra (1995,247) notes, for example, that the singular vision of customary law promoted by 
Mexican indigenous groups in collective advocacy efforts was quite different from the diverse 
strategies employed on an everyday basis. If the culture was not seen by the government as 
unique enough or if it was seen as disjointed in some way, it may not have been granted the right 
to partial autonomy. Because of this, the indigenous groups described by Sierra catered the 
official version of their group identity to the accepted, essentialized notion of an indigenous 
group.    
Work such as Sierra’s points to one of the ways in which participation in human rights 
activities may affect identity. As she and others such as Jane Cowan (2001) have shown, the 
claiming process itself often produces many of the essentialized notions of “culture” that are 
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used as the basis for right to culture claims. Cowan (2001) describes how, after being ignored by 
the Greek government, the Macedonian minority of Greece recast their claims for recognition in 
the language of human rights to appeal to the global community. To further appeal to 
international cultural rights movements, Macedonian activists within Greece sought to portray a 
united Macedonian culture in an effort to make a “persuasive” right to culture claim. Two 
important components of this image of “culture” were the use of a single group name 
(Macedonians), and the solidifying of an official Macedonian language. As Cowan describes, 
efforts were made by Macedonian rights advocates to “impose unity and suppress differences 
within the population” (Cowan 2001, 170). Where the population that was now being 
characterized as Macedonian once lacked a common name for their language or a common sense 
of group identity, the process of claiming a right to their “Macedonian” culture created a united 
sense of a Macedonian nationalism and reified the group’s differences from the Greek majority. 
Examples such as these have led Leve (2007) to claim that the human rights system has 
become a “transnational identity machine.” By this, Leve means that human rights have become 
part of “a global cultural imaginary that compels people to represent themselves in certain terms 
and make their claims in certain ways” (2007, 80). As a discourse, human rights has created 
acceptable ways of categorizing actions (violations), human rights actors (victims, perpetrators, 
activists), and the categories of people who are able to make claims (cultural groups, for 
example). Because of this, individuals are compelled to make their claims within these structures 
(Leve 2011, 517). Although I am particularly interested in the relationship between human rights 
participation and individual identity, these studies contribute to our understanding of the 
mechanisms through which identity and human rights are related. As I will discuss in the 
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following section, processes of legal participation may also directly impact the way that an 
individual understands their own subjectivity in relation to their community or their government.  
 
Legal Participation and Individual Subjectivity  
Most directly, this dissertation contributes to the body of scholarship concerned with the 
relationship between individual subjectivity and legal participation. Anthropologists have 
examined this relationship from multiple angles, many concluding that the relationship is a 
mutually constitutive one (Merry 1990, 2003b; Osanloo 2006)  One’s individual subjectivity 
affects the way that one chooses to participate in legal processes, but that participation also 
impacts individual subjectivity.  
 In her work on legal consciousness among working class Americans who bring cases to 
court, Merry (1990) notes that even entering the legal arena require a certain level of legal 
consciousness. She states, ““Before a person can bring a problem to court, he or she must 
conceptualize it as something that ‘law,’ whatever it is thought to be, can help.” (1990, 37). 
Individuals must understand “law” in a way that allows them to frame their individual problems 
as legal cases. Merry also notes that individuals are often aided in this new type of framing by 
others around them such as police, friends, or community leaders. The work of human rights 
education is not dissimilar. In Nima and Maamobi, LRC lawyers spent a large amount of time in 
the beginning of their tenure in the community encouraging residents to frame their concerns in 
terms of human rights violations as opposed to other kinds of problems.  
Having legal consciousness, Merry argues, encourages an individual subjectivity that 
motivates individuals to feel entitled to bring their cases to court. Once there, however, the court 
challenges this subjectivity. Judges may attempt to move the case outside of the courtroom and 
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into mediation, or may attempt to recast the case as a moral issue rather than a legal one (Merry 
1990). Merry’s study reflect notions of “forum-shopping” as theorized by Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann (1981). Benda-Beckmann argues that individuals forum shop on the basis of where 
they believe they have the highest chance of fulfilling their self-interest. Forums, however, are 
simultaneously attempting to “acquire and manipulate disputes from which they expect to gain 
political advantage or to fend off disputes which they fear will threaten their interests” (1981, 
117).  Individuals may have adopted a rights-holding subjectivity, but the court is not a passive 
receiver of this subjectivity. Instead, it is an active participant in shaping the subjectivity of the 
plaintiff. In her later research on domestic violence, Merry (2003b) explains the impact of the 
legal sphere pushing back strongly against the rights-holding subjectivities adopted by women. 
She argues that when the police do not make an arrest, the prosecutor does not push to press charges, 
or court mandated battering rehabilitation programs are not enforced, women are less likely to 
continue representing themselves using rights language (2003b, 352). 
 Arzoo Osanloo (2006) found similar results in her study of women in Iranian family 
court. She notes that women come to court with multiple and shifting subjectivities. They are 
rights holders, but in other environments might choose to highlight a different aspect of their 
subjectivity. Osanloo argues that in the legal system, the court “sanctions” subjectivity by 
approving of particular lines of argument or discourses. For example, although women have 
multiple subjectivities, the court rewards women who represent themselves as both autonomous 
rights holders and Muslim women (Osanloo 2006, 193). In this way, particular versions of 
subjectivity are favored due to their effectiveness.  
 Rather than focusing on the way that legal processes contribute to group identity, both of 
these studies stand out for the manner in which they consider the impact of legal participation on 
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individual identity. These studies are particularly useful in understanding the plurality of 
subjectivities within any group. In Chapter 6, I apply this logic to my thinking of the state as 
well. I draw on Akhil Gupta’s (1995) notion of the “imagined state,” to explain how encounters 
with the state through human rights campaigns lead activists to develop a new conception of the 
state. Gupta argues that individuals come to conceptualize the state through their interactions 
with bureaucracy as well as through public media portrayals of the government such as those on 
television and in newspapers. Because these notions of the state are formed through individual 
experiences, understandings of the “imagined state” vary from person to person. For Gupta, the 
imagined state is multilayered and translocal. It is multilayered in that there are various levels of 
the state apparatus, some with which citizens do not regularly engage. By stating that the state is 
“translocal,” Gupta is emphasizing the fact that the state, in the way that is it experienced by its 
citizens, is always a local institution. Although a central government exists, the state comes to be 
imagined through the experiences individuals have with local politicians and bureaucratic offices 
throughout the country (1995, 384). 
 This theoretical conceptualization of the state is useful when applied to the question of 
political subjectivity in Nima and Maamobi for several reasons. First, it illustrates the way that 
individual citizens can come to conceive of their government in widely different ways depending 
on their own individual experiences. Focusing on how the state comes to be imagined within the 
citizenry runs counter to much of the research on non-Western states, which has focused on the 
coercive nature of state control. This research tends to focus on how states proactively seek to 
shape national identity from the top down. Nugent (1994) notes that an “emphasis on state 
autonomy, and coercion rather than legitimacy as the basis of rule, actively informs the work of 
most authors working on non-Western “imposed states” (1994, 335).  
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Secondly, Gupta’s theory of the imagined state emphasizes the fact that the state is not a 
monolithic entity, but instead is multilayered.  This argument is part of a larger body of 
scholarship focusing on the disaggregated nature of neoliberal citizenship (Ong 2006). In 
contrast to many of these studies of “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999), which point to the 
deterritorialized forces of globalization, however, Gupta emphasizes the translocal qualities of 
the imagined state. This is especially important when considering how one will use the methods 
of ethnography to study the state. As scholars such as Eriksen (2010, 118) have noted, the sheer 
scale of the state makes it a difficult topic to study. However, by understanding the state as an 
entity that is discursively constructed through individual interactions with local institutions, one 
is able to examine the processes of state construction as they occur within one context.  
In this dissertation, I apply this understanding of the state to an examination of how 
political subjectivity and participation in human rights activities are related in Ghana. Human 
rights education and capacity building workshops contribute to the development of rights-
bearing subjectivities among residents. These subjectivities are then both sanctioned and 
challenged by the Ghanaian state through court cases and also through activists’ interactions with 
politicians. These interactions, in turn, affect the way that individual activists conceptualize the 
state. Although the hegemony of the government does impact the way that activists choose to 
represent themselves in their claims for human rights, this influence is not absolute. In Chapter 7, 
I will argue that activists have found innovative ways to make claims that allow them to 
challenge the subjectivities favored by the state. Through their use of multiple discourses, 
activists push against the clearly defined categories of human rights law so often critiqued by 
anthropologists and challenge the notion of “acceptable” resistance. I will discuss this further in 
the following chapters.  
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Chapter 3: Research Site and Methodology 
 
 As I noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, the seeds for this research project were 
already planted before I entered the PhD program at the University of Connecticut in the fall of 
2009. Because of my earlier work in Ghana, when I entered graduate school, I began the process 
of developing a project to study the relationship between political identity and human rights in 
Ghana. Over the course of several years (and several more summers in Ghana), I honed my 
research questions. In 2010, I spent six weeks in Ghana studying Asante-Twi language and 
conducting preliminary research involving observation at the human rights court, conducting 
semi-structured interviews with human rights NGO workers, and participating in many 
unstructured conversations with community members on the topics of human rights, customary 
law, and justice. The primary goal of this preliminary research was description, which allowed 
me to delineate the primary “boundaries, characteristics, and component parts” of the human 
rights field in Ghana (Schensul et al. 1999, 19). Through the understanding gleaned from 
fieldwork, I was able to formulate preliminary research questions that were grounded in the local 
context.  
During the following summer, I conducted more preliminary fieldwork in Nima and 
Maamobi. While in the field, I was able to test my initial theories with key informants as well as 
further distill my dissertation research agenda. The primary focus of this fieldwork was the 
development of a community survey. Following the model of ethnographic surveys, the survey 
questions were informed by data collected through unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation during previous trips to the field (Schensul et al. 1999). During the 
research trip, I also conducted several focus groups with human rights workers and community 
members on my survey. I received valuable feedback during these meetings on the content and 
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wording of the questionnaire, and these combined experiences helped me to construct a local 
“formative theory” that guided my dissertation research agenda (Schensul et al. 1999).  
 
Primary Data Collection 
This research project focuses on the relationship between participation in human rights-based 
community activities and individual political beliefs and behavior. Specifically, my research asks 
whether participation in human rights activities has an impact on 1) the way that participants 
pursue community development goals, 2) how they understand their relationship with the state, 
and 3) how they conceptualize and choose to participate in local level political processes.  To 
answer these questions, in May of 2013, I traveled back to Ghana to begin my primary data 
collection. In total, I conducted 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork (June-July 2010; July-
August 2011; June-November 2013; March-April 2014). I employed a mixed methods approach 
to data collection, which prioritized the ideals and procedures of ethnography, but also used data 
collection techniques such as a community survey and archival research. This mixed methods 
approach accounts for the inherent limitations of ethnographic interviews and observation and 
allows for the inclusion of a wider breadth of data. Additionally, triangulation of data gathered 
through a variety of methods increases the validity of the results (Creswell 2009).  
 The primary data presented in this dissertation was collected through participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews. During the course of fieldwork, I attended meetings 
with community groups and conducted interviews with their members. I spent time with human 
rights activists, and I accompanied activists to their meetings with community stakeholders, 
human rights lawyers, and opinion leaders such as imams, chiefs, and other local elders. I 
attended many political meetings and interviewed both local and state level authority figures 
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involved in various community development projects. I also spent a significant amount of time 
just walking around the neighborhood, visiting with residents, and taking part in daily 
community life. I joined friends while they watched the news (and Nigerian “Nollywood” 
movies) and commented on the day’s events. I engaged in regular political discussions with a 
group of youth who hung out in the unfinished second floor of a building across the street from 
my research assistant’s home. I sat with women and assisted with childcare as they prepared 
evening meals. All of these experiences were part of my participant observation.  
 Participant observation, the defining method of anthropological fieldwork, allows the 
researcher to better understand aspects of culture that may not be easily verbalized. Dewalt and 
Dewalt (2002, 1) refer to this type of culture as “tacit culture” (as opposed to “explicit culture”). 
Tacit culture becomes intelligible to the anthropologist by taking part in daily life. As Dewalt 
and Dewalt (2002, 9) note, “it allows us to understand nonverbal communication, to anticipate 
and understand responses.” This understanding, in turn, allows a more grounded interpretation of 
data collected through other methods, such as interviews, surveys, and focus groups. In this way, 
participant observation contributes to both data collection and data analysis.  
 In addition to participant observation, I conducted 38 in-depth interviews with human 
rights activists and many other semi-structure interviews with politicians, human rights lawyers, 
local opinion leaders, and community residents. I also conducted several focus groups. For the 
semi-structured interviews, I began with a predetermined list of questions, but would often veer 
away from the list to ask follow-up questions or provide clarification. The in-depth interviews 
generally occurred over several encounters. Although I would go into these interviews with an 
idea of the themes and a list of general questions that I was interested in exploring, these 
interviews were much more open-ended and free-flowing. As I had more time with the activists, 
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these interviews often included the relaying of lengthy stories about past experiences with human 
rights campaigns.  
As my fieldwork spanned the course of several years, I was also able to interview many 
of the activists repeatedly, which allowed me to document the changes in their beliefs and 
behavior over time as they moved between human rights activism and politics.  In this way, my 
fieldwork falls in the category of “longitudinal ethnography” or “longitudinal qualitative 
research.” This form of research is thought to be most appropriate when exploring changes that 
occur over time, especially in the context of a “‘career’ of some sort or which involves a 
developmental process,” (Farrall 1996, 2). When I first began working in Nima and Maamobi in 
2008, many of the human rights activists were just beginning their involvement with human 
rights. For the youth group, many of the members were young and unmarried students. By the 
time that I finished my fieldwork in the spring of 2014, the individuals with whom I had 
maintained contact were considered seasoned community activists, and most of the youth club 
members were now married, some with children of their own. This longitudinal perspective not 
only enabled me to see the changes in community beliefs and behavior, but also to better 
understand the kinds of large-scale factors that contribute to these changes (such as a change in 
national level political regime).  
In addition to interviews, over the 12 months of fieldwork, I conducted 100 community 
surveys (50 with individuals who had participated in human rights activities and 50 with 
individuals who had not participated in human rights activities). I did not have to remove any 
participants from the study. The survey themes were informed by my preliminary ethnographic 
fieldwork. Many of the specific questions relating to political identity were adapted from 
questions used by the Afrobarometer Ghana Round 5 survey. The Afrobarometer is an 
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independent multinational survey that seeks to better understand the political, social, and 
economic climate across the African continent. The survey is currently used in 35 different 
countries, and it is administered on a cyclical basis (generally every 3-4 years). Survey questions 
are worded in a way that seeks “to offer comparability across the continent and across the globe 
but also to make sense to local respondents in each country under study” (Zuern 2009, 586). In 
addition to questions about political identity, my survey included questions about human rights, 
community development, and basic demographic information (see Appendix 1).   
For the community survey, human rights participants were located using snowball 
sampling. Bernard (2000, 179) notes that snowball sampling is most appropriate when 
attempting to identify a “difficult to find” population. Although many of the individuals who are 
most active in human rights work attend local community group meetings, there are also many 
individuals who were active at one time, but are no longer. In a densely populated community 
such as Nima and Maamobi where many residences are not permanent, social contacts are key in 
locating individuals.  I began by conducting surveys among those individuals who regularly 
attend community meetings. After each survey, I would ask if they knew of others individuals 
who had participated in human rights activities in the past, but no longer came to meetings. Once 
I began to only receive names of individuals whom I had already interviewed, I considered the 
sample saturated.  
As no sampling frame exists for Nima and Maamobi, to identify individuals who had 
never participated in human rights activities, I followed the sampling model previously used by 
Brydon (1999) in the same community: “Introductions to key people in various ethnic 
communities… were followed by further introductions and thus a range of people were 
interviewed, fanning out from several original points of entry” (Brydon 1999, 375-376). In 
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relation to my study, this method entailed having my friends in the community introduce me 
multiple individuals (of varying ethnicity, gender, and status in the community), and then having 
these people each introduce me to 2-3 other people, with whom I administered surveys. By using 
multiple points of entry, I was able to guarantee that I did not sample people who all lived in the 
same area or who were all part of the same social group. This second point is particularly 
important given the importance that social networks play in political and legal participation (a 
connection that will be discussed at length in the following chapters).  
I had to make special efforts to conduct surveys with women. Women in Nima and 
Maamobi are often employed as traders, working both inside and outside of the market. Many 
cook and sell food throughout the day. Because they were working, it was sometimes more 
difficult to find women who would agree to meet with me for an interview during the day. 
Although I was not able to interview an equal number of men and women, I did interview a 
significant number of women by the end of my fieldwork.5  
To complement the community-based fieldwork, I also conducted archival research at the 
Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) and the Balme Library at the 
University of Ghana. These archives were especially useful in obtaining official documents (such 
as city planning information) pertaining to Nima and Maamobi from the colonial period and the 
early years of independence. These documents provided information about how the two 
communities were social and demographically situated within the larger city of Accra throughout 
history. They also contributed to my understanding of how being labeled a “slum” within the 
national plan can affect future development.  
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Challenges and Ethical Issues 
There were several challenges that emerged during the process of data collection. The first 
challenge was related to the community survey. Within the first week of research, I quickly 
realized that several of the survey questions were potentially eliciting answers that the 
respondents believed to be “correct” rather than their true opinions. An example of this was the 
question “if you want to gain a public service, such as improved sanitation or health care, does 
human rights help you?” As I will discuss in the following chapter, human rights discourse has 
permeated many levels of society in Ghana (Anyidoho 2009). Human rights are taught in local 
schools and are discussed in the public media.6 Because of this, some people who may not be 
able to define human rights may still interpret them, on the whole, as something positive or 
something with which they should agree. To account for this potential bias, I added several open-
ended questions to my survey. In the new version of the survey, I asked a three part question in 
place of the original question. The series began with the question: “If you want to gain a public 
service, such as improved sanitation or health care, what would you do?” This was followed by, 
“do you think that human rights could help you?” If the person answered yes, I followed-up with 
“how do you think human rights could help?” Although adding these additional questions 
expanded the length of the survey, it also provided much more valuable information about the 
levels of local knowledge of human rights.  
 Another challenge that I faced was related to the ethical issue of confidentiality. Life is 
public in Nima and Maamobi, and everyone constantly seems to be aware of the location of their 
fellow residents. When my research assistant and I would go to interview someone, if they were 
not around, we could almost always track them down after consulting with other individuals who 
lived or worked near their home. As an American woman, my comings and goings were even 
48 
 
more closely monitored. This does have its advantages. One day, as I was walking by myself 
through a part of the community in which I was less familiar, a man started following me. I did 
not know him, and I quickly picked up my pace toward my destination. As I would later find out, 
some young boys noticed what was going on, and ran to tell their mother. She, knowing my 
research assistant, sent her teenage son to follow us and ensure that the man did not try to harm 
me. Although being socially visible increased my safety in the community, it also made it 
difficult to protect the confidentiality of those whom I was interviewing. Although I did ensure 
that I conducted the actual interview in a space that was either private or specifically chosen by 
the individual being interviewed, I could not conceal the fact that the person was participating in 
the research. Although I was concerned with this issue, no one in the community appeared to be.  
I had similar challenges ensuring confidentiality among the human rights activists with 
whom I conducted interviews, particularly members of the Federation of Youth Clubs (FYC). By 
the time I left, I had interviewed all of the executive members of the FYC. As my fieldwork 
progressed, my research often became the topic of discussion when we were together. “How did 
you answer the question about civil society?” one club member might ask another. Because I had 
added several questions to my interviews with activists about issues that were being broached 
and causing disagreement at club meetings, the activists were clearly interested in knowing how 
their fellow club members felt about the topic. To address this issue, at the request of the youth 
club, I made a presentation of the results of my fieldwork. I described the data in aggregate, 
mostly speaking of general trends. And the end of the presentation, I was able to answer 
additional questions, and the group discussed how they might be able to use the results going 
forward.  
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Lastly, there are limitations on the extrapolation of the quantitative data that I collected 
due to the fact that there is no reliable census data for the communities of Nima and Maamobi. 
For Nima, population estimates ranged from 55,830 (Kang et al. 2010, 2) to 69,044 (Abdul Aziz 
2012, 11) in the year 2000. Equivalent data for Maamobi does not appear to be available.  One 
potential reason for the lack of data is the fact that, as an unplanned community that is home to 
many recent migrants, the population of Nima and Maamobi is always fluctuating. In their work 
collecting data on urban refugees, Jacobsen and Landau (2003, 195) note that census data often 
omits many urban migrants “whose ambiguous legal status means they choose not to reveal their 
presence to government bureaucracies.” This could also contribute to the inconsistent population 
counts in Nima. Because accurate population data is unavailable, I am unable to calculate a 
reliable margin of error.  
 
Nima and Maamobi History 
Today, Nima and Maamobi are densely populated areas, crowded with livestock, food stalls, and 
small mosques. The communities have changed drastically from 1902, when Maamobi first 
appeared on the Gold Coast colonial census. At this time, there were 13 residents, and the area 
was outside of the city limits of Accra. Nima was first settled in 1931 by a Hausa cattle dealer 
named Alhaji Amadu Futa (Ainuson 2009).7 The land was originally Ga stool land, and Malam 
Futa had been given the land by the Ga chiefs (Arn 1996).8 Although both communities were 
generally considered suburban pastoral areas at the time, by 1947, the official Accra Town 
Planning Scheme noted increased population in Nima due to “untoward labour immigration” 
(Accra Town Planning Schemes: Accra). Some of these migrants chose to settle in Nima due to 
the fact that they gained employment at an American military base that had been constructed 
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nearby during World War II (Songsore 2003). Due to the rapid population growth, Nima and 
Maamobi were already densely populated by the time the city limits were extended, 
incorporating the two communities into Accra.  
Because development occurred while the neighborhoods were outside of the city limits, 
growth was unregulated. Residents constructed homes, kiosks, and mosques wherever they could 
find land, many building their structures without direct access to roads, water, or electricity 
(Harvey and Brand 1974). Nima and Maamobi were especially affected by their lack of 
coordinated drainage systems, something that continues to cause problems for residents today. 
For areas inside the city limits, drainage was seen as an essential component of infrastructure. 
The 1945 Accra Town Planning Scheme Report, for example, instructed town planners to design 
“the drainage systems of large areas of houses well in advance and calculate the sizes of main 
drains needed” (Fry 1945, 26). For Nima and Maamobi, however, drainage schemes were not 
considered until after the areas were already densely populated. Due to the crowded and 
deteriorating environs, in 1958, the government officially designated Nima as a slum (Ministry 
of Housing, Town and Country Planning Division 1958).  
The population expansion of Nima and Maamobi mirrored overall growth in Accra. In 
1877, the British Colonial Authority relocated the administrative capital of the Gold Coast 
Colony from Cape Coast to Accra. Prior to this, Accra had primarily been a fishing settlement of 
the local Ga tribe. With the relocation of the capital, Accra became a center for administration, 
transportation, and trade (Essamuah and Tonah 2004). This new economic activity brought 
increased opportunities for employment, and with it, many migrants from other regions of Ghana 
and the surrounding countries. By 1960, the indigenous Ga were no longer the majority in Accra. 
Instead, more than 50% of the population came from other ethnic groups including Ewe, Akan, 
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and various Northern tribes (Essamuah and Tonah 2004). Many of these migrants settled in low-
income settlements like Nima and Maamobi. In the ensuing years, Nima and Maamobi continued 
to grow, and by 2000, population estimates for Nima alone ranged from 55,830 (Kang et al. 
2010, 2) to 69,044 (Abdul Aziz 2012, 11).   
As population density continued to increase, living conditions deteriorated and little was 
done to improve local infrastructure. According to one longtime resident of the community, in 
the 1970s, residents (most of whom had migrated to Accra) were not as concerned with 
development in Nima and Maamobi because they did not think it would be a permanent 
condition. He stated, “There was not a thought that this was permanent. People thought that 
Nima one day will be something else. They thought the homes will all be rebuilt in concrete or 
that some people will be forced to move elsewhere.” He continued, explaining that after decades 
of governmental neglect and stalled development projects, attitudes have changed. “Now we 
know we have to do it. Now the questions is, how do we do it?”9 As the years have passed, the 
histories and livelihoods of the two neighborhoods have remained intertwined. Many individuals 
who now live in Maamobi, once lived in Nima and vice versa. Although there are formal 
boundaries between the two communities, the border more closely represents that of a 
“vernacular neighborhood,” a term that refers to “neighborhood boundaries that are broadly 
recognized and agreed to by residents…even if they may have no premeditated and formal 
definition,” (Weeks et al 2010, 563).  
 
Nima and Maamobi Today 
Walking down a dusty back alleyway in Maamobi, it is easy to get a picture of daily life in the 
community. Men and women stroll through cramped passages, avoiding the traffic on Nima 
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Highway, the one major road that runs the length of the two communities. As they walk, they 
glance down at cell phones, attempting to shield them from the glare of the blazing sun. Many 
have a cell phone in each hand, a strategy to cut down on out-of-network costs and to maintain 
contact even during a prolonged local power outage when cell phone charging can be difficult. 
Most residents live in rooms within larger houses. These homes generally have relatively 
spacious open courtyards, which serve as communal spaces for cooking, laundry, and childcare. 
Many of the homes in Nima and Maamobi resemble traditional Nigerian Hausa compounds, with 
rooms around a courtyard and high walls. Pellow (2003) argues that these homes are reflections 
of customary “Hausa / Muslim socio-spatial practice” and beliefs about privacy (Pellow 2003, 
63). Outside of the houses, men and women can often be seen sitting on wooden benches, 
greeting passersby. Around nearly every corner is a woman selling some kind of food: biscuits 
and candy or northern specialties like Tuo Zafi, pinkaso, and waagashi that can be hard to find 
outside of Nima and Maamobi. Life is public here, and the constant presence of people in the 
alleys serves as both a gossip network and a neighborhood watch organization. Several times 
during my fieldwork, when residents saw that I was alone and getting too much of the wrong 
kind of attention from someone, they could come over and say, “You are Fatah’s (my research 
assistant) friend, yes? Here, let me walk with you.” Even though I had never met the person, 
everyone knew who I was and to whom I was connected.  
Both Nima and Maamobi have a reputation in Ghana for being violent and crime-ridden 
areas. But as my research assistant explained when I arrived in May, you are really only in 
danger if people do not know who you are. Because of this, we spent the first few weeks walking 
through various sections of the community, stopping in to visit with residents, and in general just 
being seen. There are many NGOs that have worked in Nima and Maamobi over the years. 
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Although interns are a common sight, they are generally not trusted or taken very seriously, as 
they do not spend a significant amount of time in the communities. Therefore, spending time just 
walking through the neighborhoods was not only a safety precaution, but also a way for residents 
to see that I was not just someone who was there for a day. It also allowed me to become more 
aware of the rhythms of the community: the weekly schedule of various youth club, political, and 
“supporters union” meetings, the five daily calls to prayer echoing from speakers at the many 
local mosques, and the evening rituals of eating and visiting in the streets after the sun sets. As 
other scholars have noted, these activities help maintain community connections, which then aid 
residents by serving as an economic social safety net (Grindal 1973; Owusu, Agyei-Mensah, and 
Lund 2008). The creation and maintenance of social networks is especially important in places 
where migration has removed individuals from traditional kin-based networks (Pellow 1987), as 
is the case with Nima and Maamobi.  
Although Nima and Maamobi are relatively distinct from the surrounding areas in Accra, 
they have many similar characteristics to other “zongo” communities across Ghana. “Zongo” is a 
Hausa word meaning “the camping place of a caravan, or the lodging place of travelers” 
(Abraham 1962, 972). As Schildkrout (1978) notes, however, under the British Colonial 
Administration, the term “zongo” was used to “refer to the section of the town where Muslim 
traders lived. It was used interchangeably with ‘Hausa settlement,’ ‘Mohammedan settlement,’ 
and ‘strangers’ quarter’” (67). Today, the term is often used to refer to any low-income 
“agglomeration of Muslim migrants.” (Pellow 2001, 59). The term does not carry a pejorative 
meaning and is often used by local residents. In fact, there is even a national political 
campaigning organization called “Zongo for Mahama.”10 There is at least one zongo in every 
major Ghanaian city and over seven in Accra alone (Ntewusu 2005).  
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Although the character of each zongo is different, most are dominated by migrants from 
the north of Ghana as well as immigrants from neighboring countries such as Togo and Burkina 
Faso. Because of this, many Ghanaians continue to see “zongo” communities as communities of 
outsiders or migrants (Schildkrout 1978, 85). In 1973, scholar Bruce Grindal estimated that 90 
percent of Nima’s population was “ethnically non-indigenous, consisting of northern tribesmen 
and a significantly large proportion of non-Ghanaians from northern Togo and Upper Volta” 
(1973, 335). Although there continue to be many residents who were born outside of Nima and 
Maamobi, there is also now a significant portion of the local population that was born and raised 
within the neighborhoods. Despite this demographic change, many Ghanaians tend to still see all 
zongos as migrant communities. Some residents feel that this reputation has led them to be 
treated by policy makers as non-indigenous and transitory, and therefore less worthy of much-
needed development funds.  
The discrimination faced by zongo communities in Ghana can be noted as early as the 
colonial period. In the Accra Town Planning Scheme’s Report of 1945, it is noted that “slums at 
their worst exist at Ussher Town, James Town, and areas generally inhabited by the Hausa or 
Mohammedan communities.” The report continues, stating “Conditions such as these may be 
accounted for by poverty and ignorance.” (Accra Town Planning Scheme Report 1945. 
Document 32, 9). The question of whether deteriorating conditions are the fault of the 
community (from lack of education) or the government (from a lack of service provision) is one 
that came up many times in my conversations with community leaders and local politicians about 
sanitation. It is also central to the reframing of issues as human rights as opposed to charity, as I 
will discuss in Chapter 6.  
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When used by outsiders, the category of “zongo” often implies a homogeneity that 
obscures local social diversity.  Many scholars who have worked in zongo communities have 
noted that, in comparison to other low-income communities in Ghana, zongos are surprisingly 
diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, and social background (Essamuah and Toneh 2004; Agye-
Mensah and Owusu 2012). In terms of religion, within Nima and Maamobi, somewhere between 
54% (Owusu et al. 2008, 184) and 90% (a figure commonly cited by residents in interviews) of 
the community’s population are Muslims.11  There are also many individuals who practice 
Christianity or other traditional animist religions. Although generally poor, there is also 
economic variation within Nima and Maamobi. This is especially apparent in the western portion 
of Nima, which contains many large single-family homes (including the residence of Nana 
Akufo-Addo, the leader of the primary opposition party during my time in the field, the NPP). 
The communities are also very diverse in terms of ethnicity. The following table shows the 
percentages of the four primary ethnic groups in Nima in the year 2000:  
 
Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Nima in 2000 
Akan 24.60% 
Ewe 16.30% 
Mole-Dagbon 16.10% 
Ga-Dangbe 11.80% 
Other 31.20% 
(Ghana Statistical Services 2000) 
 
Some of the misunderstanding regarding the diversity of zongo communities may be the 
result of prejudice, but some can also be attributed to local social practices. Scholars such as 
Ntewusu (2005) have described the intentional creations of a shared culture within the zongos. 
He notes that due to the great diversity, a conscious effort is made by many new migrants to 
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adopt the practices of the zongo, which are loosely organized around Islam and a general 
“northern identity.” In her work on Sabon Zongo, another zongo within Accra, Deborah Pellow 
(2003, 60) similarly found that a general sense of “zongo-ness” was far more relevant to local 
identity than ethnicity. The identity of the zongos remains strong, even in diaspora. In fact, the 
Bronx in New York, home to one of the largest Ghanaian immigrant communities in the United 
States, has an association called the Nima Residents Association (Abdul Aziz 2012, 13).12  
Ethnicity, however, remains present in Nima and Maamobi, and any tribe with a large 
enough local population will have a “zongo chief.” These chiefs are not the official leaders of 
their ethnic groups in Ghana, but rather represent the tribes within the community. As Grindal 
(1973) notes, “while the methods of selection vary from tribe to tribe, the zongo chief is usually 
an elderly man who is a more or less permanent resident of Maamobi [or Nima] and who through 
his wisdom and deeds has earned the respect of his fellow tribes-men.” There are over 30 chiefs 
within the community, and many of them serve on a collaborative council called the “Council of 
Muslim Chiefs.” Because the community is an urban, multiethnic one, many residents mentioned 
that although the chiefs may help with settling small disputes or advocating for residents, they do 
not have the same level of authority as they would in a village. Instead, the Council of Muslim 
chiefs has taken on the role of providing ceremonial authority for the entire zongo, again 
highlighting the salience of a collective northern identity.  
Although chiefs still play an important role in Nima and Maamobi, other respected members 
of society, often referred to as “opinion leaders,” have also come to play primary leadership roles 
as well as serving as patrons or “brokers” that connect individuals with other big men in the 
community. A chief may be included into the category of “opinion leader,” but the term also 
refers to individuals who have earned the respect of the community in other ways. The status of 
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opinion leaders is often achieved through their demonstrated success as problem solvers. As one 
older man, identified to me by several community youth as an opinion leader, described, “It’s 
about how people see that you are observant. When something is broken, even if it has nothing to 
do with you, you take it to be your business to make it work. Then people push you a bit because 
people know that you can help with their problems.”13 Opinion leaders do tend to be relatively 
wealthy, but they may also earn their prestige by gaining a reputation for objectivity, humility, 
industriousness, or their ability to assist fellow residents in dealing with the police, family 
disputes, or potential employers. In Nima and Maamobi, opinion leaders often have as much, if 
not more, influence with community members than chiefs. As Pellow (1991, 442) states, “the 
man with the title and the man with the power may not be the same.” 
 
Language  
Within the zongos, use of the Hausa language has become one marker of a collective northern 
identity, even though it is generally not the native language spoken by most of the migrants 
(Dakubu 1997). In Nima and Maamobi, it is normal to hear Twi, Hausa, English, and even 
French spoken regularly, although causal greetings almost always occur in Hausa. Most 
individuals in Nima and Maamobi speak at least Twi and Hausa, and many also speak English. 
English is the official language in Ghana, and it is widely spoken (Bodomo 1996, 39). In 
addition to English, however, 90% of Ghanaians use at least one African language in their daily 
interactions (Bodomo 1996). Asante-Twi is generally the default African language spoken in 
southern Ghana, and it is spoken as a first language by over 40% of the Ghanaian population and 
by many others as a second language (Obeng 1997).  
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During my fieldwork, I was able to conduct interviews with government officials, human 
rights lawyers, and local political leaders in English. Interviews with community activists were 
often conducted in English, however, I also enlisted the help of my research assistant who was 
able to speak and translate an additional five languages, and therefore served as my translator.14  
To prepare for research, I had learned basic Twi, as that is the most common African language 
spoken in Ghana. To ensure accuracy, however, I continued to use a translator when interviews 
occurred in Twi. When conversations occurred in a language other than English in situations 
where direct translation was not possible, I asked others present to separately recount what had 
occurred. I then checked the descriptions for consistency against each other (and with my own 
understanding, if the conversation occurred in Twi) to ensure that the interpretation of the 
situation was shared among participants. All direct quotations used in this dissertation are taken 
from conversations that occurred in English.  
In Nima and Maamobi, the language used in community meetings was generally tailored 
to the audience. For example, larger political constituency meetings occurred in a mixture of 
Twi, Hausa, and English, whereas meetings of local youth clubs nearly always occurred in 
English. Meetings with government officials that I observed (both large and small) also nearly 
always occurred in English. Occasionally, however, an opening statement would be given in Twi 
or Hausa. Because of the symbolic connection between Hausa and northern-ness in the zongos, 
when Hausa was used in these encounters, individuals sometimes interpreted the use of the 
language by an outsider as a signal of solidarity. For example, I was once speaking with a human 
rights activist about his experiences bringing a petition to the Supreme Court. He made a point to 
note that the clerk at the court attempted to speak Hausa. The activist stated, “He was even trying 
(to speak Hausa), he wasn’t doing well, but it means look, we understood each other at the 
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Supreme Court, so we were at ease.”15 During my fieldwork, I was also able to learn enough 
Hausa to participate in the regular greetings that are performed throughout the day. For residents 
who did not know me well, my response of “Lafiya lau” when asked, “Kina lafiya?” always 
seemed to be bring surprise. Hausa is not among the nine official “state sponsored” African 
languages in Ghana, and it is officially categorized as an “immigrant language.” In Southern 
Ghana, it is not often used by non-zongo residents, therefore it was even more surprising when it 
was spoken by a “Baturia” (in Hausa, a foreigner, literally a white woman).   
 
Why Nima and Maamobi? 
Throughout the process of developing the project, I chose to focus my research in Nima and 
Maamobi both for practical and theoretical reasons. As an intern at the LRC, I had developed 
several contacts within the communities, contacts which I was able to maintain over the years. 
The communities also posed an interesting theoretical context due to their designation as “slum 
communities.” Over the past few decades, slums have become popular locations for research. 
According to a 2008 report issued by UN-Habitat entitled, “State of the World’s Cities” there are 
over 800 million people around the globe living in slums. The Millennium Development goals 
acknowledged this situation by setting a goal to “achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in 
the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” (Target 7.D. United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals). Despite the fact that the United Nations considers this goal to have been 
met “well in advance of the 2020 deadline,” slums remain pervasive in many countries around 
the world. In 2005, 63% of the urban population in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 45.4% of the urban 
population in Ghana, lived in slums (UN-Habitat 2008, 179-180). 
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Urban slums located in capital cities like Accra also present a particularly rich 
opportunity for research on the nuances of political involvement as they are simultaneously very 
near the site of governmental power and far removed from it. Residents of Accra potentially have 
many more options for advancing claims than individuals living in rural areas as they can 
relatively easily access local and national politicians in addition to community authority figures 
such as chiefs, religious figures, and opinion leaders. Due to their socio economic status, 
however, residents of low income urban communities in Ghana still struggle to advance claims. 
Despite being closer than one mile from Flagstaff House, the office of the President, residents in 
Nima and Maamobi often expressed frustration over the fact that they were treated as outsiders 
by other residents of Accra due to the community’s poverty and demographics. Because of these 
factors, conducting research in Nima and Maamobi allowed me to observe the everyday 
challenges faced by residents in advancing claims amidst a plurality of authority figures and 
systems of power.  
Another advantage of conducting research in Nima and Maamobi is that the two 
communities have been the focus of several other academic studies over the years,16 so there is a 
relatively large amount of historical data on the development of and challenges faced by the 
communities. Most notable, and often cited by residents, is the fact that the Millennium Cities 
Initiative research team from Columbia University’s Earth Institute came to Nima to conduct 
mapping exercises (see Kang et al 2010). The project resulted in the production of intricate 
design plans for the redevelopment of the community.  
Finally, Nima and Maamobi offered a useful location for research due to the fact that they 
have been the focus of the work of the LRC, one of Ghana’s primary human rights NGOs. As 
previously discussed, local social practices and economic status have led to the community’s 
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boundaries being relatively well-defined, bordered on all sides by wealthier neighborhoods. 
Once described by scholar Lucie White (2011, 275) as “a city within a city,” Nima and Maamobi 
function almost as a small town within the larger city. This allowed me to better understand local 
social practices and to explore how various features of daily life in the community impacted how 
residents chose to interact with the LRC. As Nima and Maamobi are so close (in terms of 
proximity) to the national seat of government, but also still have many traditional authority 
figures (including chiefs, imams, and “big men”), the communities offered a rich political 
landscape in which to study the connection between human rights participation and political 
identity. In the following chapter, I discuss this local legal and political landscape in more depth. 
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Chapter 4: Law and Human Rights in Ghana 
 
 
This chapter examines the legal context in which human rights activism functions in Nima and 
Maamobi. Ghana has a complex legal history, one that has for decades been attempting to 
balance competing normative systems. Current questions of where human rights fit into the legal 
landscape are part of a long trajectory of contestation between legal fields that began with the 
system of indirect rule during colonialism (Roberts and Mann 1991). In this chapter, I review the 
legal history of Ghana, beginning with colonialism and moving through independence, the 
PNDC military regime, and the transition to democracy. I also outline the legal environment in 
Nima and Maamobi, discussing the community’s relationship with the police as well as the 
history of human rights mobilization in the neighborhoods.  
 
Law, Legal Pluralism, and the Colonial State 
In Ghana, human rights entered into a multifaceted legal system that is influenced by the 
contestation between multiple legal regimes that began with the system of indirect rule during 
colonialism (Roberts and Mann 1991). The British colonial system of indirect rule was first 
implemented in Nigeria by Sir Frederick Lugard, High Commissioner of the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria. It then spread throughout the colonies during the first half of the 20th Century. 
As a general rule, the system of indirect rule employed a bifurcated legal structure of European 
and African law. Colonial courts were created to handle disputes that involved Europeans or 
Creoles (Roberts and Mann 1991, 13). In addition to these courts, African “native” courts 
(sometimes called “customary courts”) remained in place to hear cases involving Africans. 
Traditional authority figures were given the power to rule over customary courts as long as the 
laws passed the repugnancy test and were not deemed to violate the British sense of good 
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conscience and equity (Davies and Dagbanja 2009, 306).  In the Gold Coast, these courts were 
incorporated into the colonial legal system through the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 
which created an appeal mechanism in colonial court for those dissatisfied with the African court 
(Roberts and Mann 1991). The system was conceived of as a way to exert power over African 
communities through the use of local institutions (Mamdani 1996). Lugard’s plan included 
organizing colonial and African rulers in a way in which there would not be a dual system of 
rule, but rather, “a single government in which Native chiefs have well-defined duties” (Lugard 
1918, quoted in Roberts and Mann 1991, 20). This structure was seen as a way to add local 
legitimacy to colonial command by drawing from the influential powers that chiefs had over 
their people (Enwright 1985, 38).  
In implementing this system, the British sought consistent sets of justiciable customary 
laws, easily identifiable leaders, and political structures reminiscent of governments in Europe. 
Despite this goal, colonial administrators had to contend with local systems of fluid customary 
laws and variable levels of political cohesiveness. In response to this, colonial administrators 
attempted to create uniformity amidst diversity. In Ghana, for example, certain regions, like 
Ashanti, were already organized into a centralized system of authority. Other areas, such as 
Northern Ghana and the Volta Region, however, had lower levels of political centralization 
(Nugent 1996). In areas lacking a clear authority figure or hierarchical structure, the British 
appointed “warrant chiefs” in order to create uniform systems that would facilitate trade and 
order (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987, 11). There were also efforts during this time to codify 
customary law into a more consistent system to be used in native courts (Davies and Dagbanja 
2009, 306).  
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Although these acts to restructure systems of authority in the colonies should be viewed 
as strategies of British domination, it would be a mistake, as Martin Chanock (1985) notes, to 
ignore the ways in which African elites also attempted to manipulate the system to advance their 
own interests. An example of this can be seen in the codification of customary law. Many of 
those selected by the British to become warrant chiefs pushed forward their own self-serving 
interpretations of customary law to be codified and therefore found the system “to be the most 
advantageous instrument for translating their values and interests into power over others” 
(Chanock 1985, 236). The advancement gained by chiefs through the system of indirect rule was, 
however, not without consequence. David Apter (1972) has noted that chiefs who were able to 
make social and economic gains through their association with colonial officials were often 
viewed as being in collusion with the colonial rulers. This perceived complicity not only made 
the system of indirect rule less effective for the British, who relied on the legitimacy of local 
chiefs, but also led to tensions between customary authority figures and the African elite who 
assumed power at the time of independence. 
 
Postcolonial Period and Neoliberal Reforms: 1957-1992 
At the time of independence, law continued to hold a prominent place in the Ghanaian political 
imagination. Chanock (1985, 54) describes how during the transition from colonialism to 
independence, the political leaders of many African nations quickly sought to do away with the 
bifurcated legal systems that had been imposed during colonialism. Creating a legal system with 
“proper courts, proper procedures, known laws, and a separation of powers” that was also guided 
by the principles of customary law became a popular model of postcolonial African “legal 
nationalism” (1985, 54). The use of these laws and courts therefore became associated with the 
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notion of citizenship in the newly independent nations. In their book, Law and Disorder in the 
Postcolony, Jean and John Comaroff revisit the role of law in the postcolony by examining the 
causes and consequences of legal fetishism. As they note, 36 African nations have written new 
Constitutions since 1989. Accompanying these Constitutions, the Comaroffs argue, has been a 
certain wholehearted belief among the citizenry in the law’s ability to solve problems and to 
“conjure up equitable, just, ethnically founded, pacific polities” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 
22). Within this context, the legal system (including local courts, Constitutions, and other 
organizations mandated to uphold laws), plays a central role in the country’s political 
imagination.  
In the postcolonial period, political leaders have continued to manage the relationship 
between customary and statutory law in efforts to protect their authority and pursue nation-
building projects. In the years following Ghanaian independence, the powers of the chiefs were 
severely restricted by policies enacted by Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah. Kwame 
Boafo-Arthur (2003) argues that the policies implemented by Nkrumah in the years following 
independence were primarily motivated by two factors. First, despite the fact that some chiefs 
supported the movement to independence, many were still perceived as supporters or 
collaborators of the colonial system from which they derived significant power. Second, there 
was still considerable fear that the legitimacy of the chiefs would present too large a risk to the 
primacy of state authority. This fear was heightened when the traditional ruler of the Ashanti 
region, the Asantehene, decided to support the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in what 
was viewed by many as a secessionist campaign against Nkrumah (Ray 1996).   
One of the policies undertaken by Nkrumah was the adoption of the 1961 Chieftaincy 
Act, which established Regional Houses of Chiefs. These councils served as representative 
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bodies in which chiefs could collectively advise on specific national issues, although they only 
dealt with matters that were referred to them by state level officials, and their powers were 
strictly advisory in nature (Rathbone 2000). The Houses of Chiefs therefore provided a 
controlled space for chiefly participation, while remaining under the direct control of the state. 
By locating the ultimate authority over decisions concerning the system of chieftaincy within the 
state apparatus, Nkrumah’s policies had a similar effect to the system of indirect rule (Ansere 
1977; Francis 1968). The system of chieftaincy was allowed to continue, but chiefs were, at least 
in a formal legal sense, dependent on the state. 
Although the spheres of state and customary authority were strictly divided by law, there 
are many areas of political life in Ghana where this distinction is not so clear. The practice of 
patronage is one such area. As many scholars have noted, informal institutions continue to play a 
prominent role in the daily lives of Ghanaians (Kleist 2011; Pellow 2011; MacLean 2010; 
Nugent 1995; Lentz 1998). The informal relationships between patrons and clients assist 
individuals in making political connections, demonstrating status, navigating government 
bureaucracy, and fulfilling everyday material needs. This hierarchical system has its roots in 
customary notions of authority and obligation, but has also been reinforced through the policies 
of indirect-rule and neoliberal reform. Price (1974) argues that current systems of patronage find 
legitimacy in Ghana due to the fact that both pre-colonial and colonial systems of authority were 
organized in a similar fashion. For the Akan, the largest ethnic group in Ghana, hierarchical 
relationships were a primary feature of social organization with elites ruling over both slaves and 
voluntary servants (Price 1974, 179). Price notes that even among the acephalous tribes in 
Northern Ghana, status was regimented along the lines of age. In these customary hierarchical 
relationships, the division between “big men” and “small boys” was distinguished not only by 
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status, but by obligation. Big men had clear responsibilities in terms of providing for the “small 
boys” who supported them, and in turn, the small boys displayed obedience to and public support 
of their masters (Price 1974, 175). Despite the state’s desire to divide customary and statutory 
practices, this belief that political big men have a responsibility to provide for their small boys 
has persisted.  
As time passed, the state’s negotiations with competing legal regimes also grew to 
include new normative orders, notably international human rights. The state’s use of rights 
language actually extends back to the years surrounding the country’s struggle for independence 
when Nkrumah rejected European colonialism as a violation of the “fundamental human right” 
of self-determination (Nkrumah 1958, 46). Since this time, Ghanaian state officials have 
occasionally embraced international human rights as a justification to regulate the customary 
system or as a way to build legitimacy within the international community. At other times, when 
the human rights regime has posed a challenge to the power of the state, officials have rejected 
its values as being foreign impositions (Hodzic 2009).   
The negotiation with, and strategic use of, rights language in Ghana became especially 
apparent, however, during the 10 year period under the military regime of the Provisional 
National Defense Council (PNDC). When Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and his military 
government came to power in 1981, they cited “economic mismanagement” as a primary 
justification of their coup (Adedeji 2001). During the period in which the PNDC ruled, Rawlings 
and other government officials loudly promoted collective “economic rights” while 
simultaneously violating the civil and political rights of citizens (Haynes 1991; Oquaye 1995). 
Much of the repression came through government actions and new laws put into place that 
seriously limited the rights of citizens. One such law was the “Habeas Corpus Amendment Law” 
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(PNDC Law 91). This law prevented courts from making inquiries into discretionary detentions 
made by the military regime under the Protective Custody Law (PNDC Law 4).  Another law, 
the Public Tribunal Law, (PNDCL 78) “imposed the death penalty by firing squad for political 
offenses” and prevented the Superior Courts of Judicature from overseeing or reviewing these 
decisions (Oquaye 1995, 564). In addition to these laws, associates of the military regime also 
perpetrated extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, disappearances, and other acts 
of violence against suspected political opponents (Haynes 1991, Anyidoho 2011).  
This period of time also saw an increase in the use of local patrons to meet individual and 
community needs (Ubink 2007). Eric Wolf once wrote that a patron’s power “depends in a large 
part upon his ability to distribute some share of the all-too-limited supply of goods and services,” 
(1966, 94). He continued by stating if the state is unwilling or unable to provide for the basic 
needs of citizens, the opportunity exists for individual patrons to attract new clients. Ghana under 
the rule of Jerry Rawlings provides an excellent illustration of this causal relationship. In 1983, 
after many years of economic crisis, President Rawlings signed an agreement with the World 
Bank and embarked on wide scale neoliberal reforms. The reforms instituted by Rawlings 
conformed to the model of structural adjustment as required by the IMF and the World Bank. 
Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have several primary components. To be in compliance, 
governments receiving loans must implement policies to privatize property and state-owned 
businesses, cut public expenditures, deregulate international trade, and devalue their currency to 
encourage foreign investment and trade (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, 15). Ghana was one of 
the first African countries to adopt and institute these policies (World Bank 1984) and quickly 
became known as a model of compliance in the international development community (Clark 
2003, 94; Chalfin 2008, 521). Within the first ten years of policy implantation, the impacts of 
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structural adjustment were clearly visible in the county’s economy. In 1983, when structural 
adjustment began, the rate of exchange was three cedis (Ghana’s currency) to the U.S. dollar. 
Ten years later, the rate had fallen to 450 cedis to the dollar (Meredith 2005, 372). The Rawlings 
regime also privatized the cocoa industry (Ghana’s largest cash crop), increased levels of foreign 
investment and trade, and attempted to increase privatized land within the country (Dicklitch and 
Howard-Hassmann 2007).  
The reforms also contributed to new burdens placed on individual citizens. Some of these 
burdens were purely financial, such as higher costs for utilities, reduced governmental subsidies 
on education and health care, and higher unemployment rates (Boafo-Arthur 1999b, 53). Public 
expenditures were also drastically cut including the withdrawal of health subsidies, making 
health care unaffordable for the average worker (Boafo-Arthur 1999a, 49). These reforms had 
several effects on the systems of patronage in Ghana. First, where citizens used to rely on the 
state for the provision of social services, including education and health care, they were now 
responsible for paying for these costs individually. This created opportunities for wealthy and 
well-connected individuals to gain status through their ability to assist others in obtaining various 
services. Janine Ubink (2007, 126) notes, for example, that the institution of structural 
adjustment policies “created an increased space for the involvement of traditional authorities in 
law enforcement, dispute resolution, service provision, and the implementation of development 
projects.”  
In other cases, local level politicians have found themselves increasingly responsible for 
self-funding local small-scale development projects that the state is no longer willing or able to 
complete. One Sunday evening, during my visit with a local Assemblyman, he lamented the fact 
that he had spent his entire weekend trying to fix a streetlight that had gone out within the 
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borders of his constituency. When I inquired as to whether this was part of his official 
responsibilities as Assemblyman, he stated:  
Actually, we are not supposed to do it. I am not supposed to pay for anything without 
using money from the AMA (Accra Metropolitan Assembly). But if you wait to get 
money from AMA, it won’t come. If you want to be reelected, you have to take your own 
pocket money to build trust.17 
As this example illustrates, weak and poorly funded state institutions often create contexts in 
which politicians feel pressure to play both informal and formal roles in the community. 
Although neoliberal reforms may have decreased the state’s presence in some areas of 
life, such as social service provision, they also altered jurisdictional spaces in ways that increased 
the need for citizens to interact with the state bureaucracy in others. As previously noted, in 
Ghana, structural adjustment policies required the state to assume control over some spheres that 
had historically been under the control of customary authority figures (notably, land regulation). 
Whereas villagers used to be able to visit their local chief to attend to land disputes, they were 
now encouraged to take their concerns to state courts and title offices. To assist individuals in 
navigating these new bureaucratic procedures, a growing number of agents and middle-men 
sprang up within communities. Within postcolonial settings, scholars have tended to focus on the 
roles that these “brokers” play in mediating the relationship between citizen and state (Ansell 
2010). Brokers serve the role of connecting individuals either to government offices directly or 
to other big men who can do so. In Nima and Maamobi, residents sometimes refer to these 
people as “push people,” as they are able to help push claims and requests through to higher-
level officials. Brokers such as these continue to play a significant role in what one resident 
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called the “communication channel” in communities such as Nima and Maamobi, earning their 
status through their “wealth in people” (Bledsoe 1980) rather than their financial resources.  
 
Democratization: Human Rights in the Fourth Republic 
During the same time that supporters of the PNDC were cutting social services and committing 
acts of violence against their suspected opponents, the international community was placing 
more pressure on developing countries to support policies of democratic rule. As Mike Oquaye 
(1995) notes, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, “good governance” became a requirement to 
continue receiving aid from international agencies. These continued domestic and international 
pressures led the Rawlings regime to prompt a transition to democracy in 1992. Despite their 
past actions, the PNDC successfully transitioned the country to democracy and helped to write 
the current Constitution, a document that places a large focus on human rights. As Anyidoho 
(2011) notes, this was partially due to global political pressure, but also was guided by the 
initiative of the regime itself.  
 
The Constitution 
In many ways, the 1992 Constitution stands as the clearest example of the attempt by the 
Ghanaian elite to maintain “conscious coordination between legal orders” (Schmid 2001, 10). 
First, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana blends aspects of various competing legal orders in the 
country, including customary law and human rights, while continuing to maintain the state’s 
primacy of law. Chapter 22, Article 270 (1) of the 1992 Constitution states, “The institution of 
chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is 
hereby guaranteed.” The power of the House of Chiefs is also maintained through a provision 
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that gives the House advisory power over any issues relating to chieftaincy as well as the duty to 
oversee, collect and review customary laws (1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 272 (c)). 
Despite these provisions, however, the Constitution draws a clear boundary between the state 
authority system and the customary system. Chiefs may advise on customary issues through the 
regional and national Houses of Chiefs, but they also are restricted by Article 276, which states 
“A chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any chief wishing to do so and seeking 
election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin.” Individuals may attempt to traverse the 
border established by the Constitution between the state and chieftaincy, but these actions are 
contentious. One example of this is when chiefs are perceived as too openly supporting one 
political candidate or another. The press, as well as elite members of both the government and 
the chieftaincy, tend to treat actions such as these with suspicion18 because they see them as 
threats to the Ghanaian system of “divided sovereignty” that offers both government officials 
and chiefs protected spaces to rule and adjudicate disputes (Ray 1996).  
In addition to outlining a clear divide between the state and chieftaincy systems, the 1992 
Constitution also clearly delineates the boundaries of the human rights field in Ghana. Chapter 
five of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana outlines the “fundamental human rights and freedoms” of 
all Ghanaian citizens, and many of the human rights described in international treaties and 
declarations have been incorporated into domestic law within this chapter. The Constitution also 
makes provisions for a special Human Rights Court devoted to adjudicating cases related to this 
chapter of the Constitution and a non-judicial institution called the Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) mandated to “protect fundamental human rights and 
to ensure good governance for every person in Ghana” (CHRAJ Ghana 2014). CHRAJ, along 
with an independent Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Civic Education 
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(NCCE), was initially developed as a “buffer institution” to maintain the public’s confidence in 
the system of checks and balances (Quashigah 2013). The organization is vested with the ability 
to investigate complaints of human rights violations, acts of corruption, or “unfair treatment of 
any person by a public officer in the exercise of his official duties” (Quashigah 2013: 19). In the 
past, CHRAJ has even conducted investigations which resulted in their recommending the 
removal of prominent state officials.19 
The contents of the 1992 Constitution were, in part, determined through a process of 
national consultation. Starting in 1990, the National Commission for Democracy (NDC) (an 
organization established by the PNDC charged with guiding the transition to democracy) held 
community forums around the country to solicit information about what the people of Ghana 
wanted in terms of government. Forums were held in all 10 regions of the country, and 
participants from a variety of social backgrounds were invited (Ghana Information Services 
1994). After determining that the people wished to return to multi-party rule, the PNDC gathered 
a nine-member Committee of Experts to write a new Constitution for the country. Although the 
Committee had some independence in writing the Constitution, they were mandated by the 
PNDC to include certain provisions. Some of these, including the guaranteed freedom and 
independence of the media, were clear reactions to negative reputation that Ghana had gained in 
the international community under the rule of the PNDC (Berry 1995). Once the Constitution 
was written, each provision was then voted upon by a 258-member Consultative Assembly. The 
Assembly also took suggestions from the public during this time. (Constitution Writing and 
Conflict Resolution 2005). After the process was completed, the PNDC added an extensive set of 
transitional provisions, which granted blanket immunity to members of the party for acts taken 
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under the regime. Before coming into force, the new Constitution was put to a public referendum 
on April 28. 1992. The referendum passed with 92% of the vote.  
 
Human Rights Discourse and Debates 
Despite the formalization of human rights in the Ghanaian legal system, there are still many 
examples of human rights being contested, both by the citizenry and by the government. In many 
cases, claims of cultural incompatibility between Ghanaian “traditional beliefs” and human rights 
have been offered as justification for this opposition. Scholars such as Saida Hodzic (2009) have 
noted, however, that often, in cases such as these, essentialized notions of “culture” are 
instrumentalized to achieve particular political aims. A clear example of this can be seen in the 
case of Ghana’s Criminal Code (Amendment) Act of 1998, commonly referred to as the 
“Trokosi Law.” Trokosi refers to the practice of sending young virgin girls to religious shrines to 
serve as slaves and atone for the crimes committed by another member of the family. The 
practice, which is associated with the customary religions of some ethnic groups in Eastern 
Ghana, was, at one time, somewhat common. The passing of this law, which criminalizes the 
practice, came after an extended campaign, first casting the debate in terms of Christianity 
(Ameh 2004; Dovlo 2005). Objectors to the bill quickly characterized it as a “Christian attack on 
African Traditional Religion,” however, leading supporters to recast their campaign in the 
language of human rights (Ameh 2004, 58; 63).  
Despite the initial support, use of the law has been minimal. Ameh (2004) argues that this 
has largely been due to the fact that detractors have successfully framed the law as one grounded 
in “imported values that contradict African traditional values” (2004, 54). In Ghana, the histories 
of colonial rule and also state repression continue to impact how citizens view the court system. 
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For example, Hasty (2005) argues that Ghana’s colonial history has created a common “narrative 
of colonial oppression and indigenous resistance” that leads to individuals being skeptical of 
normative systems (such as human rights) that are framed as impositions from the outside (2005, 
272).  
Additionally, other scholars suggest that Ghanaians may be less likely to use the court 
system to claim their human rights due to the supportive role that the national courts have played 
in various military regimes. At several periods during Ghana’s history, the judiciary was used by 
dictatorial leaders to “legally” imprison and repress opponents. (Oquaye 2000, 62; Tankebe 
2008, 77). Ike Udogu (2003, 103) argues that this history of repression may impact the average 
citizen’s belief in the power of the courts to protect their human rights. Although the 1992 
Constitution attempts to break with this history by emphasizing civil rights and liberties, Justice 
Tankebe (2009, 256) argues that there has not yet been a serious attempt to legitimize the police 
in Ghana. As a result, the populace retains a continued skepticism towards the criminal justice 
system (Afrobarometer 2013).20 Where courts are seen as expensive, slow, and potentially 
corrupt (Adinkrah 2005; Tankebe 2009), social mobilization outside of courts or the use of 
customary authority figures may provide alternatives that are seen as more accessible and 
legitimate (Mokogoro 1996; Crook 2004; Kane et al. 2005; Ubink 2007). 
Another example of the discursive conflict between human rights and custom can be seen 
in the debate that surrounded the creation of new domestic violence legislation.  The Domestic 
Violence Bill was initially drafted by a Ghanaian women’s rights organization. The bill was 
highly contentious, largely because it contained a provision that criminalized marital rape (Dovlo 
2005; Hodzic 2009). There were four primary objections expressed against the bill. Those 
opposed to the bill argued that 1) the human rights language was a foreign imposition, 2) the bill 
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threatened the traditional notion of a Ghanaian family, 3) domestic violence should be dealt with 
privately, and 4) that traditional authorities should be in charge of handling issues of the family 
(Ansa-Ansare 2003, cited in Hodzic 2009, 337). As Saida Hodzic notes, the debates around this 
bill “reflect familiar scholarly and activist debates about human rights, which are often structured 
as an oppositional oscillation between ‘culture’ and ‘rights,’” (2009, 332).  
Generally, the literature assumes that this debate occurs between indigenous customary 
ideals and foreign conceptions of human rights. But, as Hodzic (2009, 331) explains, in the case 
of Ghana’s Domestic Violence Bill, it was the government, not customary leaders, who invoked 
the discourse of cultural sovereignty against claims of human rights. Although both Dovlo 
(2005) and Hodzic (2009) explain that many individuals had nuanced positions about whether or 
not they supported the bill, the government campaigned against it heavily. During this campaign, 
government officials stated that they were representing the position of “the people” (Hodzic 
2009, 342). Government officials also used this opportunity to campaign for larger nationalist 
goals by portraying the bill as an imposition of Western values that should be rejected in favor of 
a more essentially Ghanaian conception of gender and the family (2009, 338). Several scholars 
note that the use of “culture” in opposition to rights is generally seen in the literature as a form of 
resistance instead of an exercise of power (Merry 2006a, 65; Hodzic 2009, 352). Hodzic 
illustrates, however, that the language of culture and tradition may also be employed by a 
dominant power (in this case, the state) in an effort to maintain sovereignty. As scholars such as 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Handler and Linnekin (1984) note, notions of tradition are 
often “invented” as a way to imbue opinions and practices with legitimacy.   
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The Role of Civil Society Organizations 
Another aspect of the political environment that has been influential in the advancement of 
human rights in Ghana is civil society. Although scholars have debated the exact definition of 
civil society, it is generally described as “the political space between the state and the household” 
(Mohan 2002, 125). This sphere has historically been regarded by scholars as vitally important to 
the development and deepening of democracy. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in 
1931, he noted in his book, Democracy in America, that it was the prevalence of civic 
associations in the United States that contributed to such as strong sense of democratic 
citizenship among the populace (Tocqueville 1969). Over the years, many other scholars have 
supported the argument that a strong civil society is related to a more democratic society 
(Krishna 2002; Putnam 1995, 2000), or at least that civil society and democracy are 
interdependent (Gill 2000; Paxton 2002).  
The growth of civil society in Africa largely followed patterns of urbanization. As people 
moved away from their villages and kin groups into urban areas, clubs and other voluntary 
organizations grew in popularity (Woods 1992). These groups were especially common in 
communities like Nima and Maamobi where many ethnic groups are living within the same 
space without clearly defined traditional authorities. In Pellow’s (1987) work on a different 
zongo community in Ghana, she argues that women generally join social organizations, 
specifically groups called “zumunci” “not for economic advancement or primary financial 
welfare or political action but for the creation of a kin-like community in the stranger setting” 
(Pellow 1987, 489).  In Nima and Maamobi, social organizations are similarly important, 
although they do not necessarily seem to serve as substitutes for kinship groups.21 
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Importantly, civil society is nearly always defined as being a political space separate from 
the state. Diamond (1996) argues that civil society is “the realm of organized social life that is 
voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal order or set of shared rules,” (1996, 228). Autonomy from the state allows civil society to 
speak freely and hold government officials accountable when they are not meeting democratic 
ideals. These factors are primary mechanisms in the relationship between civil society and 
democratic consolidation.  
Despite this definition, the distinct separation is not always so clear in practice. As was 
the case in many other African countries, civil society in Ghana was suppressed under 
colonialism (Makumbe 1998). When Ghana gained independence, there was considerable fear 
that the legitimacy of the chiefs would present too large a risk to the primacy of state authority. 
In an effort to stifle the power of the chiefs, Nkrumah selectively supported various civil society 
organizations so as to provide alternative service providers at the village level. Mohan (2002, 
139) argues that this model of “state-supported civil society” has been common in African 
countries that are attempting to centralize authority.  
The Ghanaian state has not always been in support of civil society, however. In 1983, 
when President Rawlings signed an agreement with the World Bank to embark on wide-scale 
neoliberal reforms, the state saw a drastic decrease in state-sponsored social services. Costs for 
utilities went up and there was a reduction in government subsidies for education and health care. 
To meet these newfound needs, there was also a proliferation of NGOs in the years following the 
implementation of structural adjustment (Mohan 2002). Many of these NGOs received support 
from international organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and DFID (Department for 
International Development). Officially, these organizations justified their support of civil society 
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organizations as a means to increase state accountability (Mohan 2002). Scholars such as Hearn 
(2001), however, note that foreign support for civil society during periods of structural 
adjustment is often done with the intention of broadening consensus for the stringent economic 
policies by ameliorating some of the social costs felt at the community-level.  
In more recent decades, the Ghanaian state and civil society have continued to have a 
complex relationship. Although civil society is ostensibly separate from the state, many 
individuals worry that it has been coopted by the government (Gyimeh-Boadi 1996). This 
anxiety was ever-present in my interviews with community activists. Many of them felt that they 
would only be able to remain independent and “free to talk” against the state if they remained 
completely politically neutral. As Tusalem (2007) notes, when NGOs are independent of the 
state, they are valuable to the process of democratic consolidation because they offer an 
“institutional alternative” that can monitor and expose government behavior.  Other activists felt 
that their civil society organizations needed to remain unconnected to politicians, but that they 
themselves needed personal connections with government in order to obtain resources. The 
question of how much contact with politicians was too much was highly contentious for civil 
society actors in Nima and Maamobi. I explore these tensions at length in Chapter 7.  
 
Justice, Crime, and Human Rights in Nima and Maamobi 
For many years, Nima and Maamobi have had a reputation for poverty and lawlessness. Within 
the local lexicon, the term “Nima Boy” has become shorthand for referring to youth from the 
area who engage in “rough” behavior.22 Shatta Wale, a popular Ghanaian reggae-dancehall 
musician even wrote a song titled, “Nima Boy,” in which he sings: “So if you know, say you no 
like me / Make sure say you not go fight me / we not go take things likely.” The reputation of 
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Nima as a lawless community was only strengthened when, in 2005, a man described by police 
as “the country's most wanted armed robber” and 26 members of his Nima-based gang, were 
arrested, (Ghana News Agency 2005). Although, according to residents, violent crime has now 
decreased, there is new concern that Nima and Maamobi have become hubs of “419,” or internet 
fraud, activity.23 It is especially common to hear residents of the older generation lamenting the 
number of internet cafes springing up around the community, filled with young people.  
Outside of the two communities, Ghanaians tend to refer to both Nima and Maamobi as 
“Nima.” Nima is the larger of the two neighborhoods and its market is the primary market. The 
two communities are structurally indistinguishable, and their geographic division is only marked 
by the infamous “gutter.” Although many residents will say that the two communities are the 
same, some made a point to explain to me that Maamobi was “somehow calmer” or “more 
peaceful.” The reputation of Nima carries throughout Accra and was mentioned by several 
activists as a motivating factor in their getting involved in youth clubs. One of the clubs, “Avert 
Youth Foundation,” was founded as a direct response to the community’s reputation. As one 
activist noted, “In the old days, when they said Nima, they think of it as one of these violence 
areas. We wanted to ‘avert’ this reputation, so that is where the name comes from.”24  
Due to this reputation, in my interviews, residents often described having difficulties 
accessing justice. The two most common, seemingly contradictory, complaints are that the police 
harass the youth of the community and that it is nearly impossible to get the police to come if a 
complaint is made. The police generally ask for a community member to “lead” them to houses 
where they are intending to make arrests or investigations. As one resident noted, this makes 
people less likely to report problems to the police. She stated, “Ghana police are no good. If you 
go report, they will tell you have to lead them. And you can’t because then you will have a 
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problem with your neighbor. So if you see something, you just keep quiet because you can’t 
talk.”25 Members of the local “community watchdog” group stated that the police often call one 
of them to escort officers through the community. One stated, “They do not like coming into the 
community unescorted. Many of the alleyways are dark and narrow, and the police do not know 
their way around well.”26 I was also told that sometimes the police ask members of the watchdog 
group to make the arrest themselves and then bring the person to the police station. This lack of 
police willingness to investigate community reported crimes is coupled with a general distrust of 
the police who residents believed, especially in the past, would harass and arrest young men in 
the community simply for being “Nima boys.”  
Motivated by this complex legal situation, in 1997, two University of Ghana law students 
opened a human rights and legal aid organization within the community called the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC). The model that they chose to implement was inspired by similar 
human rights-based legal aid centers around the world. In fact, one of the organization’s 
founders, Mahama Ayariga, had previously completed an internship at the well-known South 
African Legal Resources Centre, the Ghanaian LRC’s namesake.  Soon after its inception, the 
LRC began working with PDHRE, the People’s Movement for Human Rights Learning, a human 
rights organization based in New York City, to establish a human rights city in Nima and 
Maamobi. The organization hosted community leaders forums between 1999 and 2000, and in 
2001, after 13 months of planning, a Human Rights City in Nima-Maamobi was officially 
established (PHDRE 2007).  
The Nima-Maamobi human rights city did not come to fruition through formal 
government recognition. In contrast to human rights cities such as Rosario (Marks, Modrowski 
and Lichem 2008) and Graz (Starl 2016), there was no formal agreement declaring Nima and 
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Maamobi a human rights city. To say that the city was “established” in 2001 recognizes the fact 
that this was the year in which community leaders (such as chiefs, opinion leaders, and assembly 
members) officially took on the challenge of meeting the human rights goals that had been 
developed during the previous planning phase. These goals were ensconced in several 
documents, including the Organizational Strategic Plans developed by various community-based 
organizations (PDHRE 2007). It is important to note, however, that the commitment to the 
human rights city as well as its strategic goals was moral, rather than legal, in nature.  
In 1997, when the LRC first began its work, the country was experiencing tremendous 
growth in the NGO sector and in the use of human rights discourse due to its new Constitution, 
which made many human rights legally justiciable (Opoku-Mensah 2007). Within this 
formalized human rights context, the LRC began its work in Nima and Maamobi. Although 
many other human rights cities around the world have used their promotion of human rights as a 
way to “differentiate themselves from others” (van Aarsen et al 2013, 26), activists in Nima and 
Maamobi more often discuss human rights as a tool with which they can become more similar to 
other communities. For example, one lawyer stated that human rights activists in the area “are 
trying to make it so that it is not like you are moving from one town to the other when you move 
from here (Maamobi) to Airport Residential.27” Similarly, at a community human rights forum, a 
local chief stated “Our community, the area is not a great distance from the seat of the President, 
but it feels very far, like a village, a village where pregnant woman are carried! Where the sick 
are carried to be able to reach a road.” For community activists, a human rights-based approach 
to lobbying is a tool to address what they see as discrimination and inequality within the larger 
city limits.  
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“Training of Trainers” 
The LRC primarily operates through its connections with community based organizations in 
Nima and Maamobi.28 Several of these groups were created by the LRC as umbrella 
organizations to unite previously existing small community clubs into larger entities. Others 
existed as more informal groups that have now grown into very visible advocacy organizations. 
Two of the most active groups in the community, the Federation of Youth Clubs (FYC) and the 
Mother’s Club, provide examples of each of these types of provenances. The Federation of 
Youth Clubs was established at the suggestion of the two founders of the LRC. As Yussif,29 one 
of the founding members of the FYC, recounts it, the FYC “grew out of a problem.” The 
community had been experiencing a lot of problems with the police who would come into the 
neighborhood, suspect the young men of crimes, and then take them to the police station. “Why 
only do that in a deprived community? We felt that they were trying to criminalize poverty,” he 
stated. Because of this, the two lawyers who founded the LRC suggested that the youth of the 
community schedule a protest. The government did not want the demonstration to take place, so 
the National Security Coordinator invited representatives of the LRC to a meeting. The lawyers 
felt that the community should also be represented, so they invited several of the leaders of local 
youth clubs to attend as well. At the meeting, an agreement was made that the youth would call 
off the protest if the police would come to community meetings inside Nima and Maamobi. After 
the meeting, Raymond Atuguba, one of the founders of the LRC, suggested that they start an 
umbrella organization called the Federation of Youth Clubs to unite the many youth clubs in the 
communities.30 This organization has continued to champion the causes of the local youth ever 
since.  
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The second organization, The Mother’s Club, followed a different trajectory. The 
Mother’s Club began in 1996. The president of the club describes it this way:  
When we started, we were just 7-8 women who came to talk. Although we didn’t go to 
school, we came to talk, talk about ‘what are we going to do?’ We went house to house, 
even though we didn’t know anything. We then joined with Ghana Red Cross. We had 
small education from them. We put on aprons from them with the symbol so some people 
would take you serious. We do this for a long time before LRC called us to their 
meetings. We were very proud. We started with nothing and no one.31  
Today, the Mother’s Club has over 200 registered members throughout the communities of Nima 
and Maamobi, although the number of women who attend weekly meetings is much lower.  
Much of this group’s advocacy takes place through “house to house” campaigns. These 
education and advocacy campaigns specifically target the population of women in Nima and 
Maamobi who are at home during the day. On one house to house campaign in which I was able 
to take part the women from the Mother’s Club broke into teams of two to tackle different areas 
of the community. When we arrived at a house, the women asked if there were other women at 
home. Once everyone was assembled in the courtyard, the representatives from the Mother’s 
Club first took a survey of the sanitation facilities available in the house (such as toilets, latrines, 
running water, etc.). They then proceeded to do a brief presentation about the proper method for 
handwashing. These house to house campaigns therefore offer an efficient way for the Mother’s 
Club to build social networks, collect data, and also provide education.  
Staff at the LRC have targeted the members of these clubs and several others for human 
rights education and capacity building programs with the intention that the clubs will then take 
on the primary responsibility of mobilizing other community residents, an approach referred to 
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by many LRC staff members as “training of trainers.” This approach has taken on new 
importance in the last few years as the LRC no longer has an office within the borders of Nima 
and Maamobi. Although the office is only a 5-10 minute drive by taxi, many of the community 
residents who have worked with the organization worry that the move will discourage new 
people from getting involved or taking their disputes to the lawyers. The leaders of the various 
community-based groups now represent the community in their dealings with the LRC. They 
also represent the LRC within the community. It is these leaders who travel to the main office of 
the LRC in Dzorwulu, a relatively wealthy neighborhood north of Maamobi, when a project is 
being organized. These leaders are also in charge of organizing community forums where the 
lawyers from the LRC come to Nima and Maamobi to work on various campaigns.32 
Additionally, these individuals often serve as unofficial community-based paralegals. During my 
fieldwork, I often witnessed or heard stories about residents approaching the members of these 
organizations seeking guidance on how to handle various disputes. Although this can be seen as 
evidence of the success of the “training of trainers” method, it also sometimes brought on 
additional burdens and stress to the activists, something that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The Drain 
When one asks activists in Nima and Maamobi to describe past human rights efforts in the 
community, they may mention the campaign to have street lights turned back on along Nima 
Highway or the right to health campaign (described in detail by Perelman and Young 2010). 
They might talk about the urban development project or the waste removal research. But they 
will almost certainly talk about the drain. The drain is a long ditch that runs for over a mile 
within the communities, dividing Nima and Maamobi. Its official name is “the Al-Hamdu 
86 
 
Gutter,” but most residents refer to it simply as “the gutter” or “the drain.” The banks of the ditch 
are lined with homes that teeter on its slowly eroding edges. At the bottom of the gutter, stagnant 
water sits, blocked from flowing by piles of garbage. The drain has become a substitute 
dumpster, in part due to the government waste removal services’ neglect of the community. 
When water levels rise in the ditch, the dirt banks, and the homes clinging to their edges, become 
vulnerable to erosion. The remaining skeletons of rooms and walls that have partially crumbled 
into the drain are visible from the precarious footbridges that traverse the chasm. The drainage 
stream runs for nearly a mile within Nima and Maamobi, and it continues further on either end 
into the surrounding neighborhoods. In the other communities, however, the ditch has been lined 
with concrete. This has substantially decreased the potential erosion and has helped the water in 
these portions continue to flow. The only sections that remain unlined are the sections in Nima 
and Maamobi. Residents often suggest that their unlined drain is visual evidence of the 
discrimination that the community faces on account of their politics, religion, ethnicity, and 
economic status. 
 
Figure 1: The Al-Hamdu Gutter, Nima (on the left bank) and Maamobi (on the right bank).  
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For over 10 years, activists in Nima and Maamobi have been attempting to lobby for their 
portion of the drain to be lined with concrete. They have held meetings with government 
officials, threatened to stage protests (as will be discussed in Chapter 7), and worked through the 
media to make the plight of the drain known around Accra. Although the human rights efforts in 
the community began with the issue of community-police relations, it is the drain that has 
become the hallmark of local advocacy efforts. In 2006, with the help of the LRC, the FYC and 
several other local CBOs received grants through the Civil Society Rights and Voice Initiative 
(RAVI), a program funded through the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID).33 These small grants helped cover the costs of mobilizing community 
members around the drainage campaign and providing human rights education. The two years in 
which the FYC was receiving funding from RAVI were the most active years of local lobbying 
around the drain issue.  
Despite the fact that the funding from RAVI has ended, the issue has remained 
omnipresent. Even as activists lobby for other issues, the topic of the drain comes up. In every 
meeting that I observed between activists and Members of Parliament, and at every community 
forum, the drain was mentioned. It has become a symbol of government neglect, and the status of 
its construction has become a harbinger of community confidence in the human rights approach 
to advocacy. Throughout my fieldwork (as well as the writing of this dissertation), the drain, and 
its associated human rights campaign, loomed large in the landscape of human rights in Nima 
and Maamobi. It is the ever-present quandary that has both provided inspiration to activists as 
well as moments that have made them question whether a human rights-based approach is really 
the answer.  
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On occasion, the struggle over the construction of the drain has led some activists to 
begin engaging in party politics as a method to obtain resources (I discuss this in depth in 
Chapter 7). Other times, frustration over the lack of progress has even prompted some 
community members to call for more violent forms of resistance. For example, when I was 
working in the community as an intern in 2008, I was speaking with one resident about the lack 
of progress on the drain project. He was very frustrated with the lack of attention the issue was 
getting from the government. When I asked him what should be done, he responded: “We will 
have to hit the streets, and there will have to be causalities, and then the whole world will know. 
That is what we will have to do. Then we will get priority.”34 Although a violent protest never 
ensued, it is important to note that both activists and residents continue to struggle with the 
question of how best to advocate for community development goals. As I will discuss throughout 
this dissertation, although human rights practices were the central focus of my fieldwork, they 
are by no means the only strategy used by residents in Nima and Maamobi to address their 
concerns.  
As is the case with the drain, activists cannot escape Ghana’s complex histories of law as 
they plan their campaigns. Questions of the appropriate relationship between custom and the 
Constitution or between civil society and the state are never far away. As activists strategize 
about the best way to claim and fulfill human rights within their community, they must navigate 
through plural normative regimes. They must attempt to balance the ideals of the human rights 
world with the current laws of the state and the socioeconomic realities of their community (such 
as the drain). Although this is not always easy, activists often employ innovative and flexible 
strategies to confront these challenges. I will discuss these strategies further in the following 
chapters.  
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Chapter 5:  The Politics of Inclusion 
Human Rights Activists and Political Participation 
 
I first met Abdul and Yussif on my first trip to Ghana in 2008. At the time, I was an intern with 
the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), and Abdul and Yussif were young activists working on a 
community sanitation rights campaign. The two men lived in adjacent low-income 
neighborhoods in Accra, Ghana’s capital city. They had been active in local civil society groups 
for many years and had quickly become integral community mediators helping to connect 
residents with the LRC.  From the LRC’s inception to when I met them in 2008, the men had 
joined many other residents at human rights education events, capacity building workshops, and 
individual meetings with human rights lawyers. “We were just learning then,” one of the men 
stated when, five years later, I asked the men to recount their history with the organization.  
It was a breezy day in late October of 2013, and the three of us were sitting on rickety 
wooden benches on a street corner in Nima. We had been discussing the men’s experiences with 
human rights activism and what they felt had changed over the years. Toward the end of our 
conversation, Abdul turned to Yussif and asked him if he remembered an incident that had 
occurred with one of the founders of the LRC, Raymond Atuguba. In early 2011, Atuguba was 
blacklisted by the Association of Magistrates and Judges of Ghana after making remarks during a 
roundtable discussion at the National Commission on Civic Education claiming that many judges 
in the country were engaged in the corrupt practice of taking bribes. In response to the claims of 
corruption, the Association resolved that judges reserved the right to recuse themselves on any 
cases brought by either Atuguba or any of the three other lawyers who also engaged in the 
roundtable discussion (Benson 2011). This decision effectively negated Atuguba and his 
colleagues’ ability to practice law in the country.     
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At the time, both Yussif and Abdul had already been involved with human rights 
activism for 8 years (2001-2008). As Abdul relayed to me, although they had never taken action 
in the high court, they knew from their training that what was happening to Atuguba was not 
right and they wanted to take action. He stated:  
They were becoming the victims. Now none of us had thought of going to the Supreme 
Court then. We had not even been to the high court, but when that happened, we quickly 
mobilized and said look, we are in a democratic era, we have the media over there, we 
know we have the basics that what is happening is not fair. We can’t sit down and let this 
go without making any comment, so we mobilized. The next moment, we were at the 
Supreme Court presenting a petition to the chief justice of the land at the time and the 
television [reporters] were there. Can you imagine that? We were there! And then police 
officers were there with arms thinking that, when they heard the federation from Nima 
were coming, they thought maybe we’d be harmful. Look, in those days the perception 
was that anyone from Nima is going to do something, so expect violence. But they didn’t 
know we had already graduated from that, that we understood what human rights were, 
so they were there in force. The police officer asked us why we didn’t call him before and 
we said look, we didn’t need to even call you.”  
Both Yussif and Abdul were laughing by this point of the story, and Yussif noted, “Yes! They 
called me and told me that before we get there we should call them, and when we went in, there 
were so many officers. We went on a motorbike past them, went to present our petition and came 
out and they didn’t even notice.” 
Their laughter continued as Abdul finished the story:  
We went marching into the office of the secretary and he was even happy because one of 
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them (staff) was even speaking Hausa! He was even trying, he wasn’t doing well, but it 
means look, we understood each other at the Supreme Court, so we were at ease. We got 
there, left it, we thanked each other, and then we left peacefully and then we had results. 
The next day we were in the media, on the television, saying look, this is our mind.35 
After he finished the story, Abdul reiterated that going to the Supreme Court is not something 
they would have thought they could do before becoming involved with the LRC. Through their 
training in lobbying and human rights, however, Abdul, Yussif, and other members of the 
community had learned that they had a right to go and present a petition. Further, they knew that 
there was no legal requirement to notify the police beforehand.36 This example is one of many 
that I heard during my fieldwork illustrating the way that participating in human rights activities 
changed the political beliefs and behavior of those who took part. In this chapter and the next, I 
argue that participating in human rights activities has had a long-lasting impact on the way that 
activists settle disputes, the frequency with which they contact government officials, and the way 
that they talk about the responsibilities of the state.  
In this chapter, I more closely examine the concept of participation. What does 
participation look like in relation to human rights activities and local government, and what 
implications does this participation have for social structures and political subjectivity? This 
chapter engages with the work of other scholars who have argued that participating in human 
rights can significantly affect how individuals conceptualize themselves and their relationships to 
others (Merry 1996, 2006a; Cowan et al. 2001; Leve 2007; Speed 2007). In line with much of the 
past anthropological literature on human rights, I argue that engaging with human rights 
procedures does channel resistance toward the state. Many scholars have interpreted this process 
to be potentially depoliticizing, arguing also that it may support and even strengthen existing 
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power dynamics (Merry 1992; Wilson 1997; Englund 2006; Speed 2007). In this chapter, 
however, I explore how this process can also potentially be an empowering and politicizing one, 
particularly for individuals who have previously been excluded from, and neglected by, the 
government. For these individuals, human rights practices offer the “legal backbone” necessary 
to destabilize community power hierarchies and make claims directly of state officials.37  
 
Participation and the Politics of Inclusion 
Central to my argument in this dissertation is the notion that the process of claims making itself 
has an effect on the way that human rights activists view themselves and their relationship to the 
government. After participating in human rights activities, activists interact with government 
officials more frequently and express greater confidence in their ability (and in fact, their right) 
to do so. This claim is supported by the work of many other anthropologists who have argued 
that engaging with the human rights system influences behavior by compelling individuals and 
groups to make claims in particular ways (Merry 1996, 2006a; Cowan et al. 2001; Leve 2007; 
Speed 2007). As such, participating in human rights activities, whether through rights talk or 
legal processes, requires specific constructions and performances of subjectivity. As a result, the 
human rights system serves to universalize political subjects. This process of universalization, 
some argue, decreases the possibility of actually challenging the state’s repressive power (Speed 
2007).  
The bolstering of the power of the state, frequently the primary perpetrator of rights 
violations, by routing of claims through national channels is often seen as a potentially 
depoliticizing force. This may be especially true in cases where human rights claims are made 
through the legal system. As Wilson (2007) notes, it is the process of moving social disputes 
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from the political into the legal realm, as he calls it, the “legalization of social conflicts,” that 
leads to the depoliticization of human rights victims and violations. Human rights organizations 
often remove social context in order to more neatly make the facts of the case fit into a technical 
legal framework. In doing so, the structural processes related to the violations, which are so often 
the basis for political struggles, are erased (Wilson 1997).  
 At the same time, however, for individuals who have long been viewed as “foreign” and 
excluded from the political process, the act of representing oneself in front of the government as 
an “acceptable” political subject can also be potentially politicizing. Residents of Nima and 
Maamobi have for years been limited in their ability to effectively engage with the national 
government. As slum communities, both neighborhoods are categorized and governed by the 
state.38 And yet, as residents of slum communities, individuals living within the two 
neighborhoods often struggle to gain recognition for themselves as full rights-bearing citizens, 
entitled to social service provision, property rights, and access to justice. Because of this, the act 
of representing oneself as a rights-claiming political subject in Nima and Maamobi has the 
potential to challenge existing power inequities in a way that it may not in other contexts.  
 The roots of the struggle over political representation within slums reach back to the days 
when Ghana was a British colony. Under colonial rule, clear and “rational” plans, maps, and data 
collection were valorized as key components of centralized administration (Rao 2013).  
Similarly, fingerprinting and census taking were central practices of colonial administration 
across the British Empire (Jacobsen 2012). These practices, and their unquestioned importance, 
has largely continued. Today, Ghana has a national preoccupation with biometric data, using it 
on health insurance cards (Quaicoe 2014), passports (Dogbevi 2010), and even in distributing 
government payroll (Ahmed 2012).  
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In postcolonial nations, crafting official plans has also continued to be seen a primary 
component of effective and efficient governing. Data sources such as national maps, strategic 
plans, and collections of biometric data often serve as the epistemological foundation for 
postcolonial governmental interventions (Kalpagam 2000). Put another way, the categorization 
of people and places and the locating of individuals within the official state plan is intricately 
linked with the engendering of legal postcolonial citizens. Residents of unplanned communities 
who may not as easily be able to locate themselves within the official national maps or “plans,” 
are therefore hindered in their ability to fully ascend to the category of ideal legal citizen. 
In the following sections, I explore the ways in which participating in human rights 
activities has impacted the interactions of local activists with the state as well as how these 
activists understand their political positionality. For many activists, participating in human rights 
campaigns has resulted in increased direct contact with state offices and personnel, a change that 
itself challenges community hierarchies and beliefs about political engagement within slums. 
Coming from communities that straddle the boundary between legal and illegal, participating in 
human rights processes has reinforced the categorization of residents as legal citizens, entitled to 
the same attention and services as the larger public.  
 
Changing Subjectivity: “Learning How to Talk” 
The changing political behavior of individuals who have taken part in human rights activities in 
Nima and Maamobi is intimately linked with their shifting feelings about their own relationship 
with government. When I would ask community residents who had never taken part in human 
rights activities whether they would feel comfortable taking a complaint to a Ministry office or to 
the Member of Parliament, it was common to hear phrases such as “you cannot just go there,” 
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“you have to go step by step,” or “who are we to go to the government and say we need it?” 
These feelings are reinforced by community power dynamics related to age (where young 
residents generally do not make demands of older residents).  
There is also another layer of power inequality related to the fact that the community is 
poor and has a reputation for lawlessness. According to many residents, especially the young 
men and women who have ventured out of the community in search of work and education, 
when you say “I am from Nima,” people will immediately treat you differently. As Yussif 
explained to me: “I have worked with so many people outside of this area, and they are amazed 
at me. They think ‘What?’ When I tell them I am from Nima they say, “No! It can’t be” and 
anytime such happens, I feel very bad inside that people don’t believe that something good can 
ever come out from here.”39 Experiences like these often leave residents of Nima and Maamobi 
feeling less confident in their ability to interact with those living outside of the community and 
be treated as equals.  
As Snell-Rood (2013, 273) notes, residents of slums, “more than any other urban people, 
are defined by the place they live – as ‘slum dwellers’” This identity is not solely controlled by 
the residents themselves, but also by government officials who have the power to officially 
designate a community as a “slum.” At the same time, people living in slums often find 
themselves removed from national political processes, rendered “illegal” residents of the city by 
the creation of official maps that do not included their unplanned communities (Rao 2013). 
Although slum communities frequently have vibrant civil society organizations (Pellow 1987) 
and local political scenes (Contursi 1989), there often remains a separation between the 
community and the national government.  
These factors together create an environment that discourages residents, especially the 
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young and the very poor, from feeling as if they can go directly to government officials with 
their concerns. One of the primary ways that the LRC has attempted to counter this attitude is by 
teaching two primary axioms: 1) that services such as the provision of water and sanitation 
facilities are human rights that the state, by law, is required to provide, and 2) that every 
Ghanaian is part of the government. These two changes have the effect of potentially 
repositioning how community residents see themselves in relation to government officials. By 
reframing services as rights instead of charity, and by reinforcing the concept that all Ghanaians 
are part of the same government, the LRC is attempting to shift the relationship from a vertically 
defined one (as is the case with the patronage system) to a horizontal one, where everyone is on 
equal ground.  
Universality is one of the founding tenets of human rights. As Goodale notes, human 
rights “assumes the most global of facts: that all human beings are essentially the same, and that 
this essential sameness entails a set of rights” (2007, 10). By repositioning community activists 
as potential equals, as opposed to poor “Nima boys,” who need a favor, there is less fear around 
going to meet with government officials. In the following excerpts from my interview with 
Abdul, one of the well-known community activists mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, he 
clearly explains this change in attitude. Abdul began by explaining the way that community 
residents felt before they began working with the LRC. He stated: 
Before then, if you asked me to go and see the mayor, I would ask, ‘my friend, do you 
want me to land in trouble or do you want his security men to lash at me?’ Because at the 
time, anybody in higher position, that alone, of course is a threat. They come with a lot of 
security, and if you want to avoid trouble, don’t go near them. And if you go near the 
person, for good, or whatever the reason was, it doesn’t matter, so that fear was there.40  
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He then continued by explaining that once he and his fellow activists began working with the 
LRC, they learned more about the responsibilities of officials, as well as what they were allowed 
to do as citizens without breaking the law. They learned that if they followed protocol, they 
would be protected by the laws of the country, and they were assured that the LRC would stand 
by them if anyone tried to threaten them or violate their rights. Several other activists described 
this as the LRC providing the activists with a “legal backbone.”  Abdul described it this way:  
From there, we never developed any fear. Of course, because we were dealing with the 
laws, we had teachings and forums and they would tell us, ‘this is what the law says, this 
is what if you do will land you in this trouble. If you do this, nobody can do anything to 
you. Yours is to know what is right and to know what is right at all times and don’t have 
any fear because you know you are doing the right thing per the law. Because as a state, 
the state holds the laws supreme. And so if you are familiar with laws, and you do 
accordingly, it shouldn’t be anything.’ So from there, we were just making our own 
plans, mobilizing around issues. It was so beautiful, so interesting, coming together.41 
Having increased knowledge about human rights as well as the boundaries of police and political 
power enabled many young activists to feel comfortable and justified when speaking with more 
highly ranking individuals. When their encounters with these political figures went well, as they 
did in the example about the Supreme Court with which I began this chapter, this legitimates the 
activists’ subjectivities as rights-holders. Sally Merry (2003b) notes that the chances of 
individuals continuing to represent their community as a “rights bearing” community is largely 
dependent on the reception that their claims receive. For example, in her research on domestic 
violence, Merry found that when the police do not make an arrest, the prosecutor does not press 
charges, or court mandated battering rehabilitation programs are not enforced, women are less 
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likely to continue to represent themselves using rights language (2003b, 352). In Nima and 
Maamobi, it is these legal successes, the times in which their subjectivity as rights-bearing 
citizens was recognized by others, that remain touchstones for activists in recounting their 
individual histories with human rights activism.  
When I surveyed community activists about the benefits that they had received from 
working with the LRC, this knowledge and confidence, (often characterized as “learning how to 
talk” by activists) was the most commonly stated answer. “Learning how to talk” also increased 
the confidence of activists in speaking to other residents within their community. Rose, a 
member of a community women’s organization, explained how the LRC’s activities helped them 
learn the law and also how the law affected their position as women within the community. She 
stated, “Through their education we learned a lot about rights. Women have right to own land! 
Before we thought only men. Now we can stand in front of a crowd. Before we didn’t feel bold 
to do that.”42 
 
Changing Behavior: Political Participation and the Advocacy Chain 
“We the young ones cannot go, and the older ones are not paving the way for the young ones to 
go. Who are we to go to the government and say we need it?”43 This sentiment, expressed to me 
by a young man during a conversation about the lack of access to water in the community, was 
common among individuals who had never participated in human rights activities. As I 
repeatedly observed during fieldwork, if a community resident needed to take a personal concern 
to the Member of Parliament (MP), for example, she would likely first approach an elder, who 
would direct her to either an Assembly Member, chief, or other local “opinion leader” who knew 
the MP.44 This person would then make a call to attempt to arrange an appointment and might 
even accompany the individual to her meeting. I had noticed this practice, but I first began to see 
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its true salience for residents after a brief discussion with a friend of my research assistant. He 
was telling us about his struggle to obtain compensation for being unfairly fired from his 
teaching job. He mentioned that he had to go through a long process to finally obtain a meeting 
with the Director of his program. I said that I had observed others going through the same kind 
of process to address other concerns. When I said this, he responded excitedly:  
Yes! I would call it the communication channel. You just cannot wake up and at once go 
see the President. I am a teacher, and I wanted to go see the director. Before I could go, I 
had to fill the form. This process can sometime hinder us from going forward. Since we 
don’t have a chief of this community, it is these front liners of the political parties. If you 
want to see the MP, you have to go through the constituency secretary. So you have to go 
so far from where you start.45 
His formal naming of the process as “the communication channel” was notable to me, as 
it meant that the practice of advancing claims up through various individuals was not just an 
occasional practice that I had witnessed, but instead, a stable and accepted form of advocacy. 
This reliance on personal connections results in the reinforcing of local power dynamics where 
older and more well-connected individuals gain power by serving as the gate-keepers to policy 
makers and other individuals with access to resources. When I began questioning residents about 
the effectiveness of this lobbying model, I was often told that, although the process was slow and 
did not always work, it was unavoidable. For example, when asked about how he would address 
a community concern, like a lack of public toilets, one man stated that they must work through 
the elders within the community. He stated,  
You have to start from one to the second. You cannot just all of a sudden, because you 
need something, move to the upper place. I don’t think they will listen to you. Everything 
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has to go through the grassroots. Even if you go there (government offices) first before 
starting with the elders in the area, they will tell you to go back. If you go there, you have 
to go step by step.46  
Working through this protracted chain of communication has several downsides, however. First, 
the process is often very time consuming. Second, working through this system of making 
requests and asking for favors leaves less powerful community residents beholden to those with 
more influence. The reliance on these connections creates and sustains local patronage 
relationships. Although common across Ghana (Nugent 1995; Lentz 1998; Hasty 2005), strong 
patronage relationships are particularly prevalent in unplanned communities where residents 
often find difficulty accessing things like employment, credit, and government officials (Fox 
2014).47 Within these communities, local level patrons benefit from the simultaneous presence 
and absence of the state. They settle disputes in place of the police, provide funding for water 
pumps and schools when the state does not build them, and connect residents to political figures, 
who, although officially represent the community, seldom set foot within its boundaries. At the 
same time, local patrons also gain power from the fact that residents remain vulnerable to the 
regulations of the state. They may vouch for residents attempting to complete building projects 
that violate formal regulations (Fox 2014, 198) or provide business addresses for residents to use 
for the purpose of submitting job applications or getting mail.48 As Wolf (1966) notes, patronage 
relationships, although mutually beneficial, are always asymmetrical in terms of power.  
When the LRC began its work within the community, however, they encouraged a 
lobbying strategy that differed from many of these community practices. The advocacy chain 
proposed by the LRC prioritizes analyzing the problem and identifying which government 
official or department is responsible. After this person has been identified, the LRC lobbying 
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approach encourages community activists to take the problem directly to that person or office, if 
possible. For activists to begin using the new advocacy chain, however, both practical and 
emotional changes must first occur. On the practical side, activists must be able to contact such 
leaders, so they must first know who they are and where they are located. This practical 
knowledge made up a large part of the LRC’s early community training programs. For example, 
one of the lawyers at the LRC explained to me:  
For us, we don’t just say we are coming here to fight for your rights blah blah blah, but 
we sort of change the language. The language being if you are going into the community, 
we ask ‘why are there no schools’ and they’ve been given some excuse or reason and 
then we tell them, ‘but the Constitution tells you you should have basic education’ and 
then we say ‘ok, so what should we do? Ok, Ministry of Education is responsible for this, 
there are agencies responsible for this,’ and then they just sit and figure out where to go.49 
This practice of restructuring the method of advocacy was clearly apparent in my conversations 
with activists. Abdul described the change in this way:  
In the past, our way of doing things, our way of getting results and our way of getting 
solutions to problems have rested at the doorstep of chiefs. Over here, chieftaincy reigns. 
That is the African set-up, more based on ethnic community. Also imams and the other 
clergy, and so usually, if it is within your household, you identify an imam and in the area 
of Christians, you meet with a pastor. If it is a bit higher than he or she can handle, then it 
gets to the chief. And then, talk to the Assemblyman… But when LRC came, and you 
see, sometimes too even when you compare to the old, they could still meet with the chief 
and the issue could remain there. Of course if the chief was not able to get the issue 
beyond his level for one reason or another it means that the problem remains. He may use 
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his own means, whatever means, but even if, it may not be the best, and you are forced to 
sit with him and look up to God and see what happens, religious as we are. But when the 
LRC came, we realized that each and everyone has a unique role to play. And there are 
certain things that needed to be for certain solutions. And you can’t get all solutions from 
just any other means, and so there were certain things that might have to go to the 
doorsteps of the chiefs but other things would need different solutions. So if it is about 
the state institutions, the Assembly or any other public servant, all you need to do is find 
out the channel of approach and engagement. And so that channel was properly defined 
and it made matters so short and simpler, and then it got these public officers working!  
Now that the people were coming in their numbers and knocking at their doors they knew 
they had work to do.50 
But for this change in advocacy to happen successfully, activists needed to learn more than just 
who to contact. They also had to learn how to contact them. Although this model of advocacy 
may appear to be less reliant on social networks, several lawyers at the organization noted that 
this is not necessarily the case. Even when they are not using the more common community-
based lobbying chain, activists rely on their relationships with officials to schedule meetings and 
make claims. Because of this, the LRC has attempted to assist activists in building new 
relationships by putting them in direct contact with governmental duty bearers. There are several 
methods used by the LRC to make these introductions. The first is by supporting community 
groups in their efforts to meet with government officials by providing a letter of introduction. 
The second method used is inviting people, like police commanders and MPs, to community 
forums. This second method was especially important when the LRC first began its work in 
Nima and Maamobi. By hosting these events, community activists were able to introduce 
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themselves to local leaders, sometimes even collecting the phone numbers of sympathetic 
officials. Once these initial introductions were made, it became much easier for activists to gain 
direct access to the officials in the future as they lobbied for their rights.  In the beginning of 
their work, the LRC would host meetings with local activists every Friday.  
The following example demonstrates the value that having the phone number of an 
official when attempting to obtain a meeting. One afternoon, I accompanied Joe, one of the local 
community activists, to a meeting with the MP. Around noon, as we were getting ready to catch 
a trotro that would take us to the MP’s office, Joe received a text.51 “Look,” he said and held out 
the phone so that I could see. The text was from the MP and read “let’s make it after 4pm.” 
When we arrived at 4pm and spoke to the receptionist, we were told that the MP had informed 
her that he was not accepting visitors that day. Joe tried to explain that we had a meeting, and 
that the MP informed him a few hours prior to come at four. He even showed the receptionist the 
text, but she refused to let us through security. Luckily, Joe had the phone number of one of the 
MP’s staff members, and he called to ask what was happening. The staff member came 
downstairs himself to tell the receptionist that it was alright for us to go through. Finally, at 6pm, 
we were able to meet with the MP.  
 In this example, the fact that Joe had the phone numbers for the MP and a member of his 
staff enabled us to avoid six hours of needless waiting and also to bypass the receptionist, who 
likely would have otherwise prevented us from entering the building. When I first visited Ghana 
in 2008 and accompanied the same group of activists to several meetings with officials, 
extensive waiting time was common. At the time, many of the activists were just beginning their 
lobbying efforts. Even when meetings were scheduled, the activists would often have to come 
back on multiple days before actually getting to meet with the official. On at least one notable 
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occasion, several members of a community youth group waited all day to meet one official, and 
then were told at the end of the day that the meeting would not occur. In 2008, activists often 
noted that the time and resources used in attempting to obtain meetings in this way was a large 
burden for them. 
One of the activists, whom I have known since 2008, noted that advocacy has become a 
little easier now that they have more connections. He stated, “Normally, you would have just 
started and it would have taken a longer time, and so once you know somebody somewhere you 
ask, ‘I want this, but I don’t have much time. Is there any other way I can do it?’ He might say 
‘the boss is here at this time.’ Or ‘He prefers it this way’ so those all have helped advocacy 
improve.”52 As this quote alludes to, having connections with the staff of higher-up officials may 
be especially helpful for obtaining information about scheduling and the preferences of officials, 
information that may be key in decreasing waiting time and increasing the success of meetings.  
Importantly, this points to the fact that the new shortened advocacy chain has not entirely 
removed the use of personal connections to advance claims. In his article, “Declarations of 
Dependence,” Ferguson (2013) notes the prevalence of giving in poor communities and the way 
that these practices help to create a web of dependence among residents. These dependencies 
create networks of people through which individuals address a variety of concerns. Human rights 
activists in Nima and Maamobi continue to draw on their personal connections with high ranking 
officials to advance claims effectively, they have simply cut out many of the middlemen, leaving 
them less bound to those individuals’ personal interests regarding the specific issue.  
The effect of the training by the LRC is not only visible in the statements of individual 
activists, but also by comparing survey data. The following table illustrates the responses when 
community residents, both those who had and those who had not participated in human rights 
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activities, were asked about their interactions with political and governmental officials over the 
course of the last 12 months. This data is also compared with the responses from Ghanaians all 
over the country, taken from the AfroBarometer survey in 2012.53 
 
Table 2: The following table lists the number of respondents who indicated that they had  
approached the person at least once over the course of the last year to discuss a 
 problem or give them their opinion 
  
HR 
Participants Percent 
Non-
Participants  Percent Ghana Percent 
Assembly member 40 80.00% 13 26.00% 754 31.63% 
Member of 
Parliament 27 54.00% 16 32.00% 307 12.88% 
Political Party 
Official 33 66.00% 16 32.00% 332 13.93% 
 
Table 2 illustrates the extreme difference that exists between participants in human rights 
activities and those who have not participated in terms of interactions with political figures. This 
relationship is clarified even further by looking at the frequency with which these interactions 
occurred (Table 3). Table 3 illustrates that residents of Nima and Maamobi as a whole have more 
interaction with MPs and political party members than the average Ghanaian. This is likely due 
to the fact that the communities are located in the capital city, where access to politicians is more 
easily obtained. This also makes the significant difference between human rights participants and 
non-participants in Nima and Maamobi even more notable. When the significance of the 
relationships is calculated through a t-Test, the test reveals that the human rights participant 
group interacts with Assembly Members, Members of Parliament, and Political Party Officials 
significantly more than either the non-participant portion of the fieldwork sample or the general 
Afrobarometer sample (both are significant beyond the 0.005 level).  
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Table 3: Frequency of Contact with Authority Figures 
  Never Once Few Often Don't Know 
Assembly member           
HR Participants 10 (20%) 4 (8%) 14 (28%) 22 (44%) 0 (0%) 
Non-HR Participants 38 (73%) 1 (2%) 9 (17.3%) 4 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 
Ghana 1620 (68%) 239 (10%) 
329 
(13.8%) 
186 
(7.8%) 10 (0.4%) 
Member of Parliament           
HR Participants 23 (46%) 6 (12%) 11 (22%) 10 (20%) 0 (0%) 
Non-HR Participants 35 (67%) 8 (15.4%) 4 (7.7%) 5 (9.6%) 0 (0%) 
Ghana 2054 (86.2%) 
120 
(5.3%) 135 (5.7%) 52 (2.2%) 23 (1%) 
Political Party Official           
HR Participants 17 (34%) 4 (8%) 10 (20%) 19 (38%) 0 (0%) 
Non-HR Participants 35 (67%) 7 (13.5%) 6 (11.5%) 4 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 
Ghana 2029 (85.1%) 
113 
(4.7%) 154 (6.5%) 65 (2.7%) 23 (1%) 
 
Although some might argue that these results could be pointing to the fact that 
individuals who are more likely to approach governmental leaders might be the same individuals 
who choose to get involved in human rights work, triangulating these results with the other 
qualitative data from this dissertation suggests otherwise. In my interviews with activists, they 
often mentioned how much easier it has gotten for them to contact and meet with government 
officials over the years. And as I discuss in the previous section, their confidence in their ability 
to lobby these individuals for community concerns has also increased. Similarly, in my 
observation of their activism strategies over the four years in which I conducted research, I was 
myself able to witness how the frequency with which they interacted with government officials 
increased over the years.  
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Other Implications for Participation 
In my interviews, many activists stated that building relationships with officials and “learning 
how to talk” were the primary benefits that they derived personally from their work with local 
CBOs. But activists also noted that there are several challenges associated with developing 
relationships with political officials. Building connections with local leaders results in activists 
being seen by their fellow residents as well-connected individuals. This, in turn, increases the 
expectations that other individuals may have of the activists’ ability to help them in pursuing 
personal interests. For example, on several occasions while I was walking through the 
community with Musa, one of the leaders of a local youth group, various individuals would 
approach us and then appeal to him for help. The requests ranged from seeking assistance in 
pursuing claims against an employer who had not paid for contracted work to a mother 
requesting assistance in getting her son into a particular secondary school. Although the 
individuals who approached Musa during these encounters did not expect him to personally fix 
the problem, they would request that he lead them to someone who could help, be that a lawyer, 
a community politician, or other opinion leader. Therefore, although the advocacy chain has 
changed for activists, it has not necessarily changed for their fellow residents. Activists often 
expressed feeling a desire to help their fellow residents, and they did when they could. In several 
cases, activists exemplified the “training of trainers” model by explaining the process of 
contacting a Member of Parliament. Once, I was even able to observe an activists as he 
accompanied an elderly woman to the MP’s office. These kinds of activities have is has the 
effect of increasing the status of local activists, but it also increases the burden of their work.  
This became especially apparent in my observations of one local activist who has been a 
primary figure in the human rights campaign to build the new concrete drain. In September of 
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2013, conflict over the drain had hit a high point. Although a contract had been awarded to build 
a portion of the drain, work had stalled, and the contractor had just been arrested on charges of 
corruption. The construction workers had not been paid for their work and blamed the contractor. 
The contractor, in turn, blamed the government for not providing him with funding for the 
project. Over the course of several weeks, I witnessed multiple construction workers appeal to 
this particular activist for assistance, even coming to his home. During the same time, the MP 
had approached the activist for assistance in encouraging patience among the residents, and even 
the contractor had requested the activist’s help in communicating with the MP. The stress of the 
situation boiled over at one of the FYC’s weekly meetings when one of the members complained 
that the aforementioned activist was not doing enough to advance the drain campaign. In 
frustration, he responded, “I wonder if there is anyone who feels connected to that drain in the 
way that I do. The number of workers who come to me to complain about their condition. The 
number of people living by the drain who come to my home. The MP asks me for help. Even the 
contractor asks me to help him.”54   
Increased connections to various stakeholders within the community may often make the 
work of human rights campaigning more efficient and effective for activists, but it also positions 
them as key stakeholders themselves. In addition to becoming valuable resources to community 
members, local activists are also assets for NGOs. Once the activists had become established 
within the community, the LRC would regularly call on several of the leaders of the various 
CBOs to help mobilize the community when they wanted to host an event. For example, when an 
international team of human rights activists visited Nima and Maamobi to help launch a new 
National Slum Upgrade plan, two community activists were tasked with distributing invitations 
from the NGO to community leaders about an upcoming community forum.55 This work took 
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several days, as each invitation had to be delivered in person. Although the activists found value 
in this work because it advanced the goals of the project, they also noted the burden of the work 
as well. One of the men, for example, told me that he loves doing community activism. “I feel 
like it was what I was born to do,” he stated. “But it does not pay. It’s not that it doesn’t pay 
much, it doesn’t pay at all.”  
Activists like this fit into the category of people that Ann Swidler and Susan Watkins 
(2009) have described as “interstitial elites.” Interstitial elites are individuals who work with 
NGOs, not as salaried staff members, but as volunteers who “hoped that they might be able to 
parlay their years of volunteering with NGOs into a salaried position that would confirm their 
status among the educated and urban” (Swidler and Watkins 2009, 2). Interstitial elites fit into 
the larger global context of “community participation,” in which NGOs use “local volunteers” to 
demonstrate community buy-in and project sustainability (Swidler and Watkins 2009). Critics of 
“local volunteers” and community participation more broadly have noted that participation at this 
level does not often confer many benefits to those who take part. At best, this participation is 
viewed as “nominal,” where community residents are only used for consultation, imbuing NGO 
projects with legitimacy (Arnstein 1969; White 1996; Cornwall 2008). At worst, this form of 
participation is described as unpaid labor (Swidler and Watkins 2009; Buerger and Holzer 2015), 
which as Swidler and Watkins found, almost never translates into an actual paid position, despite 
the hopes of interstitial elites.   
In his critique of civic education in Malawi, Harri Englund (2006) notes that the process of 
human rights education creates and reifies distinctions among different groups of people. He argues 
that rather than destabilizing the current power dynamics in Malawi, these inequalities are reinforced 
through education programs that divide people into “those who need help and those who can provide 
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help” (Englund 2006, 71). Interstitial activists in Nima and Maamobi experience a similar fate. 
Participating in human rights activities, especially becoming acquainted with local and national level 
politicians, increases the status of activists. These activist are able to challenge community 
hierarchies as well as larger patterns of inequality related to their neighborhood’s slum status. It is 
also important to note, however, that social status divisions are not just a result of participation in 
human rights activities. In some cases, preexisting divisions may influence who becomes involved 
with human rights in the first place. This may be even more pronounced due to the “training of 
trainers” model used by the LRC. By focusing their education efforts on the members of community-
based organizations, the LRC is specifically engaging with a portion of the population that already 
has a bit more social status than the average community resident. Although the members of these 
organizations vary widely in terms of economic status and education level, by becoming engaged 
with community-based organizations, their social status in terms of personal connections is elevated. 
In this way, it would be more accurate to say that human rights participation reproduces and 
potentially strengthens status distinctions rather than creating them.  
The emancipatory outcomes of human rights education are somewhat limited, however. 
Activists are seen by fellow community residents as well-connected, and quickly become labeled as 
individuals who could help others achieve various goals. Quickly, the original advocacy chain 
returns, imposed on activists from their fellow residents. Following the LRC’s “training of trainers” 
method,56 the human rights knowledge and connections possessed by interstitial activists should 
eventually spread throughout the community. But this “trickle down” education model takes time. It 
is also potentially limited by the motivations of interstitial activists who are themselves trying to 
strategically navigate the space between working for the communal good and individual 
achievement. In my interviews with activists, when I asked about how they felt their work in civil 
111 
 
society had affected their lives, many people were quick to note how they had benefited by getting a 
“bigger platform” or by building connections with more powerful individuals. For example, one 
activist stated:  
I think I have been able to develop my leadership skills. I have met with different kinds of 
people with different backgrounds, different knowledge. You can imagine that at the 
leadership level, people come in with their minds and you try to harmonize all of these into a 
common goal where everyone will be very satisfied. And as and when you achieve 
successes, it places you at a certain level. And through the Federation, I've been able to 
impact a lot in the community. If I had been alone, I don't think I would have been able to. 
But through the Federation, I'm sure I'm very popular. And I wouldn't be surprised...in fact, 
some have been asking me to go for Parliament.57 
As this activists describes, his successes with the FYC and the LRC have brought him to “a certain 
level” within the community. He also ascribes his popularity in the community to his work in civil 
society, suggesting that this might even lead him into an elected position in the future.  
 But for some activists, the challenges of balancing individual achievement with communal 
goals are more evident. One activist whom I have known since 2008 stated:  
I’ve heard a lot of people say the construction of the Nima drain is the biggest success for 
FYC. I would agree with them, but I would think that my success is the kind of impact we 
have made in the lives of individuals. The kind of belief that we have given youth who now 
believe that oh, if this person can do this, that if this person can stand on a platform with all of 
these participants to express himself, to speak about the need to join hands in developing our 
own neighborhoods, then I can also do it, and I also want to be part of that. The issues I hear 
people outside of our community say about the previous perception about Nima and now the 
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kind of perception they now have, for me, these are some of the successes. 
He continued:  
But I also ask myself, what have you done for yourself over the last years? I have seen people 
who I started the FYC with who have along the line traveled outside, and they come back, 
and they own their own houses, their cars, their kids attend a school that I can’t afford with 
my kids. And if you should compare their kids with my kids, their kids are far ahead of mine 
in terms of education. I have seen people who have abandoned the FYC to educate 
themselves and now have good jobs that pay them a good wage to live comfortably. And my 
kids, the story is different.58 
In the statements of this activist, one can clearly see the tension between a desire to achieve 
communal goals and individual advancement. Many members of the interstitial elite hope that 
through their work with NGOs, they will be able to continue their community activism while still 
advancing their own careers. Unfortunately, as other studies into interstitial elites have shown 
(Swidler and Watkins 2009), and as the comments of the activist allude to, this does not always 
happen.  
 
Conclusion 
The results within this chapter demonstrate one mechanism through which participation 
in human rights practices reinforces the power of the state. Whereas activists may have 
previously used a variety of methods to lobby for community development, they are now 
focusing their efforts on working through established state channels. By providing these 
“appropriate” channels for claims-making, the state is more readily able to control and contain its 
citizens. Claims-making through these channels therefore does not necessarily challenge the 
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generalized social inequalities or power dynamics built into the neoliberal state system, but 
rather works within, and potentially reinforces, its structures (Merry 1992; Speed 2007). It is 
important to note, however, that activists still continue to meet with these community leaders. It 
is the motivation for these meetings that has changed. There is no question that local authority 
figures continue to hold great influence within communities, and activists still capitalize off of 
this by enlisting their support when organizing a project. Whereas before, activists would 
schedule meetings to make pleas for assistance, they now primarily do so in order to mobilize 
community support for issues or to distribute invitations to events. It would be inaccurate to say 
that the hierarchy has disappeared, but the relationship has certainly changed.  
The changes in the political participation of human rights activists described in this chapter 
signal a change in local accepted advocacy behavior currently taking place among activists in Nima 
and Maamobi. In 2008 when I began doing research, many activists who had recently become 
involved with the LRC were still unsure of their ability to walk into government offices and petition 
for their community. Five years later, however, these same activists communicated regularly with 
state level ministries and politicians. This change in behavior is particularly notable in Nima and 
Maamobi, where residents generally engage in a protracted advocacy chain when they need to 
advance concerns beyond neighborhood boundaries. This advocacy chain is deeply connected with 
local norms of participation in patronage exchanges. In return for their political support, local level 
authority figures, such as Assembly Members and political party officials, help to connect residents 
with higher ranking governmental figures who may be able to address community development 
issues. The human rights-based approach endorsed by the LRC offers an alternative to this system of 
political reciprocity. And, as I will discuss in the following chapter, by proposing an alternative to the 
system of political patronage, activists are more willing to critique the system as a whole, even going 
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so far as to label it corruption.  
In addition to changing local advocacy practices, the human rights model also has had an 
effect on confidence levels among activists. During my interviews, most individuals who had not 
taken part in human rights activities tended to describe themselves as being fairly disconnected from 
the government. When asked whether they would be able to take a concern directly to a 
governmental office, most responded that they would not feel comfortable doing so. For participants 
in human rights activities, however, the reaction was very different. These individuals not only 
understood that government officials were indeed responsible for things like neighborhood sanitation 
facilities, but they also felt confident in their own ability to make claims of the government. 
Moreover, data from my community survey demonstrates that these feelings were supported with 
action, as human rights participants reported contacting government officials at a much greater 
frequency than individuals who had not participated in human rights activities.  
Activists have become key stakeholders in their own right, occupying important positions 
within the more common neighborhood advocacy chain. These activists build connections with 
various decision makers and can more efficiently channel community concerns to someone who 
might be able to do something about the problem. But this increased social status also presents new 
burdens for activists, who are now seen as valuable potential patrons themselves.  
Although the ethnographic examples contained in this chapter illustrate how human rights 
practices channel resistance toward the state, they also demonstrate the potential of these practices to 
challenge community power dynamics. Before, local opinion leaders, chiefs, and religious figures 
held the key to the advancement of concerns through the communication channel. These individuals 
relied on existing patronage relationships and community norms regarding the respect of elders to 
maintain their esteemed positions.  Human rights activists, however, no longer depend on their 
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assistance in making connections. Because of this, their method of political participation as well as 
their political subjectivity has changed.  
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Chapter 6: Corruption Talk and the Imagined State in Ghana 
 
It was the summer of 2013, and in nearly every home, office, and shop in Accra, people were 
watching and listening to the same thing. Huddled together around radios or televisions, people 
sat enraptured, listening to the proceedings of the Supreme Court that were broadcast live every 
day. The case was a challenge to the results of the presidential election that had occurred the 
previous year. On December 9, 2012, President John Dramani Mahama had been declared the 
winner of the election over his opponent Nana Akufo-Addo. The election was close, but not 
close enough to require a run-off, as had been the case in 2008.59 At the end of December, 
Akufo-Addo, his running mate, and the chairman of their political party (the NPP), sued the 
Electoral Commission over what they believed to be voting irregularities that were wide-spread 
enough to have cost them the election.  
By May of 2013, everywhere I went in Accra, people were talking about ballot boxes and 
pink sheets.60 Legal jargon had become part of the everyday vernacular. On more than one 
occasion, I saw someone pull out their pocket-sized copy of the Ghanaian Constitution to 
reinforce a point in an argument about the general legality of the case. Although many Ghanaians 
with whom I spoke were consumed with arguments over who would win the case, I began to 
notice that the conversations occurring among the human rights activists with whom I was 
conducting research had a different focus. One activist told me that he thought the court case was 
good, regardless of the outcome, because it was strengthening the institutions of the country. He 
stated, “Look at other African nations that have taken to the streets after an election. In Ghana, 
we took to the courts.”61 Another activist noted that she felt the case was “very good. It 
strengthens our democracy. A lot of people didn’t know that you could petition the court, but 
now they are more confident in taking cases to the court.”62 Although it was not only activists 
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who spoke of the case this way, the resounding majority of individuals who had been involved 
with local human rights activism spoke of the Supreme Court case as a good thing for Ghana in 
that it deepened democracy, enforced accountability, and increased confidence in the courts 
among the citizenry.  Whereas other residents expressed skepticism about the efficacy of the 
court or debated who deserved to win the case, the activists’ statements reflect a very different 
understanding of the state and its responsibility to remain democratic and law-abiding.  
Public interactions with the state, such as this court case, contribute to what Akhil Gupta 
(1995) has deemed, “the imagined state.” Gupta describes the imagined state as a conception of 
the state that is multi-layered, and constructed discursively through public culture (such as 
newspapers and other forms of media) as well as through individual interactions with the state. 
The vision of the state constituted within the citizenry varies depending on an individual’s 
position within the state (1995, 392), and plays a role in shaping how citizens determine what 
constitutes “appropriate” behavior among governmental actors and institutions. In this chapter, I 
argue that by taking part in human rights-based activities, such as demonstrations, workshops, 
and lobbying campaigns, activists have developed a strong conception of an “imagined state” 
that is law-abiding and potentially rights-respecting, and that they, as activists, represent ethical 
citizens of this imagined state. Although many Ghanaian citizens view governmental institutions 
as corrupt, as I will discuss in this chapter, human rights activists characterize particular 
behaviors (such as patronage) as corrupt in ways that differ from their fellow citizens. Activists 
also differed from their fellow residents on how they viewed the implications of corruption for 
the state. As Foucault notes, developing subjectivity involves the subject beginning to “observe 
himself, analyse himself, interpret himself, [and] recognize himself” (1984, 942). I argue that 
human rights participation shapes subjectivity in a way in which activists begin to recognize their 
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government as potentially rights-respecting, and therefore see political figures who behave in 
ways that conflict with the notion of the imagined state, as corrupt. Thus, complaints of 
corruption should not necessarily be read as a rejection of the state, but should rather be seen as 
revealing a confidence that the state could (and should) do better. I argue therefore that human 
rights talk and corruption talk among activists go hand in hand and serve to discursively map the 
parameters of state responsibility.  
 
Human Rights Talk in Nima and Maamobi 
As I have described in previous chapters, in their human rights education programs, the LRC 
emphasizes the responsibilities of political officials because this helps to reinforce the notion that 
these services are rights, guaranteed to residents through the Constitution, rather than charity. 
During my interviews with activists, several also noted that this new way of thinking about the 
relationship between the government and the community assisted them in mobilizing their fellow 
residents during human rights campaigns. As one community activist explained: “We can tell 
them that look, this isn’t about the government doing you a favor, but this is about what the 
government should do, what you need to have, and you must have it. It is in the Constitution, and 
nobody gets these things anywhere in the world unless they fight, unless they demand it.”63 
 As this quote suggests, for many activists, taking part in human rights education 
introduces a new vision of the state’s responsibilities. As the activist above noted, community 
development projects come to be understood as rights as opposed to charity, and a denial of these 
projects becomes a derogation of the state’s duties. In my observations of human rights 
campaigns in the community, when they were attempting to mobilize others to join the 
campaign, activists would often reference past successes where using human rights language 
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helped them achieve their goals. On one occasion, several members of a local CBO that has been 
very involved with the LRC were gathering residents for a community forum. On a visit to the 
home of a community leader, one of the activists began describing the group’s past work on 
increasing access to health care in the community.  He stated, “If you go begging, you don’t get 
anything, but if you go demanding, knowing your rights, then you get somewhere. It has helped 
us.”64  This statement not only emphasizes the strategic value of human rights but also reveals a 
belief that the state will respond to claims made in the language of rights.  This example 
conforms to the arguments of scholars such as Gupta (1995) who state that individual 
interactions with state bureaucracy have a significant impact on the way that individuals 
conceptualize the state.  
 In Nima and Maamobi, the conceptualized law-abiding state is evidenced not only in the 
way that activists spoke about human rights, but also in how they anticipated dealing with state 
institutions in the future. When asked the open-ended question of “If you were a victim of crime 
in this country, who, if anyone, would you go to first for assistance?” 76% of respondents who 
had participated in human rights activities said that they would go to the police, while only 48% 
of those who had never participated in human rights activities stated that they would go to the 
police. The second most common response for human rights participants was to take the issue to 
a local government official, such as the MP or Assembly member (8%). For non-human rights 
participants, the remaining respondents were fairly split between taking the issue to another 
authority figure like a chief or opinion leader (13.5%), seeking no assistance (13.5%), or 
personally taking revenge (7.7%). 
When I was discussing this finding with one of the activists with whom I worked closely, 
he stated that the human rights education that they had received from the LRC taught them that 
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they do not need to be afraid of the police. Where before, they would worry that the police would 
try to harass them for being “Nima boys,” now they felt differently.65 An Assembly Member 
who had taken part in some of the LRC’s initial human rights education events suggested that it 
was not necessarily that the activists were more confident that the police would not violate their 
rights, but rather that they knew that the LRC would defend them if the police did violate the 
law. He stated:  
You know, my community, slum community like my community, a police can come and 
say ‘I am arresting you.’ When they take you to the police station they can let you spend 
more than 48 hours in a cell whereby the law did not permit you to spend more than that. 
But when the human rights lawyers came in the system, this would not happen anymore. 
But because of our little bit of education, police can take you and put you in a cell 3 days 
4 days. But through human rights we got to know that it is unlawful for you to arrest 
person for more than 48 hours. It helps hold people accountable.66 
In various workshops, the lawyers at the LRC assured activists that as long as they behaved 
within the laws of the state, they would be protected (either by the police or by the lawyers at the 
LRC). Despite the fact that many residents of Nima and Maamobi had past experiences that may 
have contradicted this image of the state, they began to distinguish between policemen who 
might not be upholding the law, and the overarching state, which was bound by the Constitution. 
This understanding again conforms to Gupta’s (1995, 391) concept of the “disaggregated and 
multilayered” imagined state. By highlighting the “disaggregated and multilayered,” nature of 
the state, Gupta is pointing to the fact that individual citizens often only personally encounter the 
state through bureaucracy. He argues, however, that individuals can imagine that there are other 
layers of the state above those with which they interact on a daily basis. Importantly for Gupta’s 
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theory, these layers may or may not share the same personal or policy goals. The highest levels 
of the state may be conceived to have good intentions even if the bureaucracy does not carry out 
these goals.  
The imagined law-abiding state conceptualized by activists in Nima and Maamobi is the 
product of past interactions with state officials (both negative and positive), but is also shaped by 
their interaction with international human rights organizations. Many scholars have observed that 
since the early 1990s, human rights talk has played a prominent role in the discourses of political 
transitions occurring in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Lauren Leve (2007) argues that the 
ubiquity of the human rights regime has led to human rights becoming part of “a global cultural 
imaginary that compels people to represent themselves in certain terms and make their claims in 
certain ways” (2007, 80). When activists choose to represent their claims in the language of 
human rights, they may more easily form connections with the international community of 
human rights activists (Sierra 1995; Sieder and Witchell 2001; Massoud 2011). In Nima and 
Maamobi, the LRC and the local community-based organizations have continued to interact with 
international NGOs, such as PDHRE, as well as maintaining an ongoing relationship with 
Harvard Law School.67  
These interactions play an especially important role in bolstering the legitimacy of an 
imagined rights-respecting state. Sally Merry (2003b) notes that that the chances of individuals 
continuing to use rights language to frame disputes is largely dependent on the reception that 
their claims receive. Additionally, she notes that it can be difficult for individuals to represent 
themselves using rights language “in the absence of institutions that will take these rights 
seriously,” (Merry 2003b, 381). In Nima and Maamobi, although activists have had some notable 
successes using human rights language to make claims for specific community needs, many 
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times they still struggle to compel the enforcement of local human rights laws. When this 
happens, however, international human rights organizations that are active in the community 
continue to reinforce the legitimacy of human rights. Moreover, they bolster the notion that even 
if the state is not currently behaving according to human rights norms, it should, and feasible 
could, do so in the future.  
 
The Social Meanings of Corruption 
Despite the strong conception of a law-abiding and potentially rights-respecting state that has 
developed among activists in Nima and Maamobi, there are still times when individuals’ actual 
experiences conflict with this idealized vision. When this occurs, activists often switch into the 
language of corruption. In this chapter, I employ the term “corruption talk” to highlight the form 
of discourse used by activists in their critique of the Ghanaian government. This term has been 
used by several scholars (Lazar 2005, Shore and Haller 2005; Bubandt 2006), but generally only 
as a way to describe observations of hearing individuals discuss corruption. In this chapter, 
however, I attempt to specify further by drawing a comparison with the concept of “human rights 
talk,” a term that has been used by anthropologists for some time (Dembour 1996; Englund 
2000; Wilson 2007; Burrell 2010). Richard Wilson defines “human rights talk” as “the way that 
people speak about those norms, or aspire to expand or interpret them in new ways” (2007, 350). 
A focus on the way that people speak about human rights opens up a potential window for 
understanding how individuals “articulate political claims which make sense in a particular 
social context” (Dembour 1996, 33). When activists speak about human rights in Nima and 
Maamobi, they are making reference to a specific set of national and international laws, but they 
are also speaking about how these values are understood within their local context. Sometimes 
this conforms to the legal interpretation of human rights. Other times, however, local human 
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rights talk may reflect reflects a different understanding of rights, one that falls outside of, or 
even conflicts with, the codified version of human rights. This type of human rights talk reveals 
the way that international human rights norms have been “vernacularized” so that they fit with 
local cultural beliefs and community needs (Merry 2006a).  
By using the term “corruption talk” in conjunction with “human rights talk,” I am 
drawing on the way that specific verbal references to notions of morality and legality, such as 
human rights and corruption, are used by activists to communicate larger beliefs about the 
behavior and responsibilities of state actors. For example, activists in Nima and Maamobi 
regularly point to corruption within the Ghanaian state. This talk goes beyond observation, 
however. Instead, it points to a larger critique of the government when compared to the 
aspirational view of what a law abiding and rights-respecting state could be. Take, for example, 
the comments made by Yakubu, a man who was actively involved in the FYC when the LRC 
first entered the community and is now attempting to transition into political work. When I asked 
him about how political work differed from his work in civil society, Yakubu stated,  
“Sorry to say, the system is corrupt. When I was outside politics, I was blaming the 
government. In my transition now (from NGO work to politics), it is not the system only. 
The politicians are also to blame. They like ideas, but then where does it go? There are 
many people who I can say now you talk like a politician, not a human rights advocate.”68 
When I later asked Yakubu to specify about what he meant by the system being corrupt, he noted 
that people in party politics are only interested in materials, in obtaining things that they can 
provide to their constituents, rather than on larger systemic inequality or welfare.  
Although providing the community with material goods may not technically be illegal, 
for Yakubu, it was tantamount to corruption because it took attention away from addressing the 
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issues that he saw as human rights issues. When activists say that an act is corrupt, they are often 
voicing a larger belief that the state is violating its democratic responsibility to provide services 
to all of its citizens or to not engage in patronage. The form of corruption talk in which human 
rights activists engage is made intelligible through the same activists’ participation in human 
rights talk and practices. In this permutation, corruption talk may refer to actual acts of illegal 
corruption or it may refer to a belief that government behavior has violated a more flexible 
understanding of state responsibility.  
In her work on corruption in Ghana, Jenifer Hasty (2005) notes that the motivating 
factors for corruption are not just driven by self-interest, but are “profoundly social, shaped by 
larger sociocultural notions of power, privilege, and responsibility,” (271).  Similarly, the 
motivations for engaging in corruption talk are also tied to social understandings of rights and 
responsibilities. Because expectations of social responsibilities may differ between persons, 
various individuals may interpret the same act in diverging ways. One may view an act as 
corrupt while the other sees it as permissible. The fluid nature of corruption has led scholars such 
as Sian Lazar (2005, 212) to emphasize the “slipperiness” of the concept, where corruption is 
simultaneously “everywhere and nowhere.”  
Multiple interpretations of corruption may be especially common in locations where 
some individuals view particular actions as justified because they are seen as necessary for 
survival. For example, many residents of low-income areas, especially those living in unplanned 
communities, depend on informal practices and patronage relationships to meet basic needs 
(Webb 2012). In unplanned communities, residents often have difficulty gaining access to such 
things as employment, credit, and government officials (Fox 2014). Using informal practices, 
however, community patrons may vouch for residents attempting to complete building projects 
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that violate formal regulations (Fox 2014, 198) or provide business addresses for residents to use 
for the purpose of submitting job applications or getting mail.69 Similarly, local level politicians 
may gain support from residents by providing letters of introduction, assisting in finding 
employment, or following-up on document requests such as passport applications. While some 
citizens may view these acts as corrupt or “dirty politics,” they may be interpreted by others as a 
necessary component of survival or even an act of social justice (Webb 2012; Witsoe 2011).  
 
Corruption Talk in Nima and Maamobi 
In Nima and Maamobi, having increased knowledge about human rights as well as the 
boundaries of police and political power enabled many young activists to feel comfortable and 
justified when interacting with state officials and institutions. It also contributed to the 
development of a new conception of how the state should behave. The LRC’s trainings 
emphasized the point that the state is bound by certain laws. Activists were assured that as long 
as they behaved within these laws, they would be protected. To hold this belief, activists must 
have a particular amount of confidence in the state’s willingness to enforce its own laws, either 
through police conduct or the courts (when police behavior violates the law). To assess how 
confident community residents were in the ability of the state to address their concerns, I asked a 
series of questions.70  The first question asked individuals to list what issue they thought was the 
most important for the government to address. As a follow-up, I asked individuals how likely 
they thought it was that government would address the issue within the next five years. I asked 
these questions to both individuals who had and who had not participated in human rights 
activities. The following table illustrates the responses from the second portion of the question.  
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Table 4 - How likely address problem? 
  Human Rights Participants Non-Human rights Participants 
Not at all Likely 8 (16%) 4 (7.69%) 
Not Very Likely 19 (38%) 16 (30.77) 
Somewhat Likely 15 (30%) 7 (13.46%) 
Very Likely 7 (14%) 19 (36.54%) 
don't know 0 (0%) 5 (9.62%) 
N/A 1 (2%) 1 (1.92%) 
 
Interestingly, despite their increased belief in the notion of a law-abiding and accountable state, 
individuals who had previously participated in human rights activities were significantly less 
likely than those who had not participated in human rights to believe that the state would address 
the problems that they felt were the most pressing within the next five years. One telling reason 
for this difference might be related to the fact that the two groups also differed on the issues that 
they found most important for the government to address. When I asked “in your opinion, what 
is the most important problem facing the county that the government should address?” the most 
common answers among human rights activists were issues related to the government itself, such 
as partisanship, corruption, and lack of political leadership.71 Issues relating to the government 
were mentioned more than twice as often as the other stated concerns. As can be seen in Table 5, 
after concerns about government, unemployment, the economy, and education were all cited at 
similar rates. For individuals who had never participated in human rights, however, concerns 
about the government were nearly non-existent and the subject of corruption was never 
mentioned (see Table 6).72   
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Table 5: Human Rights Participants - Most Urgent Issue for Government to Address 
Rank Issue Percent 
1 Government (partisanship, corruption, political leadership) 32% 
2 Unemployment 16% 
3 (tie) Economy 14% 
3 (tie)  Education 14% 
 
  
 
 
Table 6: Non-Human Rights Participants - Most Urgent Issue for Government to Address 
Rank Issue Percent 
1 Unemployment 26% 
2 Economy 14% 
3 Meeting basic needs (food, water, sanitation, health)  12% 
 
Although some may view these results as revealing a lack of confidence in the state 
among activists, employing the work of Gupta (1995) suggests a different interpretation. A 
notion of illegality only holds meaning when compared to an image of how the state should and, 
importantly, could behave. In this way, it might be more accurate to refer to this particular 
conception of the imagined state as the “aspirational state.” Therefore, claims of corruption 
reflect back off the image of an aspirational state that is law-bound, impersonal, and democratic. 
Without this idealized conception with which to compare everyday encounters, charges of 
corruption would be meaningless. When individuals have a sense of a potentially accountable 
and rights-respecting state, however, making claims of corruption becomes an act of citizenship 
(Gupta 1995, 389). Other scholars, such as Karam (2003, 2), have similarly noted the way that 
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identifying corruption is viewed as an important part of maintaining a transparent democratic 
society.  
In Nima and Maamobi, the concerns over corruption and lack of political leadership 
expressed by human rights activist reflect their beliefs about what the state should be, rather than 
what it currently is. To identify specific acts as “corruption,” one must have a conception of an 
alternative possibility for state behavior. For the activists with whom I worked, a law-abiding 
and rights-respecting state was this alternative. These activists readily described the 
responsibilities of government officials and their own rights to hold these officials accountable. 
In describing the past community mobilization efforts of the FYC, for example, one activist 
stated:  
Human rights can be very very helpful if you know your rights and responsibilities. FYC 
used the 1992 Constitution and were able to take it to the people so that even lay persons 
can understand. Not everyone in this community is educated, but even the layman 
understands that it is your responsibility to protect the Constitution. Even the uneducated 
know that. It is the right of the individual to demand certain things from the state like 
security, housing, roads, health.73 
In this statement, the activist describes protecting the constitution as a responsibility of the 
citizenry. To do so, in his opinion, one must hold political leaders accountable to the law 
contained within the Constitution. Because of beliefs like this, when the state failed to live up to 
these expectations, activists were more likely to characterize these failures as corruption rather 
than as typical or even acceptable behavior. Whereas individuals who had not participated in 
human rights activities were more likely to point to the actual problems that they saw (high 
unemployment rates, lacking sanitation and water facilities, etc.), human rights participants were 
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more likely to indicate that the person who had failed to rectify these issues was the problem.  
 
Is Patronage Corruption? 
For many people in Nima and Maamobi, patronage is one of the primary pathways through 
which individuals fulfill their needs and achieve status. Residents regularly approach local big 
men for assistance with paying rent, sending children to school, financing visa applications (and 
for the fortunate, subsequent trips abroad), and covering various other costs. Patronage 
relationships in Ghana tend to come in two forms: relationships with political leaders and 
relationships with customary authority figures such as chiefs, elders, and “opinion leaders.” In 
addition to these hierarchical relationships, residents often also participate in more balanced 
reciprocal exchanges of food, child care duties, and money for emergencies (including health 
care costs and the expenses of traveling back to home villages to attend funerals).  
In addition to allowing residents to address tangible material needs, patronage 
transactions can also convey symbolic power. Exchange transactions create social relationships, 
and when done publicly, they also demonstrate those relationships to a wider audience. Although 
much of the literature has focused on the prestige gained by the giver through public displays of 
giving, in Nima and Maamobi, both patron and client benefit from their relationship being 
known by the community. By publicly giving, patrons may demonstrate their wealth and power, 
and therefore their desirability as potential patrons for other residents. One local politician noted, 
“When you help someone, others are able to pass it out and say your name. They say, ‘oh, 
Honorable is a good person,’ so it makes you popular.”74 For would-be politicians, 
demonstrations of patronage can be particularly important as they are taken as evidence of the 
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candidates’ desire and ability to assist their fellow residents: an expectation of politicians once 
elected.  
Although these relationships are grounded in fundamentally asymmetrical power 
dynamics (Wolf 1966), in Nima and Maamobi, the individual receiving the goods also gains 
status through these exchanges. Gift giving, whether of food, money, or other material goods, is 
an accepted (and expected) component of Ghanaian hospitality, and therefore the accepting of 
gifts does not socially diminish the recipient (Hasty 2005, 286). Rather, by receiving goods from 
a politician or opinion leader, an individual may demonstrate their close connection to big men 
and therefore their ability to potentially help others to address their own problems in the future. 
The following excerpt, taken from an interview with a local youth political leader, provides an 
example:  
There is a house down there, a very big house, and there are lots of people who live there. 
They decided that they weren’t going to vote for the current MP. So first, the guy running 
for the spot from the NPP came to visit them. They wanted some cement and some sand 
to do some construction in front of their house, so he brought that. Then the MP came. He 
came with two of his guys, but they weren’t that popular in this community. He wanted a 
popular guy, so he asked me to come with him. We also brought the founder of Zongo for 
Mahama. We went to meet at the house. During the meeting, he kept referring to me as 
“my younger brother.” On that day I was wearing a new Zongo for Mahama t-shirt. It 
was a very nice quality t-shirt and it was brand new. It was black. All of the t-shirts given 
out by the party are white, so it made me seem different. Because I was wearing this 
brand new t-shirt, it really made people think that we (he and the MP) are related. After 
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the meeting, everyone was calling on me to get a shirt like the one I had. People believed 
that if we are related, I would have influence with him, so they believed in me.75  
In this example, the value of the t-shirt is related to the fact that it serves as a public 
demonstration of the relationship between the community resident and the Member of 
Parliament. Because the t-shirt was unique and easily distinguishable from the other free t-shirts 
given out by politicians, it identifies the special position of the recipient. Though the community 
resident mentioned in the example is not actually related to MP, the lack of social distance 
evidenced by the special t-shirt, along with the pronouncements of the MP himself were enough 
to “prove” to other community residents that the two men were in fact related biologically, in 
addition to socially. In demonstrating a dual level of relatedness (social and biological), the value 
of the t-shirt increases by identifying the wearer as a potential “broker” with the ability to 
connect others to the MP.   
Relationships between patron and client are demonstrated in many different ways in 
Nima and Maamobi. Sometimes the actual exchange takes place in public. This appeared to be 
particularly common with political patronage relationships. For example, one of the Members of 
Parliament for the community told me that if he makes a contribution to a local group, he always 
arranges a public presentation of the gift.76 Other times, patrons may give brief speeches at the 
events of clubs and organizations that they sponsor. Still other times, the owner of an item may 
directly mention the person who gave them the object. On several occasions, my research 
assistant, whom I had given an old phone that I brought with me from the United States, told 
others that the phone traveled all the way from America, clearly identifying me as the giver. 
Although the identical phone was available in nearly every market in Accra, the fact that this 
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phone was a gift from America demonstrated the close relationship between the two of us and 
therefore added value.   
In her study of elite patronage relationships in Northern Ghana, Lentz (1998) argues that 
conversations about patronage in Ghana fit into a long trajectory of anxiety regarding corruption 
and the morality of wealth in Ghana. Lentz notes that at least since the 1966 founding of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the assets of President Nkrumah and his ministers, Ghanaians have 
been consumed with the public debate over what qualifies as “good wealth” and how it relates to 
concepts of “good governance” (1998, 48). After a decade of the PNDC’s military imposed 
“culture of silence” (Hasty 2001), publicly expressed anxieties returned in the 1990s, along with 
Ghana’s transition to democracy. Today, stories of corruption and theft from “government 
coffers” dominate newspaper headlines (Price 1974; Hasty 2005). Examples of recent headlines 
from Ghana’s most widely-read newspaper, The Daily Graphic, proclaim: “Let’s crack whip on 
corrupt officials,” (July 5, 2014) and “Lead crusade against corruption” (June 20, 2014). 
In contemporary Ghana, financial wealth is precariously positioned between status and 
immorality, and although money is view as one of the most reliable routes to becoming a “big 
man,” (Nugent 1995), “wealth acquired through public office, is generally regarded as 
illegitimate,” (Lentz 1998, 52). Along the same lines, patronage relationships with chiefs and 
opinion leaders are often not seen as immoral, but there is a greater ambivalence in regards to 
political patronage. It is common to hear community residents in Nima and Maamobi criticize 
those who have entered into politics as having done so for “selfish interests,” ulterior motives,” 
or to “amass wealth.” Political patronage and corruption are closely tied in Ghana, in part due to 
the particular way that corruption is constructed within the Ghanaian imagination. As Hasty 
(2005, 274) notes, in Ghana, linguistic tropes of corruption frame the process as an 
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“intensification of contact with the vital flows coursing through the political body,” rather than 
as a problem of sociopolitical alienation. Corruption is not an anti-social act, but rather a hyper-
social one. Patronage increases and strengthens social relationships, and therefore individuals 
who maintain extremely close social relationships with politicians are often suspected of 
corruption.     
There are also some community residents who believe that patronage encourages 
corruption more indirectly. It can do so in several ways. First, multiple individuals, both 
politicians and human rights activists, explained to me that the pressure put on politicians to meet 
the desires of their constituents forces them to “put their hands into the state coffers.” Secondly, 
as scholars such as Robert Price (1974) have noted, patronage systems inherently discourage any 
form of criticism against the patron. As Price notes: “a critic of government actions not only calls 
into question the wisdom of a specific policy, but by so doing also demeans the big-man status of 
the responsible official through suggesting that the critic has a superior capability in the exercise 
of public responsibility,” (1974, 190-191). In response to criticism, the big man may retaliate by 
ending the particular patronage relationship. In the mind of the criticized patron, the exchange 
relationship is no longer benefiting both parties, as the client is supposed to “repay” the patron 
through his loyalty and support. In my interviews with political party members, many said that 
the threat of retaliation makes it very unlikely that they would ever publicly criticize local 
political leaders who provide them with access to resources and social networks. Because of this, 
corruption in government may go unchecked by the populace who fear losing valuable patronage 
relationships.  
But, as mentioned previously, the view of patronage as corruption is also context 
dependent and is often characterized as “social justice” when benefitting the poor (Witsoe 2011). 
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This framing of corruption was also evident among many individuals whom I interviewed. When 
asked whether politicians had a responsibility to provide certain things for residents in the 
community, such as money for weddings and outdooring ceremonies, many respondents 
expressed that normally a politician should not do these things, but that if the individual was in 
need, then the act should be excused. For example, one man responded: “Under normal 
circumstance, they are not supposed to do that. But our part of the world is a different thing 
altogether. We live in communities where people cannot even afford to buy food to eat, so it 
would not be out of place if a politician helps the constituents.77 Another similarly stated, “Well, 
there are many people who cannot afford to do things like go to school, and they should be 
helped. But when the rich people who could just ask someone in their family come for help, 
no.”78 By framing patronage as a mode of social welfare, these individuals distance the exchange 
from popular images of corruption.  
Despite a national ambivalence regarding the practice, patronage relations between 
politicians and community residents are common in Ghana. In his study of clientelism in Ghana, 
Lindberg (2003, 124) found that Ghanaian Parliamentarians regularly partake in paying for 
“schools fees, electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses; or distributing cutlasses 
and other tools for agriculture, or even handing out ‘chop-money’ (small cash sums)” to their 
constituents. My ethnographic data supports these findings. In Nima and Maamobi, local level 
politicians regularly pay for school fees, help facilitate travel to Mecca to perform Hajj, and 
assist residents in making connections with higher level government officials to address various 
personal and community needs. These actions are not only common, but they are generally 
supported by residents, who view participation in patronage relationships as a politician’s 
responsibility. In my interviews, 85% of opinion leaders surveyed and 77% of political party 
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members surveyed (none of whom had participated in human rights activities) were in support of 
the practice of patronage.  
In stark contrast, only 15% of individuals who had participated in human rights activities 
expressed support for the practice. Specifically, human rights participants strongly opposed the 
practice of political supporters obtaining personal benefits for their support of candidates. 
Compare, for example, the following responses to the question: “Do politicians have a 
responsibility to help residents pay for school fees?” One community resident who had not 
participated in human rights activities stated: “I think so. Because there are more people who 
need that help and they don’t have that support from anyone else. Since they don’t have that 
support, we should get them that support.”79 Another non-human rights participant similarly 
stated, “Yes. The leaders have to know what worries their supporters. If they promise, they have 
to fulfill. Leaders have to know what is needed in the community. If you have an MP who does 
not support the community, the community will suffer.” 
In contrast, when the same question was posed to human rights activists, the answers 
more often pointed to themes of corruption. One activists answered: 
I don’t think that it is. I think what they are supposed to do is put in policies that can help 
all of us to thrive. If conditions are there, one is able to work. People who make these 
requests are giving a politician another burden, and it will lead to him putting hands in 
state coffers and corruption. But it is self-inflicted. Party A does this for their 
sympathizers when they are in power, so Party B will be compelled to also do it or people 
will say ‘why did I vote for you?’80 
Another activist stated:  
That’s what I hate most, they are there for development and we the community are 
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pushing the government for corruption. And what does that mean? It means they have to 
go deep inside the coffers of the nation, and if I don’t do that then next year, they will 
vote no, even though that is not right.81 
Participants in human rights activities cited three primary reasons why they opposed 
patronage exchanges including feeling that patronage led to corruption, that it distracted 
politicians from community development goals, and that it made community residents less free 
to speak out against the government. These concerns echo those of many scholars who have 
argued that there are potentially problematic long-term implications of patron-client relationships 
for the poor (Ferguson 1990; Nelson and Finan 2009; Fox 2014). As I will discuss in the 
following chapter, however, activists disagreed on whether political patronage relationships 
should be used strategically to obtain collective benefits for the community. 
 As previously stated, the anxiety about the relationship between patronage exchanges and 
corruption is common in Ghana, especially when the patron is a politician (Lentz 1998). The 
second concern cited by activists (that patronage may be distracting for politicians) is less 
commonly discussed. When I asked whether politicians should reward their supporters by paying 
for school fees or providing money for celebrations (two of the most commonly made requests of 
politicians), one member of the FYC described it to me in this way:  
You will see that by doing so, most of them don’t really tackle the issues facing the 
community. They will just focus on keeping their supporters. It blocks them from really 
making it a priority. If there is a community problem then a supporter also has a problem, 
he will attend to the supporter’s problem first to ensure the vote in the future.82  
Because patronage exchanges are based on personal relationships, they often require a large 
investment in time. Political party members expect their elected leaders to be accessible to the 
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community. When I asked party members “what are the qualities of a good MP?” accessibility 
was the most common answer. One party member responded that, as an MP, the most important 
quality was, “Your visitation with your constituency, we should be seeing you every one or two 
weeks. That will solve the problem.”83 Another stated, “Anytime you call, he will pick up or call 
back. When you come to him with requests, he will help or tell you no – he is honest. When you 
don’t call, he finds time to call you, to see how you are.”84 These expectations of accessibility 
and assistance are not only expensive, but they are time consuming, taking time away from other 
tasks such as community development. Long lines of residents waiting to make requests for 
letters of introduction, school fees, or other assistance were a constant presence when the MP 
was at his office. In fact, one of the MP’s for the community stated that these constant requests 
were the biggest challenge of his job. When I asked him how many requests he received each 
month he responded, “It is difficult to count. Some come in my house, some come in Parliament, 
some come when I am in the community attending social functions, some come at the mosque, 
some come when I am paying visits to schools. One is unable to keep count.”85 
 Other human rights activists in Nima and Maamobi pointed to the fact that even though 
politicians complained about patronage, they often used the exchanges as proof of their 
commitment to the community, even when they had repeatedly failed to bring tangible 
development projects (such as the new drain). Similarly, many activists were concerned that 
when individuals became involved in politics, and therefore in patronage relationships, they were 
no longer “free to talk” (a commonly mentioned phrase). When individuals rely on politicians to 
meet their everyday needs, they may not feel able to openly criticize that politicians for fear of 
reprisals (Price 1974). Whether it is possible to engage in party politics while still remaining able 
to speak critically was a fiercely debated issue among human rights activists during my 
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fieldwork, and I will explore this topic in detail in the following chapter.  
 
The Potentially Realized Aspirational State 
The version of an imagined state held by the Ghanaian human rights activists with whom I 
worked illustrates the fluid nature of topics such as state responsibility and corruption. Due to 
their different social experiences, activists conceptualized particular events (such as the Supreme 
Court case challenging the presidential election results) and practices (such as patronage) 
differently than their fellow residents. Scholars such as Gupta (1995) and Benedict Anderson 
(1991) have noted the impact that public culture such as newspapers and personal interactions 
with government bureaucracy can have on an individual’s conception of the state. This 
dissertation illustrates the similar impact of international collaborations and participation in 
human rights education and activities on the development of individualized understandings of 
state responsibility.  
Importantly, for activists in Nima and Maamobi, even though their everyday encounters 
do not always conform to their vision of a rights-respecting state, it is still seen as a possible 
future reality. It is this belief in the feasibility of a rights-respecting state that leads activists to 
make claims of corruption when the state does not meet their expectations. Whereas residents 
who had not participated in human rights were more likely to identify issues such as 
unemployment or the economy as the most urgent concerns for the country, human rights 
activists were more likely to point to the government itself as the locus of the problem. Often, 
these concerns were expressed in the language of corruption. These claims of corruption do not, 
however, signal a rejection of the state or even necessarily a lack of confidence in government. 
Rather, they reveal points of contention where the state of their personal experience does not 
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coincide with the aspirational view they have developed of how a law-bound state should 
govern. 
By focusing on “human rights talk” and “corruption talk” in this chapter rather than on 
codified law, one is better able to understand how these terms take on meaning within a specific 
social context. For activists in Nima and Maamobi, an act is deemed “corrupt” when it violates 
their conception of a law-abiding aspirational state. This understanding of the state’s duty to 
respect, protect, and fulfill their rights is the product of various experiences, including personal 
interactions with state officials, participation in human rights-based education and lobbying 
campaigns, and collaboration with international organizations that constantly reinforce the 
legitimacy of a human rights approach. Having a clear understanding of local laws, democratic 
processes, and human rights ideals allows activists to more confidently make claims of illegality. 
Similarly, concerns over corruption continue to motivate activists to demand accountability in 
the language of human rights.  In this way, human rights talk and corruption talk are mutually 
constitutive. Without rights talk, corruption talk would be meaningless. Together, however, these 
two discourses delineate a local conception of government responsibility and map the borders of 
a rights-respecting state.  
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Chapter 7: Interstitial Subjectivity 
The “In-Between-ness” of Activists in Nima and Maamobi 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I described the ways in which participating in human rights has 
impacted the political beliefs and behaviors of participants. Through their participation in human 
rights campaigns and education events, many activists have developed a new sense of the state’s 
responsibilities in terms of their community and have acted on this new sense by lobbying their 
representatives more frequently. This understanding has contributed to a conception of an 
“aspirational state,” that is law abiding and potentially rights respecting. Despite the fact that 
there have been tangible changes in the behavior of activists, many scholars might still question 
the emancipatory potential of human rights in Nima and Maamobi. A common critique of the 
human rights sphere among anthropologists is that by channeling resistance toward the 
government, human rights buttresses the power of the state without challenging the underlying 
power inequities. Merry (1990) notes that citizens are often “invited” into court through their 
knowledge of rights, but then are denied any real judicial remedy. As she states, “Incorporating 
them into the legal arena is important because they are potentially disruptive to the larger social 
order. But they need only to be framed and contained, not to receive the full panoply of litigation 
which brings with it an invitation to assert rights and to demand change” (1990, 180).  
This critique of legal “empowerment” argues that it is advantageous for the state to 
provide an avenue for resistance because it contains dissent. Following this critique, one could 
argue that the activists that I described in previous chapters are doing exactly what the state 
would wish by using their energy to claim their rights in an “appropriate” manner. But what 
happens when activists refuse to stay contained in the appropriate channel of resistance? In this 
chapter I will address this question by exploring the innovative strategies used by some activists 
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in claiming human rights. By choosing to incorporate various legal and normative subjectivities 
into their lobbying campaigns, these activists are challenging the sanctioned subjectivities of the 
state and refusing to be “contained and framed” (Merry 1990, 180) as appropriate rights-bearers.  
As described in chapter 4, Ghana is a legally plural country with various normative and 
legal orders. It is a system of what Santos (2002) has deemed “interlegality,” where “everyday 
life crosses, or is interpenetrated by, different and often contrasting legal orders and legal 
cultures” (2002, 98). Although the activists in Nima and Maamobi have come to shape their 
interactions with the state through the procedures of a human rights approach, when this 
approach fails to produce results, they have often integrated discourses and procedures from 
other realms of authority, including customary law and partisan politics. In this way, they have 
developed interstitial subjectivities that resist the categories of standard forms of political 
engagement. The actions of these activists have been contentious, both among state officials and 
activists themselves. This chapter more deeply explores these strategies as well as the 
accompanying tensions.  
 
Inappropriate Action in Appropriate Channels 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, the Al-Hamdu gutter, or simply “the drain,” has been the center 
of community human rights advocacy for many years now. The ditch runs for nearly a mile 
within the community, deteriorating more each rainy season. As the width of the drain increases 
due to erosion, residents of the homes lining the drain cordon off rooms where walls have begun 
to fall into the ditch. Activists have attempted to use protests, government meetings, the media, 
and the threat of the court to address the problem. These methods often break with the 
established and state sanctioned model of claiming rights. Below, I discuss two separate 
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examples of lobbying strategies that push the boundaries of what has typically been considered 
appropriate human rights activism. By exploring these two examples, I show that activists often 
use innovative strategies to claim rights, despite the consequences that may occur.  
 The first example that I will discuss occurred in early 2008, just before I began working 
with activists in Nima and Maamobi. The FYC and several other community organizations had 
recently received funding from the international Rights and Voice Initiative (RAVI)86 and were 
working closely with the LRC. Activists had developed some confidence in approaching 
government officials, but they were yet to establish many personal contacts, and so the process 
of obtaining meetings was often an onerous one. After working for several years to lobby for the 
construction of a new concrete drain to no avail, the FYC decided to circulate a petition in the 
community threatening to sue the government over its inaction on the drain. The petition was 
beginning to gain some traction and attract attention from local political leaders. Although one of 
the community’s Member of Parliament (MP) had been a longtime supporter of the efforts to 
build the drain, he did not approve of threatening to take the government to court. At one point, 
the MP contacted a prominent member of the FYC in an attempt to persuade him to call off the 
petition. As the activists recalled:  
“He told me, ‘look, this is too belligerent. Do not let anyone use you to test the 
Constitution.’ And I thought about that very carefully. What he was suggesting was that 
the LRC was trying to use us for their own motivation. But it was us! It was our idea! We 
had wanted to get a petition from many community members because we could show 
that, look, these people are suffering. We did not want it to be FYC bringing the court 
case, but FYC facilitating the court case for the community.87  
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The activist continued, describing how the youth club also planned to challenge the state through 
other means. He stated:  
“During this time they were also doing the renovation on the Presidential Palace, 
Flagstaff House. We wanted to seek an injunction to stop that construction. We did not 
even think we would win, but we thought we would get a lot of attention. You know, here 
are these young kids calling for a stop to the construction of Flagstaff House. If they have 
money to fix the Presidential Palace, than why not the drain?...He (the MP) obviously did 
not like that.” 
The attempt to juxtapose the construction of the lavish Flagstaff House with the lack of 
construction of the Nima drain held specific symbolic power in Accra in part due to the 
proximity of the two locations. Flagstaff House is less than one mile from the center of Nima and 
Maamobi, and its looming silhouette can be seen on the horizon from many parts of the 
community. In their threats to sue the government and seek an injunction on the construction of 
Flagstaff House, the youth club moved outside of how human rights activism normally occurs in 
Ghana. Although there is a Human Rights Court in Ghana, it primarily deals with protecting 
citizens “against overreaching government agencies,” and rarely deals with issues of fulfillment 
of positive governmental duties (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012, 6). In the past, human rights 
claims related to development or social and economic rights have generally been advocated for 
outside of the courtroom through meetings with government officials or, when that method fails, 
through government approved demonstrations. By threatening to sue, and especially by moving 
outside of the human rights realm and threatening to seek a building injunction, the FYC activists 
were no longer following the “appropriate” method of human rights claims making. This action 
was seen as contentious by local politicians who interpreted the act as a threat.  
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 The second example occurred the same year. During the summer of 2008, the FYC 
planned a large protest to raise awareness about the deteriorating gutter and the government’s 
failure to act. The demonstration quickly became the center point of conflict for the human rights 
campaign. The FYC, supported by the LRC, scheduled the protest to take place on Republic 
Day, a Ghanaian national holiday. The celebration of Republic Day in Ghana marks the 
permanent vacating of the British Colonial Administration, and the day is generally reserved for 
honoring elders and politicians. As it is a holiday to honor political officials, the decision to stage 
a protest in direct criticism of the nation’s president was seen as highly contentious. The leader 
of the youth club stated that this choice was intentional. The group’s hope was to use the 
controversy to gain national attention. The youth club assumed that the government would want 
to prevent the protest and therefore would likely grant a meeting with a high ranking official in 
order to dissuade them from proceeding.88 
After several months of holding community advocacy meetings and writing opinion 
articles in the local newspapers, the group’s strategy began to engender results. The group was 
invited to attend a meeting with the Regional Minister, a man they were told had the power to 
effectively lobby for funds to build the drain. I was invited to accompany the group to this 
meeting along with two other Americans interning with the LRC. The meeting was held on a 
weekday afternoon, in a conference room at the Regional Minister’s office. In attendance were 
16 men dressed in military and police uniforms. When the group’s turn came, we were ushered 
to a row of chairs facing conference tables and curtly told to introduce ourselves. Upon hearing 
that some of us were Americans, the Minister initially accused the youth club of bringing along 
“the press.” It was evident from these first moments of the meeting that it was not called with the 
intention of expressing solidarity or reaching a compromise. As the meeting proceeded, members 
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of the youth club explained how they had brought a petition to the Regional Minister six months 
prior to that day’s meeting. The petition stated that the human and Constitutional rights of the 
community members had been violated. It continued by stating that if the youth club was not 
granted a meeting concerning the building of the drain within one month, the community would 
hold a protest. Over the six months, the group had attempted to meet with the Minister several 
times, and at least once was kept in a waiting room at the Minister’s office for hours and then 
told that there would not be a meeting. As the Minister had, until that day, refused to meet with 
them, plans for the protest had commenced. At this explanation, the Regional Minister became 
visibly angry and the following exchange occurred:  
Minister: “I want to make sure we are all understanding each other – especially the  
                 Americans in the back that you came with. You never came to me where I    
                             refused to meet you. Did you ever try to meet with me?” 
Youth club members (at once): “Yes” “We did!” “You did” 
Minister: “No. You never came and knocked on my door and were told to go away.  
    Why are you planning to protest on Republic Day? You are expected to be                  
     at Independence Square and you choose to do something so contrary.” 
Contemporary Ghanaian governmental officials generally discuss justice, human rights, and the 
rule of law as being closely aligned with national purpose. Although the Minister said nothing 
that broke with this stance, during the meeting he made a point to note that claiming these rights 
through a protest on a national holiday would be unacceptable.  
The meeting continued after the above exchange for several more minutes, but little 
progress was made. The Minister made it known that the protest was not to go forward. He stated 
that he would do what he could to lobby for the drain. A member of the youth club mentioned 
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that the community would likely only be convinced not to protest if they believed that progress 
had actually been made at the meeting. If there was not some proof of progress toward the drain, 
residents would assume that the youth club had been “bought off.” To prevent this rumor from 
starting within the community, the youth club requested a signed document stating that the 
Minister was in support of the drain being built. At this request, the Minister yelled that the 
meeting was finished, and we were immediately dismissed. As we were leaving the room, the 
Police Commander, who had been sitting next to the Regional Minister during the meeting, 
added his own comments. He stated, “They will protest on July 1st over my dead body. He says 
he is going to lobby. If you have any other issues, speak to me directly.”89 
After the meeting, it appeared that the conflict over the protest had stalled negotiations. 
But a meeting the following day between the Police Commander (the man who uttered the harsh 
parting words just the day before) and three members of the youth club revealed a different story. 
In this meeting, which I was also able to attend, the mood was completely different. During this 
meeting, the discourse reflected notions of patriarchal obligation more than the language of 
international human rights. The leader of the youth club began by reiterating that the 
community’s rights had been violated. He proceeded by asking for help to secure a letter from 
the Minister to prove that they had not been “paid to call the protest off.” After making this 
request, the group’s leader stated, “We see you as a father and a leader. You are from the same 
community as we are. We are prepared to write an apology if our conduct was inappropriate.” 
The Police Commander responded that it would be “professionally odd” for him to try to 
convince the Minister to make a written statement. Instead, he suggested another strategy. He 
stated:  
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Let me be the father and you be the boys. We do not want to do anything political. 
Demonstrating cannot solve these problems. We need diplomacy and dialogue. I know he 
(the Minister) is a father, and he will lobby with whatever he has. I cannot pressure him, 
but if some of you would go to his home and apologize for your behavior, I believe he 
would be happier. (pause) But if there is a protest, certainly I will allow my men to 
confront them (protesters), and confront them bitterly.90  
The emphasis on themes such as apology and paternalism used by the youth club 
members signals a switch away from the strategies commonly associated with human rights 
advocacy. By telling the Police Commander that they are from the same community and that 
they see him as a father, the youth club is both making a statement of conciliatory respect and 
also attempting to appeal to the Commander’s sense of community obligation. In this case, 
alluding to a paternal relationship is not simply a passive acceptance of hierarchy, however; it is 
part of the advocacy strategy. 
At the conclusion of the meeting with the Police Commander, the leaders of the youth 
club made the decision to comply with the Commander’s requests and issue a formal apology. 
They also made the decision to cancel the protest, although there was not a consensus within the 
club in regards to this decision.91 Some members argued that the primary purpose of scheduling 
the protest was to get the attention of the government, and they had succeeded. Others felt that 
the protest should go forward, even if it led to violence or causalities among the participants. 
Never during this time did the youth club stop referring to their campaign as a “human rights 
campaign.”  
The strategic decisions made by the youth club throughout the example described above 
were doubly contentious. Politicians opposed the protest because it was planned to occur on a 
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national holiday; a suggestion that they believed was disrespectful to the politicians in office. 
The youth club’s decisions were also opposed by the LRC, who felt that by catering to the 
requests of the Police Commander and apologizing, the youth club was no longer making a 
strong human rights-based claim. In response, during the weeks following the meetings with the 
Regional Minister and the Police Commander, one lawyer even attempted to temporarily shift 
the focus of the campaign away from the drain construction and onto a more clearly defined 
human rights topic: the right to peaceful assembly.92 Although the specific concerns differed, 
what is similar in both cases is that the activists were being criticized for not performing their 
subjectivity “correctly.” From the view of the politicians, good citizens should not protest the 
government on holidays designed to honor them. From the perspective of the LRC, good human 
rights activists must not participate in patriarchal displays of deference.  
In both of these examples described above, the activists engaged in actions (or threatened 
to do so) that push the boundaries of what is normally considered human rights activism in 
Ghana. In one case, they sought to directly challenge the government in court and to gain media 
attention by publically questioning the government’s spending on other issues (the Presidential 
Palace). In the other, they attempted to cater to paternalistic tendencies amongst politicians by 
apologizing for trying to claim their rights in the “wrong” way. In each case, the activists were 
attempting to strategically move through the process of advancing claims, and in doing so, 
challenging the notions of what appropriate civic engagement looks like.  
 
The Need for Innovative Strategies 
There are many reasons for this kind of strategic action among activists. One of the reasons is the 
important interplay that occurs between the political and the legal realms in Ghana. Although 
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there is a firm line drawn in the public discourse between politics and civil society, in reality, 
activists often find their work affected by their relationships with politicians. For example, in 
2008, CBOs in Nima and Maamobi faced several struggles in dealing with the government 
during efforts to advance their claims. One likely reason is that although all of the clubs are 
officially non-partisan, and at this time, their members were also largely non-partisan, Nima and 
Maamobi have long been considered strongholds of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). 
In 2008, the NDC was the opposition party, and it was therefore difficult for community 
members to obtain meetings or funding from the then ruling party, the National Patriotic Party 
(NPP). One day in 2013, I was sitting at an FYC meeting reminiscing with several of the club’s 
members about the meeting described above. One of them attributed the tense atmosphere of the 
first meeting to a decision made by FYC leadership to remain non-partisan. The Regional 
Minister at the time was from the NPP. When the then FYC President had attempted to schedule 
a meeting with him in 2007, he had agreed, but said that the club must be accompanied with one 
of his party’s candidates for the upcoming parliamentary election. The FYC leadership had 
interpreted this as a desire to use the club’s reputation in the community to boost support for the 
NPP, and had declined, telling the Minister’s office that they wished to remain non-partisan. 
After hearing this, the Minister had broken off contact and refused to meet with members of the 
club, until prompted by the threat of protest.  
According to another activist who was central to the planning of the 2008 protest, the 
NPP largely interpreted the demonstration as political, staged more to discredit the party in 
power than to make a claim for human rights. When considered from this angle, the decision to 
apologize was a way for the youth club to speak the language of local party politics, that is, 
patronage, and demonstrate that they were not a political threat to the ruling party. Despite their 
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flexible strategy, however, the youth club was unable to make substantial progress with the NPP 
government officials. Later in 2008, however, the situation began to change. The drain became a 
talking point for then NDC presidential candidate, Dr. John Atta Mills. During the final days of 
the presidential campaign, Mills even held a press conference on the banks of the drain.93 During 
the campaign, the FYC was able to meet with leaders from the four primary parties, including 
Mills himself. During an interview, one of the leaders from the FYC recalled the meeting: “I 
showed him a picture of the drain and he said “ooh, young man. I know this drain.” He 
continued, “He (Mills) said ‘if I win this election, when I am sitting in my office and I turn my 
back, the first thing I see is that gutter. I cannot work like that.94 If I have to sleep in my office so 
that there is money for the drain, I will do it.’ So we thought, well ok. He was heavily favored to 
win at that point, so we made the decision that working with him was the best strategy.”95 
When Mills and the new Members of Parliament took office in 2009, local activists 
noticed a marked improvement in the willingness of the government to work with the 
community. On July 18, 2011, over three years after the controversy over the protest, the 
Ghanaian Parliament passed a supplementary budget, including 6,608,697 GH₵ (about 
$3,486,823 at the time) for the completion of the Nima drains. This action came after many years 
of continued negotiation between local advocacy groups, human rights organizations, and 
government officials. When I asked the leader of one of the local organizations what changes had 
brought on the budget allocation, he explained that he felt that the change had primarily been 
related to changes in the national political scene.96 
In her study of access to justice among women in Botswana, Anne Griffiths (1996) has 
noted that individuals are constrained in their ability to engage with law by “their non-legal 
power networks” (1996, 93). When an individual can pull support from a large social network, 
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they also often increase their access to institutional knowledge and economic capital, two factors 
that Griffiths found to be related to success in legal action. By engaging themselves in both 
human rights and party politics during the course of advocacy, interstitial activists are attempting 
to increase the number of social networks of which they may make claims as well as the variety 
of venues in which they may address disputes. When activists frame their claims as part of a 
patronage exchange, they may be able to gain support from political party members, even if 
those individuals are opposed to the idea of human rights. When these activists frame their work 
as “human rights work,” the group may appeal to a much larger transnational community that is 
interested in promoting social and economic rights. Additionally, community groups can gain 
support from local NGOs that may have access to international funding circles to help support 
human rights legal mobilization.  
 
The Consequences of Innovative Advocacy 
Although in both of the examples discussed above, the activists were making strategic decisions, 
their claims were also controversial to those who benefit from the established system of rights 
claims-making in Ghana. For the government officials involved, the threat of an injunction or a 
large protest on a public holiday posed a threat to the power of the state because activists were 
operating outside of the established dispute channels and therefore more difficult to control. By 
engaging with innovative advocacy strategies, these activists had become “potentially 
disruptive” (Merry 1990, 180).  For lawyers at the NGO, the actions taken by the FYC in the 
second example caused a debate over whether ends can justify means in human rights work. For 
some of the lawyers at the NGO who were invested in upholding a specific human rights-
approach, however, the advocacy decisions employed by the youth club were problematic. For 
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these lawyers, patriarchal requests, such as those made by the Police Commander, and a human 
rights approach were inherently incompatible. For them, the youth club was not only accepting a 
violation of their right to protest; they were also introducing new potential constraints on their 
future advocacy by bending to patriarchal practices more commonly associated with customary 
law.  
The actions taken by the activists during this time were also controversial among the 
activists themselves. Many felt that becoming involved in politics would damage the reputation 
of their organization as well as their ability to speak out against the government. One activist 
noted:  
We need to be on our feet. We need to be very strong in our demands irrespective of the 
party in power. When the government is not actually doing what we want, we can 
actually come out and voice out and make sure we bring that party, that government, into 
order. But when we affiliate ourselves to a particular political party and it happens that 
that party is in power, we wouldn't be able to make much noise as we should have. So 
because of this, I don't think that we need to affiliate ourselves so that we can be flexible 
in our demands and we will not be restricted.97 
Another activist directly acknowledged the patronage system and its impact on the expression of 
discontent and disagreement in the country. She stated:  
Some of us who are neutral think it is good also for us because we can say the truth – you 
can bring out the truth because I don’t belong to you. If you have money, you won’t give 
me. If I say the truth, you won’t give me. If I don’t say, you won’t give me. So I will say 
the truth to save the country.98 
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Other activists felt that by aligning themselves with political parties, they would have greater 
access to decision makers and an increased ability to have their voices heard. Of the activists 
who have chosen to become more involved in party politics, the opportunity for a “bigger 
platform” and “access to big people” were both commonly cited benefits of getting involved. For 
many, both of these benefits directly related to the largest justification cited by activists for 
involving themselves in politics: access to resources.  
McCauley (2012, 5) notes that in Africa, although patronage relationships occur at many 
levels, the resources being distributed generally originate from within the state. Community 
residents access resources through their connections with those in various public offices who 
then provide goods such as schools, roads, and jobs to well-connected patrons and community 
members. The challenges posed to activists by this system of resource flow are easily visible in 
the following example. One day, I was walking through the community with a young man named 
John, who is a member of one of the neighborhood community-based organizations, and we were 
discussing the human rights-based approach endorsed by the LRC. He had previously been 
describing how he had “learned to talk” by working with the LRC and how he now felt 
comfortable speaking with any government official. It was early in the summer of 2013, and the 
community was right in the middle of a series of public events organized to mobilized residents 
around the new urban upgrade project. At the last meeting, there had been some discontent from 
residents who felt that no matter what happened at the meeting, the success of the project 
ultimately rested in the hands of politicians. I asked John about these comments and whether he 
thought it would be effective to walk into a government Minister’s office and tell him that the 
community had a human rights to this development project. He paused for a minute and then 
responded: “I don’t know. I think it would be difficult. If I said that to him, he would just say 
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“yes, and it is everybody’s right, so why should you get this project and not them?”  When we 
discussed this further, the activist explained that everyone knows there is limited money in 
Ghana and that not every project can be funded. Some activists therefore believe that even if you 
have a right, and even if it has been legally upheld, fulfilling this right will always require “a 
favor” from someone powerful. As I began to ask more community activists about this question, 
I learned that this belief was both commonly held and highly contentious. Many agree that 
politicians are more likely to provide access to funding if you are loyal to their party. At the 
same time, however, many activists feel that to engage in this behavior, even if it increases 
access to resources, may diminish the integrity of their work.  
For activists in Nima and Maamobi, the challenge of obtaining resources is ever-present. 
Local groups struggle with obtaining money for programs and mobilization activities, and the 
community as a whole must fight to win coveted places in the national budget for their 
development needs. The degree of difficulty in obtaining resources for infrastructure projects has 
become apparent to residents over the past few years as they have attempted to actually gain the 
funding promised to them in the 2011 supplementary budget to rehabilitate the deteriorating 
drainage ditch that runs for over a mile within their communities. Three years later, after 
multiple charges of corruption with various contractors and difficulties obtaining the money from 
the government in a timely fashion, only a small portion of the drain has been built.  
These continued struggles have prompted more and more local human rights activists to 
begin engaging with political parties to see if they can more effectively push their claims through 
different channels. One activist who is also involved in party politics explained his decision this 
way, “With politics, they have power which FYC lacks. They can control resources. FYC can 
only make noise. It takes policy makers to decide whether or not to listen. And executives might 
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listen more to those in their party than to people in a civil society group.”99 But the question of 
how to best engage in a system that is, in many ways, procedurally opposed to human rights 
based activism, has not been easily answered.  
In Chapter 6, I described the system of patronage in Ghana. This system, which is 
hierarchal by nature, relies on personal relationships. Community residents must often “go 
begging,” taking their needs to a politician or community opinion leader with hopes of gaining 
assistance. Local politics revolve around these exchange relationships, and many individuals 
noted getting involved in politics to have more access to resources that the party could provide. 
In contrast, in Chapter 5, I described the way that participating in human rights activities has 
altered the political beliefs and behaviors of activists. Activists are more likely to view it as their 
right to take problems to politicians directly, rather than seeing this interaction as one which 
needs to be mediated by other community “big men.” They are also significantly more likely to 
view the system of patronage as a problem, and one that is closely related to overall government 
corruption. Whereas the political party system is explicitly hierarchical and often relies on 
patronage relationships to access higher levels, human rights is founded on the concept that 
everyone is equal and is entitled to the same rights. Although some activists view the integration 
of these two systems as necessary, others view it as problematic as it asks activists to balance 
two foundationally different models of advocacy.   
 
Challenging Subjectivity 
Although viewed as controversial among both politicians and other activists, a small group of 
activists have continued to pursue lobbying efforts that break with the established model and 
instead engage with partisan politics and customary rhetoric in addition to human rights. In this 
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chapter, I will refer to this group as “interstitial activists.” The actions of this group are defined 
by “in-betweenness.” Goodall (2007, 22) has previously noted the “betweenness” and ambiguity 
of human rights practices that unfold between the global and the local. The case of Nima and 
Maamobi’s interstitial activists, however, emphasizes the plurality of the local, demonstrating 
that human rights practices may also transpire amidst various local regimes of authority. The 
strategy employed by these activists extends beyond simply switching between a human rights 
approach and a political approach. Rather, the model of political engagement the activists follow 
more closely resembles a unique and coherent form of political subjectivity. When compared to 
individuals solely engaged in human rights activism or in party politics, this group of interstitial 
activists differs on issues such as their beliefs in the power of civil society to advance change, 
their personal feelings about using demonstrations to lobby, and also their participation in 
political clientelism. I will explore each of these categories in detail in the following sections. 
These distinct opinions illustrate that what may have begun as strategic forum shopping between 
existing normative systems of political action has transformed into an emerging form of political 
subjectivity that breaks with many of the accepted frames and categories of human rights. 
 
Civil Society vs. the Political System 
One of the primary differences between human rights activists, political party members, and 
interstitial activists are their beliefs about which system, party politics or civil society, is more 
effective at generating change. Unsurprisingly, the politicians whom I interviewed generally 
believed that working through the political system was the only way to achieve community 
development. Similarly, the non-partisan human rights activists with whom I spoke all believed 
that civil society was the more effective tool for achieving human rights and community 
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development. There were several commonly cited rationales for this belief. One was that civil 
society groups are closer to the community and understand local needs and challenges. As one 
activist stated, “Because they (civil society) are in close touch with the community, they are able 
to address their issues better than a politician who will just impose policies or programs on us. 
We know what we really need.”100 Other activists felt that civil society was a better route 
because civil society groups are able to see projects through and be a continuous presence in the 
community, even after a transition of power. This second belief is also one of the primary 
reasons why these activists argue that civil society groups must remain non-partisan. In their 
minds, their effectiveness depends on it.   
 Within the group of interstitial activists, however, there were more mixed feelings about 
which model was more effective. When I broached the question of which system would more 
effectively produce the changes they were seeking in their community, many began by 
explaining the limitations of both systems. When I pushed a little more, however, all but one 
person stated that civil society was the best method although both were needed to achieve results. 
Interstitial activists cited civil society’s ability to speak freely and openly criticize as well as the 
power that comes from working with a passionate group of likeminded people. For example one 
activist stated, “Civil society can push it farther, hit straight to the point. They don’t have any 
fear or favor – just go straight to demand what is right.”101 Another stated that the problem with 
the political system is that you could only effect change from a high political office. He stated, 
“The member of Parliament, if he is development oriented, then he can champion that cause, but 
you cannot change them if you are just a member of a party. You cannot get that done because 
you have forces that are just interested in their personal gains.”102 The issue of personal gains 
among politicians was a major concern for interstitial activists when considering their interaction 
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with party politics. Whether or not it is true, there it is a commonly held belief (cited by both 
political party members and non-partisan activists in my interviews) that many individuals 
become involved in politics for their own self-interests. These self-interests were, in turn, seen to 
cloud the politician’s objectivity. Interstitial activists struggled with how deeply they could 
involve themselves in political processes without compromising their public image as being 
objective and having the community’s needs as their priorities. I will discuss this issue at greater 
length in the section on beliefs about patronage.  
Although interstitial activists tended to state that civil society would be better suited to 
lead efforts to advance human rights and community development, they also noted the problem 
of resources. “The resources are in the hands of the politicians” one individual noted. “You can 
do all of the talking, but without resources, you cannot move ahead, so you need to engage both 
(politics and civil society).”103 Many members of this group have been active in civil society for 
over a decade now. They were closely involved with large scale lobbying projects, such as the 
drain construction, and many have become somewhat disillusioned with the idea that civil 
society lobbying, absent the assistance of the political system, will ever produce results on its 
own. It is important to note that interstitial activists specifically relate this feeling to human 
rights issues connected to community development projects. Activists often described to me the 
successes they have had in lobbying for improved community-police relations and advocating for 
specific individuals who have had their individual rights violated. It is community development, 
where the most resources are required to achieve fulfillment of the right, where these activists 
see the need for political involvement.  
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The Individual vs. the Collective  
One of the more fundamental issues that interstitial activists must reckon with in their attempt to 
operate between partisan politics and human rights is the difference between how subjectivity is 
presented in their dealings with the larger community. As members of their community 
organization, interstitial activists talk about themselves as members of a collective. But in their 
dealings with politicians, they are seen as individuals. This distinction allows interstitial activists 
to hold the position that even if every member of a community organization is involved with a 
political party, their group can still be non-partisan.  For civil society members, acting as an 
individual brings additional risks. They do not want to be seen as a group of individuals bringing 
a case, but rather as a community standing up for itself. Party politics, however, prioritizes the 
individual. Interstitial activists often made this distinction when describing to me the different 
types of benefits that they received from civil society and party politics. Issah, an interstitial 
activist, described the difference in this way:  
“At FYC we work as a team. So we brand FYC. We don’t brand the individuals. You can 
see that if they see this person, they say FYC. This person, FYC, this person, FYC. So if 
you go and introduce yourself as [Issah], no. It’s [Issah] from FYC. So that is how we do 
the branding. But politically, we brand the individual. Because at the national level, the 
party will brand itself, but here, as a politician, you yourself, you are the product. It’s at a 
different level. The national level will promote the party nationally, but you at the local 
level, you want to represent the people, so you have to be branded. So I will say that 
through the politics, I am known more.”104  
This distinction between the individual and the group also causes conflicts for activists in terms 
of speaking out against the party. Even though they will regularly describe their civil society 
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actions as “representing the community” or as “the voice of the community,” politicians 
generally interpret criticism expressed by groups such as the FYC as coming from individuals. 
This increases pressures for interstitial activists because they are always judged as being 
individually complicit in every action of their civil society groups.  
This tension also manifests itself in the opinions of interstitial activists regarding the use 
of demonstrations as a form of lobbying. When I asked non-partisan activists and interstitial 
activists about when and how demonstrations should be used to lobby, I received very different 
responses. Non-partisan activists generally saw demonstrations as one of the best ways to draw 
attention to a cause. A large demonstration occurred within the communities in the spring of 
2014 regarding the drain, and most non-partisan activists viewed this action as appropriate, even 
long overdue.105 The protest was strongly criticized by the current ruling party, however, and 
several of the demonstrators were arrested for breaking police protocols. Ghana’s Public Order 
Act of 1994 stipulates that the police must be notified of the date, time, and planned route of a 
demonstration at least five days prior to the event. It also gives a police officer the right to 
“disperse crowds at any special event where he has reasonable grounds to believe that a break of 
the peace is likely to occur,” (Section 2). The protest held in the spring of 2014 violated several 
sections of this Act. In contrast to the opinions of non-partisan activists, when I asked interstitial 
activists about the demonstration, nearly everyone stated that the protest was, in theory good, but 
that the procedures were problematic. “It was illegal. There is a law. We operate within the law,” 
said one. “I think it’s very good, only the way that they moved the demonstration was not the 
best,” said another.  
The distinction between legal demonstrations and illegal ones was emphasized by every 
interstitial activist with whom I spoke. These activists cited legality as one of their primary 
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criterion for deciding when to participate in demonstrations. For example, one activist stated, “I 
wouldn’t be part of something that wouldn’t be legal, but every cause that is a legal cause that 
will serve the interests of the people, I will be part of”106  By only participating in legal 
demonstrations, interstitial activists are both protecting their reputations within their parties and 
also following the training methods of the LRC. As I described in the Chapter 5, LRC legal 
education events emphasized the fact that if activists knew the law and operated inside of it, they 
would be protected and free to express their views. Interestingly, however, I only heard legality 
mentioned as a precondition for participating in demonstrations by interstitial activists, not non-
partisan activists.  
 
 Patronage: “The Party Doesn’t Feed Me.”  
The third primary component of the model of civic engagement employed by interstitial activists 
is conditional participation in patronage exchanges. For activists who have become involved in 
party politics, their relationship with political patronage is a complicated one. In a general sense, 
most activists still describe the system as problematic. At the same time, however, activists feel 
pressure to participate in the practice, as it is an expected mode of relations within political 
parties in Ghana. Because of this, they would often attempt to redirect these exchanges and use 
traditional patronage relationships as a way to obtain community goals. For example, two of the 
activists who had actively campaigned for a local Member of Parliament later approached him 
and asked him to reciprocate by addressing community development concerns. As one of the 
men recounted:  
When we were campaigning, I insisted that we didn’t take any money at all from the MP. 
If [the MP] gave us money to campaign, he would feel like he already paid for the 
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service. We wanted him to reciprocate by respecting the social contract that he made 
when he was campaigning. The social contract was what he said he would do if he was 
elected. He said he would provide clean drinking water, he promised to be available to 
the community members, and fixing the drain was top of the list.107  
There are three community organizations that have been very involved with the human rights 
NGO, and I interviewed all of the activists from these organizations who are also openly 
involved in politics (there are about 15). All of them mentioned that they would not accept 
personal material benefits through patronage relationships. Receiving personal benefits from 
politicians was regularly described as being “fed” by government or the party. The term “to 
chop” is commonly used in Ghana both to refer to eating and also to the practice of government 
officials stealing money from state accounts. Anthropologists such as Jennifer Hasty (2005) have 
also previously noted the linguistic connection between eating (or feeding) and corruption in 
Ghana.  
Thus, instead of seeking personal rewards for their political support, interstitial activists 
often try to use their close relationships with politicians to either obtain meetings with higher 
level officials to express their human rights concerns or to obtain collective goods for the 
community, like public toilets or access to drinking water. On occasion, politicians are amenable 
to these communal requests. Other times, however, they attempt to redirect interstitial activists 
into more accepted forms of patronage exchanges. On one occasion, I accompanied two local 
activists to their meeting with a politician for whom they had campaigned. When they began 
reminding the politician of the promises he had made to the community during the campaign, he 
quickly interrupted the activists and began listing some of the items he had purchased for other 
groups that had assisted in his campaign including plastic chairs, wheelbarrows, and t-shirts. He 
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then requested that the activists think of some requests and write them down for him. After the 
meeting, the activists discussed whether they should try to think of some smaller items that could 
benefit the community at large, such as wheelbarrows for clean-up activities or three-wheeled 
vehicles, which could help in moving goods and people around the narrow alleys of the 
community, or whether they should stay strong in their demands. In the end, they decided to 
maintain their original demands, even if this meant that they received nothing. “We must go and 
say to him, ‘forgive us, but we have given our word (to the community),” one stated.108  
This distinction between collective goods and personal benefit serves a dual purpose. 
First, it allows activists to maintain their position that patronage for individual benefit is related 
to corruption while still participating in the accepted practices of party politics. Second, it 
enables them to remain what was often described to me as “free to talk” without fear of 
damaging a patronage relationship on which they have become financially dependent. One 
activist described the importance of the distinction in this way:  
If there is something I want to say, I say it. So I think we are doing the kinds of things, 
we are breaking the old standards and trying to balance things. You know me of course, 
and you know that if I lose NDC (the ruling political party), I am not going to lose 
anything, and so let’s do the right thing, of course. And so at any political gathering or in 
a political discussion, I am very careful to make sure that no one gets the impression that 
I think, you know, even the bad is good, as far as politics is concerned. No. Good is good 
and bad is bad whether politics or no politics. Let that be, and then you are free.109  
But this position, of conditionally participating in patronage, can be very controversial within the 
larger human rights community in Nima and Maamobi. Many non-partisan activists do not feel 
that a person can be actively involved in party politics and activism simultaneously because they 
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will never truly be free to speak out against the party. Within the organizations with which I 
conducted research, this issue remains a divisive one. Although some activists feel that being 
involved in party politics is the only way to achieve the group’s long term goals, others feel that 
associating themselves with parties is simply not worth the risks. The level of tension over the 
disagreement became clear one evening during a meeting of the FYC, one of the organizations 
most involved in the lobbying efforts surrounding the construction of the new drain. The regular 
weekly meeting had ended, and several of the more prominent members of the club (including 
the current president and one of the club’s former presidents) were discussing the challenges in 
terms of advocacy about the drainage project. Suddenly, the new president took a more 
aggressive tone of speech and started talking directly to the past president, a man who has 
recently become more actively involved in local level politics. The following exchange occurred: 
 
(Current President): But politics has eaten into this. Politics has gotten into it and brought  
us to where we are. We have few members who are close with them 
(politicians) that worry that when they make noise, if care is not taken, 
they might be sidelined. But there is politics aside and then there is our 
community. The community should be our number one focus. This is one 
aspect that has caused the downfall of the drain advocacy. So until we 
come to the table to address that, we cannot move forward.... 
 
(Past President): Up till now, I am still contemplating which platform is for me. I want to  
do community work. There are some who commit themselves solely to 
civil society work and do well. Some others do solely politics and it serves 
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them well. Some will combine. But when you are not certain as to how to 
go about it, and if you were in my shoes, you would know that I am not 
certain…. I think I can access some politicians that I could not have access 
to without my connections. Some of the contact that we made, I used my 
political connections. I am still using that for developmental issues. The 
big disadvantage for me is that currently, it might be difficult for me to 
mount a platform and criticize the current government…. 
 
(Current President): I am not saying that that is the only problem, I am just also adding  
that politics have also divided us. This is something that has eaten our 
moral fiber. Even you said that you wouldn’t be able to speak out against 
the government, to the detriment of your community. (Speaking loudly) 
TO THE DETRIMENT OF YOUR COMMUNITY! And at the point that 
your community is suffering!  
 
(Past President): No! No! You have taken me out of context. I said that I may not take the 
  platform, but the real issue of my heart, I am passionate about community  
development. It is just that I am still contemplating which platform best 
serves that purpose.  
 
The exchange continued for nearly 20 minutes. At one point, the current club president said that 
he was also worried about doing anything that could damage the past president’s political ties 
because perhaps if he benefited, the whole club might also benefit. The current president (who is 
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quite a bit younger than the past president) also asked for guidance and help in determining 
strategy:  
(Current President): “If you see me being passionate and mad, it is because this is about  
the community. I believe that you know those big men. If you do, then you 
should give us a hint, tell us what is underground, help us to make those 
connections, or tell us and we can do it underground and your name won’t 
be mentioned and your stone will remain clean to them. One man I want to 
rise against is that MP. That man has taken us for granted. What have they 
done? They have not done anything….If I even call him (the MP), he 
doesn’t pick my call. If I text, he doesn’t respond. My worry is that you 
and the others will say no.  
 
(Past President): If it is about the development of the community, you have the mandate  
to do that. Don’t look at individuals and their relationships. For myself and 
the MP, we have two relationships. We have a personal relationship and 
we have a community relationship. I do not expect anything for the 
betterment of the community to dent that relationship. And if that does 
dent that relationship, (pause) I don’t mind. He doesn’t feed me. He 
doesn’t feed my family. 
By stating, “he doesn’t feed me, he doesn’t feed my family” the past president is again 
emphasizing the fact that he does not receive material benefits from the MP. This strict line 
drawn by local activists guides their relationship with politicians and allows them to better 
balance their work between the two conflicting positions. For the moment, the balancing act 
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appears to allow activists to derive some of the benefits of party politics while maintaining 
enough independence to continue their human rights activism. How long this position can hold, 
however, is another question, especially when they face pressure from both party politicians, 
who see them as somewhat untrustworthy and potentially dangerous, and from nonpartisan 
activists, who may always view their actions as colored by political motivations. 
 
The Future of Interstitial Activism 
In this chapter, I have discussed how, by combining the discourses and practices of multiple 
regimes, such as partisan politics and human rights, activists have developed a new form of 
political subjectivity. These interstitial activists believe strongly in the ideals of civil society as a 
form of advocacy, but also feel that partisan connections are necessary in order to secure 
resources. This group also has a unique form of political engagement which includes supporting 
demonstrations, but only if they are clearly legal, and participating in patronage exchanges, but 
only when politicians reciprocate by providing things for the community as a whole. As many 
scholars have noted in the past, the human rights framework compels individuals to represent 
themselves in particular ways (Merry 1996, 2006a; Cowan et al. 2001; Leve 2007; Speed 2007). 
Partisan politics also operates with certain expectations for the behavior of party members. What 
is unique about the positionality of interstitial activists is that they challenge the notion that there 
is only one correct way to represent oneself as a rights-holder or political party member. Instead, 
they engage in plural advocacy strategies. Sometimes these reflect the strategies encouraged by 
the LRC, but other times they may even directly conflict with the ideals of a human rights-based 
approach.  
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As Arzoo Osanloo (2006, 193) has noted, subjectivities are not static, but are “contingent, 
dynamic, and shifting.” Although it may be beneficial to the state to sanction only one version of 
appropriate civic behavior, activists find that a more fluid and changing subjectivity may help 
them to advance claims and challenge the power dynamics involved in human rights activism. 
Despite their use of fluid strategies, however, my research also demonstrates that there has been 
a certain solidifying of behavior and self-recognition among interstitial activists. This is in part 
due to the perceived need among activists to remain united. For many, a primary motivating 
factor is the understanding that they will only be able to potentially reshape the space of political 
engagement if they increase their numbers. When I asked Yussif about his confidence in the 
future successes of interstitial activists, he stated:  
I feel pessimistic about the future. What is keeping me confused is, otherwise I would 
just go back to what I love, but somebody tells me, someone like [Issah] or [Musa], when 
I talk to them about my lack of confidence in the game of politics, they will tell me ‘if we 
don’t come in and change it, then it will continue, and those people will always be ahead 
of us. So we cannot make a meaningful contribution unless we effect the change that we 
want to see.’ So I am hoping that we can come in en masse and effect that change. That is 
what is keeping me now.110  
When I asked Musa the same question, he stated:  
Because of political reasons and other things, you get people in government who cannot 
solve our problems. So I have always held that belief that government is not the answer. 
But we cannot leave everything out and say that because government is not the answer, 
let us sit back and watch. You have to get involved. At least some good people should get 
involved….Every politician will tell you that they are there to make change and to help 
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people. That is what they will say. But when they get there, things will look different. 
Some of us, since we started in civil society groups, our goal is to make some impact in 
our society. So even if we get a bigger opportunity in politics, we will continue to do 
what we have been doing over the years. But we believe that one person, one making a 
change, will be difficult because of, excuse me to say, how dirty politics is, how many 
influences. So we need more people who have started from the grassroots, you know, to 
get involved in politics, not people who just get involved in politics because of 
opportunity.111  
Among interstitial activists, this feeling was common. Rather than simply joining 
political parties, most of the interstitial activists with whom I met expressed a desire to change 
politics, to infuse it with the values of civil society. As the activists above expresses, they know 
that it might not be possible to accomplish this, even as a group. But they also are confident in 
the fact that if they try to accomplish this change by themselves, they will fail. These activists 
have limited confidence in the current government (an issue that I addressed in chapter 5), but 
also hold an overarching belief in Ghana’s democratic system and a driving sense of civic duty.  
Although layered with uncertainty, the opinions of interstitial activists are evidence of the impact 
that human rights education has had on individuals in Nima and Maamobi. Specifically, their 
position speaks to the conception of the aspirational and multilayered law-abiding state. 
Interstitial activists do not feel that Ghana’s government is perfect. But they often differentiate 
current politicians, whom they occasionally view as corrupt, with the system as a whole, which 
they see as having the potential to transform into the aspirational state. This belief motivates 
activists to become involved in the political system, despite the risks and additional burdens.  
Going forward, it seems that much of this group’s success will rely on whether they are able to 
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remain united in this coherent political philosophy in their attempt to map a new space for civic 
engagement and human rights enforcement in Ghana.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I have examined the impact of human rights participation on individual 
political subjectivity. Specifically, I have explored how participating in human rights activities 
affects the way that individuals conceptualize the responsibilities of the state, the manner and 
frequency with which they contact government officials, and how they speak about topics such 
corruption. Before becoming involved with the LRC, many activists recalled feeling afraid to 
approach the police or individuals in positions of power due to concerns over reprisals. Most 
individuals would attempt to settle disputes within the confines of their community, and when 
they did need to speak with someone in a higher position of power, they would engage in a 
protracted communication channel that relied heavily on patronage relationships.  
With the entrance of the LRC into the community in 1997, however, many of the 
individuals who became involved with the organization began to change the manner in which 
they engaged with the state. The lawyers at the NGO encouraged activists to go directly to the 
government officials who were responsible for different issues that were affecting their claims. 
For example, when community residents mobilized around their claim for a concrete drain to be 
constructed in place of a deteriorating gutter, activists went directly to the Hydrological Services 
Department within the Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing. When recalling these 
early meetings, activists tended to describe these experiences as empowering ones. These direct 
meetings, however, did not happen immediately. First, community activists had to know the law 
well enough to know what was (and what was not) the state’s responsibility to provide. Second, 
they had to know who was in charge of that issue and how to contact that person. Lastly, and 
arguable most important for the questions addressed by this dissertation, they had to believe that 
they had the right and the ability to make a direct claim of that state representative. These altered 
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beliefs result in a collective change in political subjectivity among activists. As such, this 
dissertation contributes to a potential body of scholarship focused on the concept of “culture 
through rights.”   
 In order to feel that they had the right to make claims of the state, community activists 
had to first conceptualize themselves as rights holders. Along with this, they had to believe that 
the state could potentially fulfill the right to which they were making a claim. Taken together, 
these two beliefs represent more than just altered opinions; they constitute a reconceptualization 
of the state itself. As Gupta (1995) argues, individuals come to understand and conceptualize the 
state through their own personal interactions with state bureaucracy and the way that the state is 
depicted in public culture. These interactions help to shape an image of an “imagined state” that 
coexists alongside the actual state. In this dissertation, I argue that human rights education and 
the encounters with state officials that activists have during their mobilization efforts also 
contribute to a new conceptualization of an “aspirational state.” Human rights education 
becomes one of the many faces of the state with which activists engage, and therefore, presents 
an image of a law-abiding and potentially rights-respecting state. When activists have positive 
interactions with the state, such as meeting with an official that they previously did not have the 
confidence to approach, this particular conception of the aspirational state is reinforced.  
The conception of an aspirational rights-respecting state also has implications for the 
manner in which activists speak about issues like corruption. As I have shown in this 
dissertation, individuals who participated in human rights activities were much more likely to 
speak about corruption being a problem within the state. This does not necessarily mean that 
these individuals were more opposed to corruption than their fellow residents, but rather that the 
two groups likely defined corruption slightly differently. As discussed in Chapter 6, the concept 
173 
 
of corruption is social defined, taking on different meanings in different contexts. As such, 
paying attention to how individuals engage in “corruption talk” provides a window into what is 
socially defined as appropriate moral behavior within that group. In my research, I documented 
strong differences in the ways that human rights participants and those who had never 
participated in human rights activities engaged in corruption talk. Activists were much more 
likely to speak of patronage as corruption and they were also more likely to describe political 
leaders as corrupt when they were violating the larger foundational concepts of human rights. In 
this way, human rights talk and corruption talk go hand in hand.  
Lastly, I discussed how the plural legal regime in Ghana affects the way that activists 
strategically navigate the human rights system. Many critiques of human rights have argued that 
human rights campaigns may bolster the power of an oppressive state by containing resistance 
within “appropriate” government channels. In Chapter 7, however, I ask the question of what 
happens when activists attempt to challenge the boundaries of these channels by integrating 
discourses that pull from other normative systems such as customary obligation or party politics. 
Activists assemble these interstitial strategies in an effort to increase the number of social 
networks of which they may make claims. These strategies, however, are not always well-
received. Both politicians and human rights workers see the mobilization efforts of these 
interstitial activists as potential threats, and often attempt to persuade activists to behave 
differently. Similarly, even some of their fellow community activists question whether deviating 
from a strictly human rights-based approach will have negative outcomes for their campaigns 
and their organizations.  
In many ways, the ethnographic examples contained in this dissertation support the claims of 
scholars such as Speed (2007) who argue that the use of human rights processes may channel 
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resistance to the state with the unintended result of increasing state power rather than challenging it. 
In Ghana, by encouraging a direct lobbying strategy, the LRC’s human rights approach does direct 
resistance into more easily controlled state channels. Rather than engaging with competing authority 
figures like chiefs or taking their protests to the streets (strategies that are more difficult for the state 
to control), activists proceed through meetings with state officials. This process helps to reinforce the 
fact that the state is the primary authority figure through which problems should be solved.112 
However, as I illustrate in Chapter 7, even when activists lobby through “acceptable” state channels, 
they do not always behave in acceptable ways. Activists continue to strategically mobilize, 
employing various claims-making discourses and drawing on multiple social networks to strengthen 
their claims.  
I also argue that the specific political positioning of activists in Nima and Maamobi creates a 
situation in which their activities may challenge local power dynamics and act as a politicizing force. 
As residents of unplanned communities, many activists have long been denied access to meaningful 
state interaction. Colonial histories of population management created ideologies that categorized 
individuals as either acceptable or unacceptable citizens in part by their place within the national 
plan. Residents of unplanned communities such as Nima and Maamobi, however, are often 
precariously positioned within these maps and plans. These residents find themselves simultaneously 
included and excluded from the governmental processes that regulate their lives (Snell-Rood 2013). 
Because of this, political inclusion itself represents a form of repositioning within the political 
landscape. Through their direct connections with government officials and their staff, activists are 
individually challenging local power dynamics that regulate who is able, and who is unable, to 
participate politically. This is one reason why so many activists describe their interactions with the 
state as empowering ones.  
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Part of this potentially empowering process may also be attributed to the fact that although 
the activists in Nima and Maamobi have engaged in human rights thinking, supported by a strong 
“legal backbone,” most of their campaigns have avoided the courtroom. In these cases, they have not 
been bound by the strict processes and categories of human rights law, aspects of legal advocacy that 
often decontextualize and depoliticize human rights struggles (Wilson 1997; 2007). Instead, they 
have been able to integrate a certain fluidity of language and subjectivity that has allowed individuals 
to continue to navigate both legal and political structures. The emphasis on “human rights as 
process” rather than “human rights as law” has impacted the political subjectivity of residents while 
still remaining flexible enough to weather the times where the use of specific human rights language 
has fallen out of favor. By employing human rights-based procedures of claims-making, activists 
have increased their direct interaction with government officials as well as their confidence in doing 
so. These factors become the foundation of further human rights campaigns and political 
engagement.  
 
Ghanaian Exceptionalism  
The fact that human rights education and mobilization have been able to have such impact in Nima 
and Maamobi is also related to Ghana’s unique positioning in the world. As one of the first African 
nations to gain its independence from colonialism, Ghana has long carried the distinction of being a 
model of African democracy. Today, the country is heralded around the world for its stability, 
prosperity, and democratic character. Democratization scholars regularly note that Ghana has 
reached a level of democratic consolidation that stands out from other democracies on the continent 
(Crawford 2005; Gyimah-Boadi 2001). In their 2015 report, “Freedom in the World,” Freedom 
House rated Ghana as “free,” giving the country a rating of 1, the highest possible, in terms of 
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political rights and a 2 in the category of civil liberties.113 And as many Ghanaian’s mentioned to me 
during my fieldwork, Barak Obama even called Ghana “a model for democracy.”  Despite these 
current trends, Ghana does not have many of the historical and structural features that normally 
accompany a successful democracy (Osei 2015). The country has a history of military coups, high 
levels of ethnic diversity, low GDP, and high unemployment. Scholars such as Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) and Lipset (1959) have argued for the strong relationship between economic 
development and sustained democratic success. And, although recent studies have questioned the 
certainty of the claim (Fish and Brooks 2004), the assumption that ethnic diversity poses a serious 
challenge to democratic consolidation has been taken as a forgone conclusion among political 
scientists for some time (Horowitz 1993; Welsh 1993; Lijphart 1977; Dahl 1971).  
In my conversations with Ghanaians about politics, they seem well aware of the fact that their 
country is, in some ways, challenging democratic theory. I often was told that Ghana was not like 
other countries that have witnessed political violence such as Nigeria or Kenya. Individuals 
mentioned how Ghanaians were peaceful, hospitable, and law-abiding whereas citizens of other 
African countries were not. For example, when I asked one local Assembly Member to describe 
what, to him, it means to be Ghanaian, he responded:  
I’ve traveled a lot, and in some countries it is not easy you understand. As I know, you and 
Fatah will eat together in one bowl. In some countries this will not happen. But in Ghana, at 
the moment that I meet you, you are my sister. You know we take you as family. So when I 
do something, you know in our political history, you can be NPP, I can be NDC, this once 
can be CPP, but we are all one mother one father, the same family. So after we shout on the 
platform, we will come back, eat together, enjoy together, we are mates.114 
177 
 
Another local resident also drew on the concept of “eating together” to describe the peaceful nature 
of Ghanaians:  
In Ghana, always they learn how to forgive, they learn how to forget. But in many countries, 
for example in Nigeria, they do not know how to forgive and forget. I can intentionally now 
step on his legs (gestures to my research assistant’s legs), I can intentionally, but he will say 
‘oh no, it is not intentionally.’ In Nigeria, I did not intention to step on his leg, but they will 
say I intentioned to. So in Ghana, in fact, compared to other countries, that is why we have 
peace. You know, in this case (the Supreme Court case challenging the presidential election), 
at the moment they got up from courtroom, you see them, you will be surprised. They will 
eat together, they will laugh, you see there, you see now!115 
It was particularly common to hear residents make comparisons between Ghana and the countries of 
Nigeria and Kenya. The comparisons made between Nigerians and Ghanaians are common, and I 
heard many during each of my trips to the country. When an act of violence occurred in Ghana, there 
would often be a news story or community gossip either linking the attack to a Nigerian or lamenting 
the fact that Nigerians had brought a “culture of violence” with them when they immigrated to 
Ghana. This attitude was reinforced by the influx of Nigerian movies into Ghana, which often 
portray acts of violence. As I was watching one such movie with the wife of my research assistant, 
she commented: “you see, this is how these Nigerians live their lives. If they want to lynch and 
armed robber, they use a tire and pour gasoline on him and light him on fire. Seriously! If you watch 
them on YouTube, you will cry. That’s why I don’t like that country. No mercy and no law.”116 
 Comparing Ghana to Kenya, however, appears to be a more recent trend. These comparisons 
often focused on the violence that had occurred in Kenya after the country’s 2007 elections. The 
Kenyan election took place on December 27, 2007, and the two most prominent candidates were 
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Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. Three days after the election, Kibaki was declared the winner, 
despite Odinga’s own claims of victory. The contestation triggered mass violence in the country, and 
after one month of fighting, nearly 800 people had been killed (Human Rights Watch 2011), 
thousands had been injured, and hundreds of thousands had been displaced (Klopp and Kamungi 
2007). When Ghana, in 2013, was itself going through a contested election, Ghanaians regularly 
pointed out how their country had handled the situation differently than Kenya. As one resident 
noted, “Ghanaians fight in the court. In Kenya… (makes punching motion).”117 A few days before 
the Ghanaian Supreme Court was to issue its verdict for the election petition, the United States State 
Department made local news by issuing an emergency travel message to all Americans living and 
traveling in Ghana warning of possible political violence. The warning was taken as an affront by 
many Ghanaians with whom I spoke, who insisted that “Ghana was a peaceful country” and that it 
was “not like Kenya.” On August 29, 2013, these individuals were proven correct, as the Supreme 
Court issued its verdict without any signs of demonstrations or violence.  
 As a whole, these experiences contributed to a feeling of “Ghanaian Exceptionalism” among 
residents, a sense that their county was different from others in Africa. This feeling also surfaced in 
the results of my community survey. When I asked individuals the open-ended question “What does 
it mean it be Ghanaian – what is unique about the Ghanaian identity?” the most commonly cited 
theme was peace, followed by answers referencing law, rights, or justice. Table 6 depicts the results 
of this question:  
Table 6: What does it mean to be Ghanaian? (number of individuals mentioning each of 
the most commonly referenced characteristics)  
  Participants Percentage Non-Participants Percentage 
Peace 28 56.00% 24 48.00% 
law / rights /justice 20 40.00% 10 20.00% 
Hospitality /friendliness 11 22.00% 7 14.00% 
Tribe / Cultural Traditions 7 14.00% 1 2.00% 
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The results of this question clearly demonstrate the impact of human rights participation on 
conceptions of national character, with human rights participants citing the concepts of law, rights, 
and justice as distinguishing factors among Ghanaians twice as often as non-participants. Although 
individuals who had previously participated in human rights activities were much more likely to 
frame their answers through the language of law, rights, or justice than individuals who had never 
taken part in such activities, both groups referenced the notion of Ghana as a peaceful county at high 
rates.  
This larger foundational conception of Ghana as a peaceful country that stands out from its 
continental peers in the way that it handles conflict likely contributed to an environment in which it 
was possible to imagine a law-abiding state that was potentially rights respecting. Even if human 
rights participants failed to find examples of states that were behaving in this way among the 
surrounding nations, they already believed that Ghana was different. In Ghana, things were possible 
that were impossible in other places. And because of this belief in their Ghanaian exceptionalism, 
human rights activists in Nima and Maamobi were primed for accepting that their state could, one 
day, behave in a way other than how it was behaving today.  
 
Moving Forward 
One afternoon, as I was nearing the end of my fieldwork, I was standing on the balcony of one of 
the few “story buildings” in Maamobi, overlooking part of the gutter with Yussif.118 Over the 
years, Yussif had provided me with invaluable insight into the history of social activism within 
the communities as well as information about the political tensions that have accompanied these 
campaigns. He was also on the frontlines of working with various individuals on the drain 
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campaign. During the prior months, there had been great optimism regarding the drain. After 
claims of corruption with a prior contractor, a new contractor was hired, and work had 
commenced on the construction of a second portion of the drain. The gutter had been cleared, 
widened (initially making the problem worse), and a concrete base had been poured for the new 
drain. But then, construction had abruptly stopped. Piles of supplies lay in stacks on a small 
piece of land between the gutter and Kanda Highway, one of Accra’s main roads that also serves 
as Nima and Maamobi’s Eastern border.  
Looking at the portion of the drain where construction had begun, I asked Yussif, “Has 
there been any progress on the drain?”  
“No,” Yussif replied. Then his face lit up, “But I have some news. I don’t know whether 
it is good or bad. The contractor has been arrested!” 
“What?! For what?” I replied.  
Yussif explained, “He is a criminal. You know he had all of these guys working for him, 
and he never paid them. So I am happy he was arrested. Some people think he took the money 
for the drain and just used it for himself.” This is the same allegation that was made against a 
previous contractor, whom the government had then promptly removed from the project. I asked 
if there would be a search for a new contractor, but Yussif replied, “In this country things are 
sometimes funny - I wouldn’t be surprised if he is back out there in a few days.”  
Yussif was quiet for a minute or two. Then he pointed down to some of the houses lining 
the drain, several with exterior walls now crumbling into the deteriorating ditch. He said, “You 
know, several years back when we were going around collecting data on the drain, some of these 
old men who live down here by the drain said that there was an evil spirit living in the drain. 
They said that the spirit doesn’t want the drain to be fixed because he has made it that way as his 
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home. At the time I didn’t believe them,” Yussif chuckled. “But now…. now I think maybe they 
were right.” 
The skepticism expressed by Yussif in his retelling of this story parallels the doubt that 
many activists expressed to me during my fieldwork about the future. As I discussed at the end 
of Chapter 7, although activists hope that their actions will engender results, they are not certain 
of this future. This skepticism also alludes to an underlying uncertainty that some activists have 
about whether their conception of the aspirational state will ever become the realized state. As I 
discussed in Chapter 6, when the imagined state is just that, imagined¸ much depends on whether 
activists believe that the state could feasibly become a rights-respecting entity. Activists make 
claims of corruption and continue to bring their concerns to governmental officials based on their 
expectation that the state is a law-abiding and potentially rights-respecting entity. Their 
experiences do not always conform to this vision, and yet there is a belief that the overarching 
architecture of the state is sound. If the state fails to make progress toward that goal, however, 
activists may lose their belief in the potentiality of their vision of the imagined state. 
The question going forward will be whether activists maintain their human rights-bearing 
subjectivities or whether they choose to shed this subjectivity in favor of some other 
conceptualization of self. As scholars such as Merry (2003b) and Osanloo (2006) have noted, the 
likelihood that individuals will maintain particular subjectivities is, in part, due to the reception 
that that their subjectivity receives. For example, if activists continue to represent themselves as 
rights-holders without making progress on their initial claims, it is possible that they may 
abandon efforts to represent themselves and their claims in the language of human rights. 
Although I argue in this dissertation that the change in subjectivity among local activists has 
been durable and long-lasting despite the fluctuations in specific use of human rights language, 
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subjectivities remain dynamic and changing. The subjectivities of human rights activists are in 
large part dependent on their own conception of the aspirational state, and therefore, their place 
as moral citizens within this imagined political community. If their notion of the state transforms, 
this change will likely be accompanied by a change in individual political subjectivity.  
In some ways, this is already visible among the group of activists whom I have labeled 
“interstitial activists.” When faced with a political environment in which they struggled to 
successfully use human rights language to obtain resources for community development projects, 
activists shifted their language and, many would argue, their political subjectivity in order to 
appeal to a greater number of social networks. The question of whether these actions actually 
represented a change in political subjectivity was contentious among the activists themselves. 
Although many interstitial activists argued that their “in-betweenness” was only strategy, others 
felt that their decisions resulted in a potentially more fundamental repositioning. For some, this 
new interstitial subjectivity was problematic, as it challenged many local beliefs about the 
dangers of integrating civil society and politics. Others, however, felt that there was potential for 
greater social change, that this might, in fact, be one path for the imagined state to become 
realized.  
In Nima and Maamobi, social histories of colonial and postcolonial exclusion are mixed with 
strongly held conceptions of Ghana as a peaceful and exceptional country.  It is this combination of 
social and historical factors that has created a situation in which human rights processes have been 
able to offer residents an opportunity to increase their political engagement. Participating in human 
rights campaigns and education activities has contributed to changes in the political subjectivities of 
activists who express feeling increased confidence in their ability to lobby for community concerns at 
governmental offices as well as a new sense of entitlement with which to do so. It has also produced 
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a context in which activists can envision the imagined rights-respecting state as a possibility. For 
residents living in slum communities, this cognitive relocation signifies more than a modification of 
the procedures of claims making; it represents a change in self-identification among activists from 
excluded to included citizens. 
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Postscript 
 
On Saturday, April 9th, 2016, just two weeks before my dissertation defense was scheduled, I 
received a message via WhatsApp from my former research assistant. The message read “helping 
to build a better community, the construction site of the Al-Hamdu Drainage” and was 
accompanied by 13 pictures of construction workers in orange suits and community activists 
posing in front of an active construction site. After nearly a decade of sustained community 
activism, the construction on the main portion of the drain had finally commenced. In November 
of 2015, President John Mahama had re-awarded the contract for the drain construction. 
According to a speech given by Mahama, this decision was in part motivated by recent tragedies 
experienced in the area due to flooding. The most notable among these occurred in early June of 
2015. Over the course of several days, central Accra was engulfed in flood waters. The flood 
overtook a gas station, where gasoline seeped into the water and caught fire, triggering an 
explosion. At least 150 people died in the incident. Due to its central location, the waters in the 
Al-Hamdu drain rise quickly in the rainy season, and residents told many stories of people, 
livestock, cars, even parts of homes being pulled into the rushing waters. The construction of the 
covered concrete storm drain will likely offer residents significant protection from these kinds of 
incidents. 
 The construction project marks a very hard-fought success for several of the community 
organizations, most notably the FYC. At the moment, activists in Nima and Maamobi are very 
excited. It is successes like these that scholars like Merry (2003b) and Osanloo (2006) point to as 
events that can help to bolster emerging subjectivities such as the ones growing among human 
rights activists in Nima and Maamobi. The construction of the drain is evidence that their 
lobbying approach has worked and that their government is, at least for the moment, living up to 
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the expectations held by many human rights activists. Events like these are also great reminders 
that subjectivity is not static, but is ever changing and related to events occurring around 
individuals.  
 It is interesting to note, however, that the announcement of the re-awarded contract came 
as a part of a nationwide tour held by President Mahama called the “Changing Lives, 
Transforming Ghana Tour.” Over the course of two months, the President traveled to each of 
Ghana’s ten regions, pledging government funds for the construction of schools, roads, public 
toilets, and drains. At each stop along the tour, President Mahama was greeted by throngs of 
NDC party members. Therefore, although the construction of the Al-Hamdu drain is being 
viewed as a success for human rights activists in Nima and Maamobi, it is also perhaps the 
strongest evidence yet of the need for interstitial activism. It is unclear whether this construction 
project will contribute to a spread of rights-bearing subjectivities in Nima and Maamobi. But at 
least for now, for some activists, it feels as if the aspirational state is one step closer to becoming 
a realized one.  
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Appendix A 
Human Rights and National Identity Survey 
                          Survey Number_____________ 
 Date___________________ 
                           Place___________________ 
Gender_________________ 
 
1. What is the name of the neighborhood where live?  
 
 
2. Were you born in this neighborhood/community? (If no, where?) 
 
 
3. How long have you lived in this neighborhood/community? 
 
 
 
4. Do you think you will still be living here in 5 years? (If no, why not?) 
 
 
 
 
5. How old are you? 
 
 
6. Which Ghanaian language is your home language? (That is, the language of your group of 
origin?) 
 
 
7. What language do you speak most often? 
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Ghana Politics 
8. Do you feel close to any particular political party?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
 
9. If yes, which party is that? __________________________ 
 
 
10. Did you vote in the last national election? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Wanted to vote, but could not (why?) 
 
11. Do you plan on voting in the next national election? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
12. How interested would you say you are in public affairs, you know, in politics and government?  
a. Very interested 
b. Somewhat interested 
c. Not very interested 
d. Not at all interested  
e. Don’t know 
 
 
13. In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing this country that government should 
address?  
 
 
 
14. How likely do you think it is that government will be able to solve this problem within the next five 
years? 
a. Very likely 
b. Somewhat likely  
c. Not very likely 
d. Not at all likely 
e. Don’t know 
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15. Let’s discuss economic conditions. In general how would you describe:  
a. The present economic conditions of the country? 
i. Very good.  ii. Fairly good iii. Neither good nor bad       iv. Fairly bad           v. Very bad   
                                     vi.   Don’t know 
 
b. Your own present living conditions 
i. Very good.  ii. Fairly good iii. Neither good nor bad       iv. Fairly bad           v. Very bad   
                                     vi.   Don’t know 
 
 
16. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some 
important problem or to give them your views?   
                               Never     Once       Few times Often Don’t know 
a. An assembly man or woman  ____  ____        ____ ____     _____ 
b. Member of Parliament   ____  ____        ____ ____     _____ 
c. A political party official   ____  ____        ____ ____     _____ 
d. A chief or other traditional leader ____  ____        ____ ____     _____ 
e. A religious leader   ____  ____        ____ ____     _____ 
 
 
17. Of the following people, who is most responsible for caring for the community? 
i. The President 
ii. Your local MP  
iii. Local chiefs 
iv. Local religious leaders 
v. The international community 
 
18. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: It makes me proud 
to be called a Ghanaian.  
i. Strongly disagree 
ii. Disagree 
iii. Neither agree nor disagree 
iv. Agree 
v. Strongly Agree 
vi. Don’t know 
 
19. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? ____________________________ 
 
20. What do you think it means to be Ghanaian? 
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21. Let’s say that you had to choose between being a Ghanaian and a _______. Which of the 
following statements best express your feelings? 
i. I feel only Ghanaian 
ii. I feel more Ghanaian than _________ 
iii. I feel equally Ghanaian and ________ 
I feel more ___________ than Ghanaian 
iv. I feel only ____________ 
v. Not applicable 
vi. Don’t know 
 
 
22. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Once in office, elected leaders are 
obliged to help their home community or ethnic group first.  
i. (If agree), would you say you strongly agree or just agree.  
ii. (If disagree), would you say that you strongly disagree or only just disagree 
iii. Neither agree nor disagree 
iv. Don’t know 
 
 
23. If someone asked you to describe your identity, which one of these is the most important?  
a. Religion 
b. Occupation 
c. Nationality 
d. Gender 
g. Political Party 
h. Tribe / Ethnic Group 
 
 
24. Some people say that many crimes are never reported to the police. Based on your experience, 
what do you think is the main reason that many people do not report crimes like thefts or 
attacks to the police when they occur?  
 
 
25. If you were a victim of crime in this country, who, if anyone, would you go to first for assistance?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. If you want to gain a public service in the community, such as improved education or health 
care, what would you do?  
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27. Do you think that human rights could help you achieve your goal?  
 
 
 
28. (If yes) How could human rights help? 
 
 
29. Of the following people, who is most responsible for fulfilling human rights? 
i. The President  
ii. Your local MP  
iii. Businesses or corporations 
iv. Local chiefs 
v. Local religious leaders 
 
30. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Participating in human rights education 
or advocacy in an important part of being Ghanaian.  
a. Strongly agree    b. agree  c. neither d. disagree e. strongly disagree
 d. don’t know 
 
31. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Participating in customary law is an 
important part of being a Ghanaian.  
a. Very important    b. Somewhat important        c. neither       d. Not very important    e. not at all   
                                                                                                                                                           important.  
 
32. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Human rights and the rule of law help 
maintain peace and stability in Ghana.  
a. Strongly agree    b. agree  c. neither d. disagree e. strongly disagree
 d. don’t know 
 
33. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Chieftaincy and customary law helps 
maintain peace and stability in Ghana.  
a. Strongly agree    b. agree  c. neither d. disagree e. strongly disagree
 d. don’t know 
 
34. How likely are you to take a dispute to the police? 
a. Very likely     b. Somewhat likely    c Neutral       d. Not very likely        e. Not at all likely 
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35. How likely are you to take a dispute to a chief? 
a. Very likely     b. Somewhat likely    c Neutral       d. Not very likely        e. Not at all likely 
 
 
36. How likely are you to take a dispute to a religious leader? 
a. Very likely     b. Somewhat likely    c Neutral       d. Not very likely        e. Not at all likely 
 
 
37. Have you ever heard of the Legal Resources Centre? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
 
38. If so, how many programs have you attended?  
a. None 
b. One 
c. A few 
d. Many 
 
 
39. How likely are you to take a dispute to a human rights office like the Legal Resources Centre? 
a. Very likely     b. Somewhat likely    c Neutral       d. Not very likely        e. Not at all likely 
 
40. Have you heard that Nima and Maamobi are human rights cities? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
41. Do you think that the fact that this community is a human rights city has made a difference? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
42. When you hear the term “human rights,” what do you think of? 
 
 
 
43. When did you first learn about human rights? 
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44. Does human rights assists democracy or does human rights hinder democracy? 
 
 
 
45. What do you think you need to do to be a good citizen? 
 
 
 
46. What are the biggest challenges in Nima and Maamobi? 
 
 
 
47. What should be done to address those challenges?  
 
 
 
48. Whose responsibility is it to address those challenges? 
 
 
 
 
49. Do you think the challenge will be addressed?  
 
 
 
50. What is the role of the chiefs in Nima and Maamobi? 
 
 
 
 
51. Do you think Chiefs should be allowed to participate in party politics? 
 
 
 
 
52. Do you think that chieftaincy assists democracy or do you think that chieftaincy hinders 
democracy? 
 
 
 
 
53. Do you trust the court?  
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54. Have you been watching the Supreme Court case? 
 
 
 
55. Do you think the case is good for Ghana or bad for Ghana? 
 
 
 
 
56. Are you a member of any of the following groups:   
b. Federation of Youth Clubs      
c. Muslim Family Counseling Services     
d. Red Cross Mothers’ club of Nima and Maamobi 
e. Gender Action Unit 
 
57. What is your religion? 
 
 
58. Do you attend a church/mosque regularly?  
 
 
 
59.   Do you have a job that pays cash income? (If yes – is it full-time or part-time) (If no – are you 
presently looking for a job?) 
 
 
 
60. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?  
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
194 
 
Notes 
 
1 Personal interview, Maamobi, July 17, 2008. 
2 For more on this discussion, please see chapter 2.  
3 For example, customary law is linked to the political system of Chieftaincy. This system 
tends to be very hierarchical. Human rights law is linked to both the national government and 
the international community. It generally does not require the claimant to perform the same 
patriarchal gestures of respect as does the customary system (although, as I discuss in 
Chapter 7, this may not always be the case). By choosing one system over the other, the 
claimant is also making a decision about how they will represent themselves and to which 
political system they will give support.  
4  Although the court has thus far only heard cases involving African countries, it is currently 
investigating situations in five non-African countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, 
and the Ukraine, as well as in Palestine.   
5 Out of the 100 community interviews, I interviewed 40 women and 60 men.  
6 The true permeation of human rights teaching became apparent to me one day while I was 
visiting a friend in a small village in the Central Region. After hearing about my research, 
one of the village’s residents told me that I should return on Friday because the school would 
be holding a human rights debate. I did return and was able to witness a debate between two 
groups of high school students about whether caning in schools was a human rights violation.  
7 Some sources (Owusu, Agyei-Mensah, and Lund 2008) state that Alhaji Amadu Futa was 
Fulani rather than Hausa, although the majority of sources indicate that he was “a Hausa 
cattle dealer.”  
8 A “stool” is the symbol of chieftaincy in southern Ghana. Akan chiefs sit on stools rather 
than thrones. In northern Ghana, the “skin” in the symbol of chieftaincy.  
9 Personal interview, Nima, July 17, 2008. 
10 John Dramani Mahama is the current President of Ghana.  
11 This is in comparison to 17.6% across the entire country (CIA World Factbook 2014).  
12 The Bronx is home to one of the largest Ghanaian immigrant communities in the United 
States, so large in fact that in 2012, the Ashanti (the largest ethnic group in Ghana) appointed 
a diaspora chief for the borough (Semple 2012). 
13  Personal interview, Accra, March 9, 2014. 
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14 My research assistant spoke Twi, Hausa, Fanti, Busanga, and French. On one occasion 
when a community resident whom I wanted to interview only spoke Ewe, I enlisted the help 
of one of the human rights activists who lived nearby to act as translator.  
15 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013.  
16 For examples see: Grindal 1973; Harvey and Brand 1974; Brydon 1999; Owusu, Agyei-
Mensah, and Lund 2008; Kang et al. 2010; Perelman and Young 2011; Agyei-Mensah and 
Owusu 2012; Abdul Aziz 2012. 
17 Personal interview, Accra, March 23, 2014. 
18 For recent examples, see Okoampa-Ahoofe, Kwame “Is this Another Peace Council 
Gimmickry?” The Daily Graphic. February 13, 2013. Bokor, Michael J.K. “Is the NPP 
Really Asante, and Asante truly NPP?” GhanaWeb. December 23, 2012.  
19 See, for example, the case of Republic v. Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice; Ex parte Richard Anane.  
20 When asked in the 2013 Afrobarometer survey, “How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The Police?” 28.1% of 
respondents answered “not at all,” 29.5% answered “just a little,” 23.7% answered 
“somewhat,” and 18.1% answered “a lot.”  
21 This might be because although Nima and Maamobi are still perceived as “stranger” or 
settler communities, many of the residents who live there now were actually born in the 
communities, and therefore have biological kin groups already in place 
22 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 31, 2014. 
23 The term, “419” refers to the number of the Nigerian criminal code dealing with fraud. 
This term has become common across West Africa, in part due to the perception that it is 
Nigerians who started, and propagated, this form of internet fraud.  
24 Personal interview, Nima, August 25, 2013. 
25 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 23, 2014. 
26 Personal interview, Nima, October 11, 2013. 
27 Airport Residential is a wealthy neighborhood that borders Maamobi.  
28 There are four primary community-based organizations that the LRC has partnered with 
over the years.  
29 All personal names are pseudonyms, with the exception of Raymond Atuguba and Mahama 
Ayariga, who are public figures. 
30 According to one lawyer at the LRC, as many as 60 small youth clubs came together under 
the umbrella of FYC. 
196 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Personal interview, Nima, July 15, 2013. 
32 For more on the work of these “interstitial elite,” see (Buerger and Holzer 2015).  
33 See http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-103317/ for more information.  
34 Personal interview, Nima, July 17, 2008. 
35 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013.  
36 The assumption made here by Issah and Abdul was that the police would have attempted to 
prevent them from presenting their petition had they been notified before the FYC arrived at 
the Supreme Court.  
37 Personal interview, Nima, July 14, 2013.  
38 In Ghana, communities are “categorized” by the state as slums in part due to their lack of 
official “layout” or planning scheme. With the exception of slums, all urban areas in Ghana 
have official planning schemes. These plans are created by the Ghana Town and Country 
Planning Department and are used in orchestrating other development projects, such as 
drainage construction. These official plans therefore serve a very important bureaucratic 
purpose. Residents regularly noted to me that this lack of layout was one of the biggest 
challenges going forward for the community.  
39 Personal interview, Maamobi, September 13, 2013.  
40 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013. 
41 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013. 
42 Personal interview, Nima, July 15, 2013. 
43 Personal interview, Maamobi, October 20, 2013 
44 An “opinion leader” is a local term used to describe a respected person in the community. 
The term is not unlike the term “big man.” A chief may be included into the category of 
“opinion leader,” but the term also refers to individuals who have earned the respect of the 
community in other ways. The status of opinion leaders is often achieved through their 
demonstrated success as problem solvers. 
45 Personal interview, Maamobi, August 7, 2013.  
46 Personal interview, Nima, October 20, 2013. 
47 Similarly, Janine Ubink (2007) has noted that the implementation of structural adjustment 
policies in Ghana “created an increased space for the involvement of traditional authorities in 
law enforcement, dispute resolution, service provision, and the implementation of 
development projects” (2007, 126).  
48 Personal observation, March, 2014. 
49 Personal interview, Accra, July 3, 2013. 
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50 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013.  
51 A “trotro” is a van used as a form of public transportation in Ghana.  
52  Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013 
53 The Afrobarometer is an independent multinational survey that seeks to better understand 
the political, social, and economic climate across the African continent. The survey is 
currently used in 35 different countries, and it is administered on a cyclical basis (generally 
ever 3-4 years). Survey questions are worded in a way that seeks “to offer comparability 
across the continent and across the globe but also to make sense to local respondents in each 
country under study” (Zuern 2009:586). Although the data is designed to enable cross-
country comparisons, for this project I am only looking at data from Ghana. Afrobarometer 
surveys have been administered in Ghana five times, starting in 1999. The data used for this 
report is taken from the most recent round, which was completed in Ghana in 2012. This 
survey was administered to 2,248 individuals across the country. According to the 
Afrobarometer website, the survey’s sampling method is “designed to generate a sample that 
is a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country.  The goal is to 
give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of being selected for an interview.” 
54 Personal observation, Maamobi, October 18, 2013. 
55 For a more detailed description of this incident, please see Buerger and Holzer (2015).  
56 See Chapter 4 for a more thorough description of “training of trainers.” 
57 Personal interview, Nima, March 28, 2014.  
58 Personal interview, Maamobi, September 13, 2013.  
59 In 2012, Mahama won 50.7% of the vote, with Akufo-Addo winning 47.7%. In 2008, no 
candidate received over 50% of the votes, so a run-off was held between the two top 
finishers, John Atta Mills and Nana Akufo-Addo. Mills won the run-off by less than 1%. 
Mills later died in office and was superseded by John Mahama.  
60 A “pink sheet” documents the voting results from a single voting station. In the lawsuit, the 
NPP alleged that the numbers on the pink sheets did not match the vote counts used in 
higher-level aggregation.  
61 Personal interview, Nima, June 11, 2013. 
62 Personal interview, Maamobi, September 20, 2013. 
63 Personal interview, Maamobi, September 13, 2013. 
64 Personal observation, Accra, June 17, 2013.  
65 Personal interview, Nima, September 9, 2013. 
66 Personal interview, Maamobi, June 27, 2013.  
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67 For an example of this collaboration, see Perelman and Young (2010) 
68 Personal interview, Nima, July 8, 2013.  
69 Personal observation, Maamobi, March, 2014. 
70 The questions were taken from the Afrobarometer Round 5 Ghana Survey. The 
Afrobarometer is an independent multinational survey that seeks to better understand the 
political, social, and economic climate across the African continent. The survey is currently 
used in 35 different countries, and it is administered on a cyclical basis (generally ever 3-4 
years). Survey questions are worded in a way that seeks “to offer comparability across the 
continent and across the globe but also to make sense to local respondents in each country 
under study” (Zuern 2009,586). 
71 32 percent of human rights participants cited problems related to the government.  
72 Issues related to the government were mentioned by three individuals who had never 
participated in human rights and corruption was not mentioned at all.  
73 Personal interview, Nima, August 25, 2013.  
74 Personal interview, Accra, March 30, 2014. 
75 Personal interview, Accra, August 31, 2013. 
76 Personal interview, Accra, July 2, 2013. 
77 Personal Interview, Accra, March 8, 2014. 
78 Personal interview, Accra, March 15, 2014. 
79 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 14, 2014.  
80 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 30, 2014.  
81 Personal interview, Nima, March 18, 2014 
82  Personal interview, Maamobi, March 22, 2014. 
83 Personal interview, Nima, March 12, 2014.   
84 Personal interview, Nima, March 11, 2014. 
85 Personal interview, Accra, September 4, 2013.  
86 See Chapter 4 for a description of RAVI 
87 Personal interview, Maamobi, October 4, 2013.  
88 Personal interview, Accra, June 12, 2008. 
89 Personal observation, Accra, June 24, 2008. 
90 Personal observation, Accra, June 25, 2008. 
91 Today, some members of the youth club argue that the club never had any intention of 
following through with the protest, but was simply using the ‘threat of protest’ to motivate 
action.  
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92 Personal interview, Accra, August 4, 2008. 
93 Personal interview, Accra, July 26, 2011. 
94 Flagstaff House, the office of the President, is located very near Nima and Maamobi.  
95 Personal interview, Maamobi, October 4, 2013. 
96 In 2009, John Atta Mills was elected President of Ghana. This marked a change in ruling 
political party from the National Patriotic Party (NPP) to the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC).  
97 Personal interview, Accra, March 23, 2014 
98 Personal interview, Accra, October 21, 2013 
99 Personal interview, Accra, March 30, 2014 
100 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 19, 2014. 
101 Personal interview, Nima, April 1, 2014. 
102 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 31, 2014. 
103 Personal interview, Nima, March 28, 2014. 
104 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 7, 2014. 
105 This demonstration was put on by a group of youth not associated with any of the 
organizations with which I studied. It did not use human rights language at the time, although 
the group has since joined forces with the FYC to work through more formal channels. 
106 Personal interview, March 31, 2014. 
107 Personal interview, August 31, 2014.  
108 Personal observation, Maamobi, July 2, 2013. 
109 Personal interview, October 13, 2013.  
110 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 31, 2014. 
111 Personal interview, Maamobi, March 8, 2014.  
112 Although it is clear that legally, the state already holds this primary position, within the 
populace, depending on the region, the state must still compete with other authorities, most 
notably, chiefs, in their control over the population.  
113 Report available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf 
114 Personal interview, Maamobi, June 27, 2013.  
115 Personal interview, Nima, July 19, 2013.  
116 Personal observation, Maamobi, October 15, 2013.  
117 Personal observation, Maamobi, October 20, 2015.  
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118 A “story building” is a building with multiple floors, literally a building that is multiple 
stories high.  
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